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Abstract
In 1849, Kierkegaard praised Hamann’s dedication to written and spoken
language as derived from the Divine Logos. This thesis examines Hamann and
Kierkegaard in order to understand both thinkers’ impact upon verbal and written
communication. Hamann’s dedication to the idea of communication as given graciously
and solely by God is apparent in his authorship. Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication is ultimately one of Christian existence. Given the fact that Kierkegaard
owed much to Hamann and was perhaps even led back to faith in God through his
exhaustive reading of the German linguist, this thesis examines the possibility of a
Hamannian impact upon Kierkegaard’s conception of communication. The research
question throughout this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s
theory of indirect communication?
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Chapter One: Introduction and Presentation of the Problem
Throughout his authorship, the Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard
(1813-1855) developed a method of indirect communication which became an essential aspect of
his thought. Indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s thought is recognizable by the use of
pseudonyms, the employment of concepts such as irony and humor, and ultimately deals
specifically with Christian existence. It is well known that a great deal of Kierkegaard’s thought
concerning indirect communication derives from his admiration of Socrates. However, one
influence on Kierkegaard’s thought has traditionally been less acknowledged: that of Johann
Georg Hamann (1730-1788). This researcher asserts that Kierkegaard was extremely influenced
by the thought of Hamann, and that this influence reaches into the area of indirect
communication. The research question surrounding this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence
on Kierkegaard’s theory of communication?
Through the voice of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard once
wrote of Hamann: “With all his life and soul, to the last drop of blood, he is concentrated in a
single word, the passionate protest of a highly gifted genius against a system of existence”
(Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 224). What Kierkegaard means is that
Hamann, above all else, is concerned with the Logos, the Creator (German 49), the divine Word.
In addition, Kierkegaard also recognizes just how starkly Hamann’s views contrast those of the
Enlightenment and the systematic philosophies of his Rationalist contemporaries. There is a
sense in which the above quotation could be applied to Kierkegaard’s life and authorship as well,
in all its enigmatic passion and charisma. For throughout the entirety of his writings,
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Kierkegaard is not only concerned with the problem of how the single individual may become a
true Christian through faith, but also with how the individual stands in relation to the inscrutable,
divine God and the Word Incarnate.
This researcher’s main objective is to investigate Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s
theory of indirect communication. In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” Ronald Gregor
Smith writes that between Kierkegaard and Hamann there “was an extraordinary connection”
(Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 52). Although it has been said that only Socrates impressed
Kierkegaard unqualifiedly as a thinker (Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel 345), it has
also been noted Hamann may have been the only author who profoundly influenced
Kierkegaard’s thought (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1 164). However, some scholars have chosen
not to recognize this connection, while others believe that Kierkegaard’s interest in Hamann was
merely a passing phase. Therefore, this researcher examines the thought of both Hamann and
Kierkegaard in order to explore the evidence behind these claims. While many scholars agree
that Hamann provided inspiration for Kierkegaard’s thought, debate nevertheless remains over to
what extent the former affected the latter. Therefore, the research question surrounding this
thesis: What is Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication?
Throughout this project, this researcher will show how Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication relates to his authorship, to the concept of religious communication, and finally
to Christian existence. Kierkegaard began dealing with the concept of communication early in
his career; in fact, the subject arises over and over throughout his entire authorship. (For the
purposes of this study, the researcher has chosen four major works which deal heavily with
Kierkegaard’s concept of indirect communication: Philosophical Fragments, Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View on My Work as an
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Author, as well as numerous entries in Kierkegaard’s journals.) As early as 1847 he had mapped
out a model of communication in his journals which is significant to his published writings. He
writes, “When I think of communicating, I think of four parts 1) the object, 2) the communicator,
3) the receiver, 4) the communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1 306). Here he
deals with what would eventually become a basic model for communication studies. Yet
Kierkegaard has not been thoroughly examined by communication scholars. While Kierkegaard
has traditionally not been understood from the standpoint of the communication discipline, this
researcher believes such an understanding is indeed necessary. Perhaps many communication
scholars simply have not researched Kierkegaard enough to realize his importance to
communication, or have simply chosen to not accept his theory as valid for the discipline.
Whatever the reason, Kierkegaard lacks any effectual presence in the field of communication
(Herrmann 71), and his expansive model of indirect communication continues to remain obscure
to the field. However, “While at present Kierkegaard does not attract the attention of
communication scholars either with reference to the purpose of his writing or his views on
Christian existence, his contributions to an understanding of communication are undoubtedly
relevant to…communication theory” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 128). Perhaps
there will always be a need for research relating to Kierkegaard, no matter how extensive the
research may be in the field in the future, for “it follows that another 150 years from now, the
need for fortified, accelerated, and expanded Kierkegaard research may be monstrous” (Lønning
178). Therefore, it is imperative to show how Kierkegaard’s understanding of communication
relates to the realm of Christian communication and Christian existence.
Now, Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, according to Kierkegaard scholar
Walter Lowrie, has to do with his notion of inwardness, subjectivity, and existence (Lowrie 630).
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The model can be broken down into two relational aspects, both of which it is imperative here to
at least introduce. First, the concept of indirect communication relates to Kierkegaard’s
authorship itself. In The Point of View on My Work as an Author (1848), Kierkegaard stresses
the central theme of his writings: to show what it means to become a Christian. He writes:
The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I truly am as an author, that I am a
religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the
problem ‘of becoming a Christian,’ with a direct or indirect polemic against the
monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours
all are Christians of a sort (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 6).
Kierkegaard saw that Christendom in his own day had become mere objective adherence, that is,
it was regarded as simply a regurgitation of facts with no substance or personal examination
behind them. What was needed instead was faith.
Indirect communication is readily observable in the authorship by Kierkegaard’s more
than occasional use of pseudonyms. By the aid of pseudonymity, he developed an “aesthetic
disguise” (14) through which he presented esthetic, ethical, and Christian categories. This often
confusing aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought has led critics such as Louis Mackay to say that “there
can be no such ‘point of view’ for Kierkegaard’s writing, only points of view” (Evans,
Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments 4). However, this
charge is refuted by the fact that Kierkegaard makes a clear distinction from his own viewpoint
and those presented by the medium of indirect communication (via the pseudonyms) in an
appended section to Concluding Unscientific Postscript (hereafter CUP) entitled “A First and
Last Declaration.” In formally acknowledging himself as the author of all the pseudonymous
literature (a fact already known throughout Denmark), Kierkegaard also states his purpose in
using pseudonyms. “My pseudonymity or polynymity has not had a casual ground in my
person…but it has an essential ground in the character of the production…” (Kierkegaard,
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Concluding Unscientific Postscript 551). He continues, saying, “What is written therefore is in
fact mine, but only in so far as I put into the mouth of the poetically actual individuality whom I
produced, his life-view expressed in audible lines” (551). Kierkegaard is referring in the latter
statement to the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, but we can safely assume that he also
is referring to his other pseudonyms as well. He takes responsibility for the content, but makes
his aim clear, mainly, that the pseudonyms often present “life-views” consistent with those in
which many men and women exist. The pseudonyms, functioning as indirect communication,
are actually leading towards what it means to become a Christian, i.e. they both present esthetic
and ethical snapshots to show how Christianity stands in marked contrast to the categories in
which people typically find themselves living. Hamann wrote exclusively under pseudonyms as
well, and his pseudonymous activity always serves a purpose, albeit a somewhat different
purpose than found in Kierkegaard’s writings.
Certainly a key inspiration for Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms is found in the Socratic
method of indirectness. From Socrates he learned the “maieutic method (the method of
midwifery) to bring to birth thoughts which the learner already obscurely possessed” (Lowrie
630). According to C. Stephen Evans, “Socrates practiced indirect communication through his
use of the ‘maieutic method,’ rather like the method of a midwife who does not give birth herself
but assists another to do so” (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 10). To Kierkegaard, the
maieutic method necessarily involves the category of reflection in order to be successful. In his
communication model Kierkegaard says, “When in reflection upon the communication the
receiver is reflected upon, then we have ethical communication. The maieutic. The
communicator disappears, as it were, makes himself serve only to help the other to become”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 307). This Kierkegaard labels “the communication of
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capability” (307). One must notice how in the maieutic method the communication is reflected
upon as well as the receiver. The communicator himself “disappears” so that the communication
can be reflected upon more clearly. In Kierkegaard’s use of the maieutic method in his unsigned
works, “the author is absent from his work, so that the reader may be free to determine the
meaning of the work” (Shakespeare 170). Kierkegaard’s style of standing at a distance from the
pseudonyms, as we will uncover later in detail, means that Kierkegaard, as the object of
communication, disappears. The reader is then left as the receiver to be faced with truth and
make an ethical choice of whether or not to accept it.
The second function of indirect communication examined herein deals not only with the
receiver’s relation to God, but God’s relation to the individual through divine revelation. To
Kierkegaard, God reveals himself to mankind indirectly through the person of Christ. It was not
directly recognizable that Christ was God; rather it is to be believed. Christ, as we shall
examine, is Himself the essence of indirect communication. The condescension, the way He
lived His life and His speech to mankind all constitute indirectness.
But where does Hamann fit into all this? Again we return to our research question: What
is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication? In order to begin
to answer this question, this researcher will set the foundation in the beginning of chapter four of
this thesis by examining the thought of Hamann as it relates to his own times. Only then will one
be able to understand the ideas he was combating and also the reason his writings were so
intriguing to Kierkegaard.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
There are five main areas through which this researcher reviews the literature examined
for this project: research concerning Kierkegaard, research relating to Hamann, research
concerning indirect communication, research relating to Kierkegaard and Hamann, and lastly,
research concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard in the area of indirect communication.
Research Concerning Kierkegaard
Based on the literature reviewed for this project, it appears that research about
Kierkegaard in the English language has increased so significantly in recent years that to
describe even half of it at length would prove to be a seemingly endless process. Instead, this
researcher seeks to incorporate into this chapter a review of some of the major secondary sources
used in this thesis which are related to Kierkegaard. Since J. Heywood Thomas pointed out that
much of the literature surrounding Kierkegaard in the English language tends to be “of
introductory nature” (Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings, i), Kierkegaard research
has expanded greatly and is now in abundance. However, this does not mean that there exists no
room for new research. Given the fact that Kierkegaard’s own body of literature is vast and
often taken out of context, it appears that there will always be a need, as Per Lønning suggests,
for new research in the field of Kierkegaard studies (178).
Walter Lowrie (1938), David Swenson (1941) and Hermann Diem (1966) all offer what
are arguably still the most definitive introductions to the thought of Kierkegaard available today.

8

Joakim Garff (2005) offers the most complete biography of Kierkegaard, and placed along side
each other, all of these act as excellent introductions to Kierkegaard’s life and thought.
Throughout this thesis, the works of C. Stephen Evans are relied upon heavily, especially
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (1999) and Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (2006).
In the former, Evans investigates the works behind the Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author
Johannes Climacus, while in the latter he presents major Kierkegaardian themes within the
proper scope of Christianity.
Niels Thulstrup’s book Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel (1980) displayed the
predominant view among scholars as to Kierkegaard’s understanding of and opposition to the
German philosopher. Recently however, new scholarship has challenged this traditional view.
Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered (2007) offers a definitive
reassessment of Kierkegaard’s treatment of Hegel.
Additional Kierkegaard research emerging recently offers a variety of concentrations.
Jacob Howland further investigates the influence of Socrates in Kierkegaard and Socrates: A
Study in Philosophy and Faith (2006). Jon Stewart edits the multi-volume work Kierkegaard
and His German Contemporaries (2007, 2008), which investigates the importance of German
thought for Kierkegaard. The works are broken up into three tomes consisting of German
philosophical, theological, and literary influences (Stewart ed., Kierkegaard and His German
Contemporaries Vol. 6 x). Central to the study is the contention that “apart from his
contemporary Danish sources, the German sources were probably the most important in the
development of his thought generally” (ix). Ronald M. Green’s article “Kant: A Debt both
Obscure and Enormous” located Tome I is of importance to this thesis. Green shows both how
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Kierkegaard with agrees with Kant on a few issues, while vehemently disagreeing with him on
others. Stewart’s own article in Tome I entitled “Hegel: Kierkegaard’s Reading and Use of
Hegel’s Primary Texts” continues his argument put forth in Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel
Reconsidered.
Craig Hinkson’s article Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up! Kierkegaard’s
View of Luther versus Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition (2002) published in the
International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 21 explores the profound connection between
Luther and Kierkegaard. Steven Shakespeare’s Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God
(2001) heads toward the direction of establishing a Kierkegaardian theory of language.
Shakespeare contends that Kierkegaard’s use of language is central to his model of indirect
communication. Mark C. Taylor (2000), in his work Journeys to Selfhood, discusses the
importance of Hegel to Kierkegaard, and the latter’s scathing critique of Hegelianism. Alastair
Hannay’s Kierkegaard and Philosophy (2003) is composed of several essays focusing on a
variety of subjects including the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the importance of Lessing to
Kierkegaard, paradox, despair, and humor. Sean Turchin (2006), in his master’s thesis,
examines Kierkegaard as the chief influence upon the theologian Karl Barth’s Epistle to the
Romans.
Research concerning Hamann
Translations of Hamann’s writings and research about him are difficult to obtain in
English. In fact, “The task of putting the whole of Hamann into English is virtually impossible”
(Smith, J.G. Hamann 13). For this reason, Ronald Gregor Smith writes that Hamann “will
always remain enigmatic, and illuminating in snatches, like lightening flashing across a rich and
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mysterious landscape” (13). Perhaps one reason that Hamann has not been completely
researched is that he is an extremely difficult writer to translate (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language
in the Thought of Hamann 8). Furthermore, as Terrence German points out, “No one will ever
be able to systematize totally the thought of Hamann” (viii). Walter Lowrie, the Kierkegaard
scholar, describes his readings of Hamann: “I was prepared to delve, but had not expected to find
the digging so hard” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 167). It remains then, that no
matter how much we learn from Hamann, and we can actually learn a great deal, he will always
remain somewhat of a mystery, an enigmatic figure who with keen awareness and insight, wrote
critically of his own times as a “preacher in the wilderness.”1
Research on Hamann appears to be relegated to religious and philosophical studies. In
the English language, writers such as James O’Flaherty (1952, 1979) and Stephen N. Dunning
(1979) successfully examined Hamann’s language theory, showing its focus on elements of
communication. However, after meticulous research, it appears that Hamann has not been
studied specifically by communication scholars. Terrence German’s book Hamann on Language
and Religion (1981) explores the importance of Hamann’s views concerning language and
communication, and the author deals in depth with the significance of Hamann’s understanding
in regards to the communicative acts of writing and speaking. German, as many other scholars
both before and after him, heavily relies on a few key works in order to complete his task. These
include: the Roth-Wiener edition of Hamann’s writings (1924), Joseph Nadler’s edition of
Hamann’s works (1949-57), and the Ziesemer-Henkel edition of Hamann’s letters (1955-75),
none of which have been completely translated into English.
At this point it is necessary to mention that two more prominent anthologies in the
English language are available and used throughout this study. Ronald Gregor Smith (1960) has
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translated sections of Hamann’s major works in his J.G. Hamann, while more recently Kenneth
Haynes (2007), in his book Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language, offers a slightly
more comprehensive translation. Haynes, however, is concerned more with Hamann’s writings
in the areas of language and philosophy, while Smith offers more diverse material by including
both excerpts from Hamann’s Biblical Reflections and a sampling of his letters. Gwen Griffith
Dickson (1995) is also responsible for translating a number of Hamann’s works into English.
Crucial to this study are the writings of the Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty. In his
book Johann Georg Hamann, O’Flaherty gives a detailed biographical account of Hamann’s life
and examines his thought through the major works. O’Flaherty deals in depth with Hamann’s
understanding of Socratic existence, his views on human reason, and shows how Hamann’s
concern for language “provides the center around which his thought revolves” (O’Flaherty,
Johann Georg Hamann 112). Of interest to O’Flaherty is also how language is a “reflection of
the Logos” (112) to Hamann. O’Flaherty also focuses on Hamann’s understanding of Christ as
the Paradox.
In his book Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Hamann, O’Flaherty
scrupulously details Hamann’s language theory and examines the concept of unity in Hamann’s
thought. He points out that “thought and language are inseparable for Hamann” (47) and gives
the necessary backdrop for understanding Hamann in relation to the thoughts of his
contemporaries. That is, he deals with Hamann’s language theory as a communicative tool used
to combat the tenets of the Enlightenment. While, O’Flaherty does not openly deal with indirect
communication in this text, he does present an insightful and thought-provoking assessment of
Hamann’s views concerning communication via his language theory. O’Flaherty also focuses on
how symbols play a major role in Hamann’s language theory.
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In his text, German specifically tends to focus on Hamann’s style of creativity and his
understanding of communication as stemming from God as the Creator. German eventually
comes to the conclusion that Hamann’s is so concerned with the idea of communication that “His
life is a communication” (175).
Frederick Beiser, in his book The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to
Fichte (1987), gives a detailed background of Hamann and shows how influential he was in
countering the tenets of the Enlightenment. Beiser acknowledges that Hamann influenced
Kierkegaard, but he does elaborate in detail on this issue. To Beiser, what is striking about
Hamann’s thought is its modernity and “foreshadowing of contemporary events” (17). He also
outlines what he views as four points of contention between Hamann and his contemporaries.
Other works about or concerning Hamann available in English includes Isaiah Berlin’s
work entitled The Magus of the North: J. G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Rationalism
(1965); Walter Leibrecht’s God and Man in the Thought of Hamann (1966); Walter Lowrie’s
“Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist” (1950); W.M. Alexander’s Johann Georg Hamann:
Philosophy and Faith (1966); Jonathan Sheehan’s The Enlightenment Bible: Translation,
Scholarship Culture (2005); and Denis Thouard’s article about Hamann and Socrates entitled
“Hamann and the History of Philosophy,”, to be found in The History of Scholarship (2007).
Research Concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard
In his article on Kierkegaard’s view of Luther, Craig Hinkson (2002) writes that
Kierkegaard “received a thorough initiation to Luther’s world of thought while yet a student by
his intensive reading” of Hamann (Hinkson, Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up!
Kierkegaard’s View of Luther versus the Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition 71). Hinkson
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expounds on Hamann’s critique of the Enlightenment, and compares Hamann’s crusade against
it to that which Kierkegaard battled in his own times.
In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” published in the journal Kierkegaardiana
(1964), Ronald Gregor Smith points out the “extraordinary connection” between Hamann and
Kierkegaard (52). Smith examines the link between Kierkegaard in the area of humor and
mentions that Hamann influenced Kierkegaard “in his very existence” (52). In the end, however,
Smith contends that Kierkegaard ended an irrationalist, and moved away from Hamann later in
his career as an author. However, this researcher contests this view. The way Smith understands
it, there exists a major break between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of faith, because
Kierkegaard took faith to extremes. This researcher challenges Smith’s understanding of
Kierkegaard in chapter four of this thesis. Nevertheless, Smith makes note of the fact that the
relationship between Kierkegaard and Hamann goes deeper than simply their shared
understanding of indirectness through the use of pseudonyms (63).
Research Concerning Indirect Communication
Harry Broudy (1961) in his article “Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication,” published
in The Journal of Philosophy, examined Kierkegaard’s view of indirect communication via
subjective thought. Broudy dealt with the five apparent problems of communicating
subjectively, and attempted to answer them in detail. However, Broudy failed to realize the
importance of communication to Kierkegaard’s view of Christian existence, for he asserts that
Kierkegaard is “neither clear nor convincing” as to why “the subjective thinker has to
communicate at all” (228). Furthermore, he insists that the subjective thinker is interested in his
own existence and his own thinking alone (226). Broudy apparently ignores the fact that to
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Kierkegaard, true subjectivity requires of the individual a relationship in “fear and trembling”
before an almighty God.
According to Andrew Herrmann, early attempts by communication scholars to integrate
the thought of Kierkegaard into the communication field focused on rhetoric (72). Such
researchers as Anderson (1963), Scott (1967), and Stewart (1972) all made attempts introduce
minor aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought into communication studies via rhetorical studies
(Herrmann 72). Matthew T. Althouse (2004) also explains Kierkegaard from the standpoint of
rhetoric in his article entitled “Moving Kierkegaard toward Critical Rhetoric” in The Review of
Communication. Herrmann interestingly notes that only two researchers, Schrag (2003) and
Peters (1999) have attempted to recently establish a Kierkegaardian theory of communication
(73). However, he writes that “Kierkegaard is conspicuously absent from most recent
communication literature” (73). This thesis differs from that of Schrag and Peters in that this
researcher is not attempting to establish a new theory, for Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication stands on its own. Rather, this researcher investigates the importance of indirect
communication upon Kierkegaard’s authorship and examines that indirectness in the light of
Hamann’s influence.
Nerina Jansen, a professor of communication theory, has also presented Kierkegaard’s
views on communication (1990, 1997). In the article “Service in Deception of the Truth:
Magister Kierkegaard and the Problem of Communication,” located in the International
Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 12, Jansen explains that Kierkegaard thinks of communication as
a mode of existence (115). Jansen also attempts to relate Kierkegaard’s views on
communication to contemporary issues in communication theory.
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In “The Individual versus the Public: A Key to Kierkegaard’s Views of the Daily Press,”
in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 13, Jansen again deals with Kierkegaard from
the standpoint of communication, setting the historical stage to present Kierkegaard’s view of the
media in the light of his battles with the press.
Herrmann’s article entitled “Kierkegaard and Dialogue: The Communication of
Capability,” in the journal Communication Theory (2008), examines the basics of Kierkegaard’s
model of indirect communication. Herrmann’s study, while referring to Socrates, does not make
mention of Hamann. While Herrmann at least touches on some of the elements of indirect
communication, he fails to take notice of the relationship of indirect communication to
Christianity, without which the proper framework for interpretation of Kierkegaard’s model is
lost.
J. Kellenberger’s article entitled “Kierkegaard, Indirect Communication, and Religious
Truth,” located in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (1984), deals with the
concept of indirect communication and its relation to the religious thinker. Kellenberger
discusses the differences between direct and indirect communication and between objective and
subjective truth. Kellenberger notes the importance of indirect communication for religious
understanding and offers personal examples of indirect communication throughout the article.
A proper approach to Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication is seen in C. Stephen
Evans work entitled Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (1999). Evans defines indirect
communication, deals with the subject at length, and presents it in light of Kierkegaard’s
pseudonymous literature, and imperative concepts such as subjectivity, humor, faith, and
Christian existence.
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Author Jørgen Bukdahl (1961), in his work Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man,
illuminates Kierkegaard’s communicative relationship with the common man in his native land
of Denmark. Central to Bukdahl’s study is Kierkegaard’s love of interpersonal communication,
and how Kierkegaard witnessed the transformation of a society “based on a rigid, hierarchical,
but “face-to-face” absolute monarchy” into “a modern mass society based on anonymous forces
of the marketplace and popular sovereignty” (xi). Naturally, Bukdahl also examines
Kierkegaard’s own indirect method and contrasts it to his fondness for direct and interpersonal
communication with the common man.
In addition, Thomas C. Oden’s Parables of Kierkegaard (1978) not only anthologizes
many of Kierkegaard’s most well-known parables, but also gives a necessary understanding for
parables as part of Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication. According to Oden,
indirect communication is Kierkegaard’s main method for communicating in a meaningful
manner (ix). Kierkegaard’s use of parabolic communication serves his aim as an author for five
important reasons, which are discussed in chapter four of this thesis (x).
George Pattison examines indirect communication in the thought of Kierkegaard in two
engaging articles, both published in the journal Kierkegaardiana. The first, entitled “‘Who’ is
the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard’s Religious Literature” (1993), studies the
communicative aspects of Kierkegaard’s Discourses, comparing and contrasting them to the
indirect, pseudonymous works. Pattison’s later work “The Theory and Practice of Language and
Communication in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses” (1998), discusses the importance of
language in both Kierkegaard’s direct discourses and his pseudonymous literature. Pattison’s
point is that the language of the Discourse serves the purpose of Christian communication (93-4).
To Pattison, metaphorical language is essential to the indirectness of faith (94).
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Research Concerning Hamann, Kierkegaard, and Indirect Communication
Of particular importance here is Craig Hinkson’s insight concerning indirect
communication in his work “Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Maieutic Art” (2001). Hinkson
writes that in Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia (1759), the author practices indirect
communication “with consummate skill” (4). If Kierkegaard indeed learned the method of
indirect communication from Hamann—and Hinkson thinks this is likely—it was through
reading Socratic Memorabilia (4). This concept is elaborated on in by this researcher in chapter
four of this thesis. Hinkson also points to a relationship between Hamann and Kierkegaard in the
indirectness of revelation (6), and makes a strong, luminous claim for a remarkable relationship
between the two thinkers. Albert Anderson’s article “Hamann,” located in Bibliotheca
Kierkegaardiana Vol. 10 (1982), principally examines Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard in the
area of humor. Anderson inspects both the writings of Hamann and Kierkegaard, and declares
the connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of humor to be one of immanent
importance. By examining Kierkegaard’s relation to Hamann in the area of humor, it becomes
clear that not only did Kierkegaard hold Hamann in high regard because of his humorous bent,
but also that Hamann “recognizes clearly that humor cannot in principle be expressed in direct
forms of language” (Anderson 134). The concept of humor as it relates to Hamann and
Kierkegaard is dealt with in chapter four of this thesis.
J. Heywood Thomas also links Hamann with Kierkegaard in his article “Christianity as
Absurd,” published in Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 2 (1978). Thomas writes that
Kierkegaard owed much to Hamann, including the recovery of his Christian faith as a young
man, for it was Hamann who “taught him that faith was not an operation of reason,” a subject
dealt with in the first part of chapter four of this thesis. Thomas also notes this same significance
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of Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s thought in general in his book Subjectivity and Paradox
(1957).
James O’Flaherty, in his book Johann Georg Hamann, links Kierkegaard and Hamann in
two places. First, he notes that in his Socratic Memorabilia Hamann used a form of indirect
communication, and that indirect communication was later to be developed and made famous by
Kierkegaard (88). Secondly, near the close of his work, O’Flaherty mentions the difficulties in
reading and deciphering the works of Hamann, and writes that comparatively, Kierkegaard’s use
of indirect communication is “crystal clarity itself” (167).
Recently, in the article “Hamann: Sharing Style and Thesis,” found in Kierkegaard and
his German Contemporaries, Sergia Karen Hay (2008) investigated Kierkegaard’s relationship
to Hamann based on the former’s use of the latter in both in the published works and in the
journals. Hay gives a background to Hamann’s life and works before delving into Kierkegaard’s
references to Hamann. Hay writes, “Kierkegaard clearly noticed Hamann’s emphasis on style
which is particularly remarkable for its use of pseudonyms, metaphor, and references to obscure
works in foreign languages” (106), and briefly mentions that Kierkegaard adapted some of
Hamann’s communicative devises as his own. Hay also states that the relationship between
Hamann and Kierkegaard is worth more investigation (108).
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Chapter Three: Historical-Critical Methodology
The path for conducting an historical-critical analysis is outlined by Raymond K. Tucker
in his book Research in Speech Communication. Tucker points to basic four-point model for
successfully conducting performing such a study.
1) Discover and Structure the Research Problem
This was the first step this researcher sought to develop in this project. This study came
into being after analyzing Kierkegaard’s theory of communication for well over year. During
that time, this researcher sought to understand many of Kierkegaard’s concepts on a personal and
academic level. Investigating Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard’s theory of communication first
of all narrows the approach. Secondly, it allows this researcher to make the claim of originality
in the field of communication. The importance of discovering and structuring the research
problem is common to any research method (Tucker 76). However, “Historical-critical research
begins when you question some idea, event, development, or experience of the past” (72).
2) Choose the historical or critical approach to be used
Step two is vital, because it affects not only this research, but the conclusions as well.
Here there are three methods which may be used: descriptive, experimental, or historical. For
the purposes of this study, this researcher does not merely offer a descriptive look, but hopes to
shed light onto the issue as well. A critical approach is necessary to assess Kierkegaard’s
indirect communication and Hamann’s view of language. All the while this researcher realizes
that this choice of the historical or critical “will likely be combined” in the final analysis (78).
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3) Collect and Verify the Evidence or Data
Evidence is the backbone of historical-critical research (79). Evidence related to this
project has been copiously collected, and that which has not fit the nature of this study has been
discarded. Our primary sources include four major works by Søren Kierkegaard: Philosophical
Fragments, its follow-up Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The
Point of View on My Work as an Author, plus selected entries from Kierkegaard’s journals,
mainly in the areas of communication, objectivity and subjectivity, faith, reason, and
Christianity, to name a few. While Kierkegaard’s works can be expensive to purchase, this
researcher has been fortunate enough to personally own many of them. Other sources come from
this university’s library. Hamann’s works, in contrast, are very difficult to obtain. For sources
related strictly to Hamann, this researcher focuses on materials such as Hamann: Writings on
Philosophy and Language, which provide us with several of his collected writings.
Our secondary sources are in abundance. The bulk of these which give Kierkegaard the
proper framework include such as scholars C. Stephen Evans, Jon Stewart, and Craig Hinkson,
and Hamann scholars like James O’Flaherty. These provide us the most accurate views of
Hamann and Kierkegaard available today.
4) Interpret Data and Draw Conclusions
According to Tucker, “The conclusions [of the study] should be limited to the available
data” (77). However, he also explains the importance of the researcher in relation to his
information. “They have a better command of the information, a better perspective of the
problem, and a better idea of how various puzzle parts fit together than do most people” (77). It
appears that this “unique perspective” is in fact dialectical. On the one hand the researcher has
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the “unique opportunity to take command of the research,” while on the other hand, the
conclusions of the research “should be limited by the available data” (77). One would do best to
interpret Tucker’s message as such: the researcher should not take liberties with the conclusions,
distorting them in relation to the research conducted; however, the researcher’s conclusions
should also be his/her own.
The importance of historical-critical research is multitudinous. Since this researcher
desires to ascertain the meaning and reliability of past facts, make comparisons of likeness and
difference, and draw conclusions from an in-depth examination of past facts, it is important to
use the historical-critical methodology here (68). Other important reasons for this type of study
are that it broadens the professional base (66) and allows for a greater understanding of the
present by examining the past.
According to Tucker, there are four goals of the critical researcher (78).
1) The critical researcher should aim for dependability, validity and reliability.
However, Tucker goes on to make it clear that statistical reliability is not as important to
the critical researcher as the reliability of the evidence. He writes, “…often excellent criticism
distinguishes itself because other critics have not agreed” (78). This researcher distances himself
from the liberal scholarship surrounding Kierkegaard. The main secondary sources used for this
study are both dependable and reliable: they give insight into Kierkegaard’s work and many are
unsurpassed scholars in their field.
2) Dependability relies on clarity and accuracy of style
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Therefore, this researcher has revised and rewritten this thesis numerous times, so that it
could be as clear and as accurate as possible. Tucker makes it clear that it is through
dependability that this is accomplished. Furthermore, for the critical researcher to receive
results, both accuracy and clarity of thought are essential.
3) Excellence in criticism also results from authenticity of sources
This researcher has not resorted to use sources that are unscholarly or invalid. Rather, the
sources reflect the originality of the topic to communication studies. Here, Tucker adds an
important point. “The critical methodologist has, perhaps, greater freedom in imposing his or
her personal stamp or mark on the study,” but the expectation is higher as a result.
4) Excellence is also determined by the criteria of the application: Can the results
be applied to life?
Tucker makes it plain that the critical methodologist must always seek to be relevant. It is this
researcher’s opinion that this study is relevant in our world today. Pains have been taken to
present it as such throughout this thesis. To communicators, this study is essential, for
discussion throughout this thesis will go to the very root and meaning of communication. To
Christians and Christian communicators, this study is vital, for Kierkegaard’s model builds an
understanding of knowing ourselves and recognizing the communication between God and man
through the person of Christ. Therefore, this study is relevant and has the opportunity to
contribute to the field of communication.
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Procedures
This study came about after researching indirect communication in the thought of
Kierkegaard for a considerable amount of time. The following is a step-by-step analysis of how
this study will be conducted.
The first real step in this process is the gathering of materials. This researcher relies
heavily on collected research from journal articles, commentaries, and books relating to the
subjects. In the case of Hamann’s writings, anthologies of his works have been used only
because they comprise the totality of works available in English to this researcher. The collected
materials all aid this research, some more than others. The majority of articles dealing with
Kierkegaard come from Kierkegaardiana, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, and The International
Kierkegaard Commentary.
The second step that goes into this study is the reading of its major texts: Philosophical
Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View
on My Work as an Author. All of these works explain Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication and are essential to understanding indirect communication.
The third step in this study deals with the writing and here it is imperative to understand
how this researcher has chosen to include or exclude content. In interpreting both Kierkegaard
and Hamann, it is necessary to deal with their major concepts. It is this researcher’s opinion that
these many of these major concepts can be understood from a communication standpoint.
Concepts such as knowledge, reason, and language all relate to the field of communication from
a philosophical point of view. God, His relation to us, and how we communicate with one
another all are associated with a Christian understanding of communication. This researcher has
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chosen to integrate these concepts so that the validity of this study cannot be questioned. In
addition, this researcher has included not only content pertinent to communication, but also that
which lends itself to a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard in general. For instance, chapter
four discusses The Corsair, the newspaper with which Kierkegaard was engaged in a dreadful
attack, and shows how that event was influential for Kierkegaard’s subsequent thoughts relating
to communication. This researcher also touches on Kierkegaard’s principle of subjectivity, since
it is necessary to an understanding of his model of indirect communication. In fact, all ideas and
concepts which may at first glance appear as overtly philosophical are indeed extremely
necessary to understanding both Hamann’s language theory and Kierkegaard’s conception of
indirect communication.
In the fourth step, this researcher has chosen to break things up into what is considered
the most logical manner. For instance, it is necessary to first give a background of Hamann so
that his language theory makes sense. It is necessary to discuss Hamann before we discuss
Kierkegaard so that this study remains chronological and it can be seen more easily how Hamann
influenced Kierkegaard. After discussing Hamann and Kierkegaard, this researcher then moves
into references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, in which major ways are presented as to
how Hamann influenced Kierkegaard. Lastly, this researcher deals with Christianity as indirect
communication, in which links are presented between Hamann, Kierkegaard, and the concept of
faith. This order appears to best serve the purposes of this thesis. This study ends with
conclusions and implications for further research.
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Chapter Four: Historical and Theological Foundations
The first step of an historical-critical study is to establish the proper historical settings.
There are four main areas of investigation set forth in this chapter. First, this researcher discusses
Kierkegaard and Hamann from the standpoint of reason and language. Second, indirect
communication in the thought of Kierkegaard is examined. Third, it is necessary to further
elaborate on Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication given his references to Hamann.
Lastly, in the section entitled “Christianity as Indirect Communication,” this researcher
investigates the thoughts of both Hamann and Kierkegaard and their emphases on indirectness in
the areas of Christian existence, faith, and the Incarnation of Christ.
Kierkegaard and Hamann: Reason and Language
Hamann and the Enlightenment
During the mid-to-late 18th century, a course of literary events in Europe not only
challenged but shook the traditional foundations of both philosophy and cultural thought. It
changed the way “not only Europeans but practically the whole world conceived of itself, of
nature, of religion, of human history, of the nature of knowledge, of politics, and of the structure
of the human mind in general” (Pinkard 2). Indeed, the significance of German philosophy
during the Enlightenment cannot be downplayed, for its remnants have affected countless
generations. One solitary tenet was reinforced above all else: the primacy of human reason.
“Philosophers loyal to the Enlightenment bestowed enormous authority upon reason, which was
the Enlightenment’s sovereign standard of truth, its final court of intellectual appeal” (Beiser 1).
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In short, reason became the end-all, the last word of truth, the supreme faculty encompassing
human knowledge. Philosophers sought to prove the supremacy of reason, and in doing so,
offered a system critical of traditional viewpoints in general and of theology in particular.
However, one seminal figure offered a perspective contra the Enlightenment, a viewpoint which
sought to put reason in its proper place.
It is in Hamann, often referred to as the “Magus of the North2,” that we see the workings
of a communicative genius both linguistically and philosophically. As a philologist he
extensively studied Greek, Latin, English, Hebrew, Arabic, French, to a degree Egyptian
hieroglyphics, as well as Persian, Tibetan, and Latvian (German 12). His interests ranged from
“…ancient and contemporary; sacred and secular; historical, political, economic, theological,
literary, and journalistic” (Haynes ed. viii). Early in his writing career, Hamann realized that if
the Rationalists were correct, i.e. if man’s reason is the supreme lens through which he views the
world, the concept of faith is then reduced to nothingness. Since man is depraved, his reason
capabilities are flawed; therefore, man must be guided by something more than reason alone.
Ultimately, Hamann says that “the reality of man’s life depends utterly upon God, upon man’s
response to God’s Word in him” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 82). To Hamann, it is faith which
“transcends the criticism and demonstration of reason” (Beiser 17).
Through Hamann’s conversion to Christianity in 1758 at the age of twenty-nine, his
thought suddenly and irrevocably turned to Christian doctrine. Only a year earlier he had
traveled to London from his home in Königsberg, East Prussia on an obscure “diplomatic and
business mission” (Beiser 19), which “apparently involved negotiations with the Russian and
English governments concerning trade in the Baltic” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 29). It is important to
understand that Hamann was, at the time, a well-versed student of the Enlightenment. However,
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when his mission fell through, he quickly sank into a life of disrepute and “sought to lose himself
in dissipation” (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 22). Through his despair however, Hamann
began rigorously reading the Scriptures and came to true faith in Christ. This change brought
about, according to Ronald Gregor Smith, “tumultuous certainty; grounded on an intense,
reiterated, highly individual reading of the whole Bible, not once, but twice through, the New
Testament even three times; and taking him through absolute despair in himself to absolute
confidence in the Lord of the Word…” (41). Shortly after his conversion, Hamann writes in his
Biblical Reflections concerning the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, “In spite of the light which
God sheds in our souls by his Word, he wants to be near to us himself. He is where his Word is,
he is where his Son is. If his Word is in us, his Son is in us; if his Word is in us, the Spirit of this
Word is in us” (129). Hamann, having already developed a strong background in linguistics, had
now become consumed by God as the Logos and the creator of all communication. “It is my
same old tune,” he writes, “but through language all things are made” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, Unity
and Language in the Thought of Hamann 19). Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty writes:
This…was an insight which he gained principally through his conversion by the Biblical
word. Just as the living organisms were called into being by the word of God, so man’s
spiritual life is re-created by that same word as it is spoken through the Gospel. But the
power of the word to create is a characteristic not only of the divine word; it is also a
characteristic of the human word, in so far as it partakes of the nature of the divine word.
For Hamann, it is therefore permissible to speak of human speech as “creative energy,” if
one remembers that the transcendent God of the Biblical revelation is the constant source
of that energy for him (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann 19).
We shall return to Hamann’s conception of language later. But it is imperative to see just
how Hamann’s life and work were shaped by his conversion to Christianity, because it provides
the backdrop for understanding both the laws that govern his thought and his unwavering stance
against rationalism.3 His conversion proved to be of such importance because it would play the
predominant role throughout his life and writings. Author Sergia Karen Hay writes that “This
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experience was absolutely decisive for the rest of Hamann’s life; it shifted his attention from
business and writing projects consistent with the goals of the Enlightenment to a thoroughgoing
commitment to theological concerns and religious life” (98). Henceforth, he “devoted his life to
a series of communicating experiences with God which were all conversion experiences, for
conversion was a sequential experience, a series of great moments” (German 2). Ultimately,
Hamann’s critique of reason presents the problems inherent to Christian communication, while
delineating the necessity of faith.
Bearing in mind Hamann’s acknowledgement of God as the supreme communicator, we
must understand how his major concepts refute those of the Enlightenment. Hamann struck out
against the idea that reason alone was man’s self-governing agent in general and against the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant in particular.
Kant and the Enlightenment
It is vital to present Kant’s views on reason and God, because without them we severely
lack the proper framework for interpreting the thought of Hamann in detail. Since much of
Hamann’s attack against the Enlightenment is aimed specifically at Kant, it naturally follows that
Hamann cannot be understood unless the ideas which he refuted are taken into account. A
certain understanding of Kant is necessary in order to assess and gain further insight to both
Hamann’s language theory and his understanding of faith in God.
The expansion of human reason was not the only product of the Enlightenment. Indeed,
the Enlightenment can also be regarded as “a movement of thought based on a basic trust in the
human being’s capacity to secure its own basis for the traditional supports of human life
(morality, religion and the state); Enlightenment was to replace a capricious tradition of
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unsupported appeals to revelation, scriptural authority and the like” (Hannay, Kierkegaard and
Philosophy 53). That is, we could say that the idea of Enlightenment celebrated human
endeavor and human reasoning, while casting away traditional viewpoints. Kant’s thought has
exceptional significance here, for after him, nothing would again be the same (Pinkard 15). With
the publication of his first major work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1784), he laid out his view
that “from now on, we moderns had to depend on ourselves and our own critical powers to figure
things out” (Pinkard 20). In the Critique of Pure Reason he writes, “Mathematical and scientific
knowledge find their basis and justification in the intuitions and categories of the understanding,
since the latter are the necessary conditions of human thought” (Kant qtd. in Gill, “Kantianism”
223). According to Kant, man’s faculty of reasoning is limited and relegated within the
empirical world, those things which can be readily known, observed, measured, and
experimented with.
Not only did Kant succeed in forever changing how metaphysics were viewed, but he
elevated reason to its highest form within the empirical world. In doing so, he discounted the
importance of language while damaging concepts in Christianity. It has been said that “It would
not be overstating the case to say that Kantian philosophy delivered a severe blow to theology”
(Turchin 7). According to C. Stephen Evans:
A large strand of theology since Kant has doubted that it is possible to conceive of God,
has claimed that it is not possible for human language to refer to a God who is not part of
a temporal, created world. Of course if we cannot conceive of God, then we also cannot
conceive of God creating the world or atoning for sin through the person of Jesus. And if
such things cannot be conceived they cannot be believed either (Evans, Kierkegaard on
Faith and the Self 185).
Kant undermined theology by altering metaphysics and through his use of the
“categorical imperative.” In his philosophy we have on the one hand, the noumenal realm (or the
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essence of things “as they are in themselves”), while on the other the phenomenal realm (“the
world of things as they appear to us in sense experience”) (Miller & Jensen D-20, D-22). To
Kant, we purely reason to that which lies in the phenomenal realm of experience. Since we can
know nothing of things in and of themselves, barricades are constructed to the noumenal world.
In other words, the noumenal becomes unknowable. The noumenal is not open to our sense
experience, and therefore it cannot be known. To Kant, all knowledge is based on experience or
empirical data. This position represented a problem for traditional viewpoints in both philosophy
and theology. Kant philosophy represented a direct attack upon theology because “the problem
was no longer the Lutheran disparagement of fallen reason’s ability to obtain knowledge of God,
but rather the self-imposed restrictions of reason itself. God had effectively been relegated to the
realm of transcendence as the utterly unknowable Ding an sich” (Turchin 7). From Kant, it
followed that “No longer do we form concepts based on our experience; rather, the concepts
exist first and shape all our experience” (Miller & Jansen 254). Through this viewpoint, Kant
attempted to reconcile rational thought with empiricism (Shakespeare 3).
The change brought to the area of metaphysics was severely damaging as well. What had
originally been known as “the queen of all sciences” (Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason 41) and
had traditionally been seen as the “inquiry into the supernatural” or the “quest for God” (Evans,
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 48) became something else entirely. Instead, Kant viewed the
metaphysician as “the alleged purveyor of a synthetic a priori truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on
Faith and the Self 48). This has sweeping ramifications for the existence of God in particular.
To Kant, God is entirely unknowable because he surpasses the standard for knowledge from an
empirical standpoint. So by denying the traditional mode of metaphysics, Kant instead
constructed his own systematic method. His writings provided the “foundations for the new kind
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of metaphysics,” which would lead him to the belief that “reason has the ability to give a final
critique of the powers of the human mind” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 52).
We have seen how Kant was able, through the Enlightenment, to cast doubt on traditional
institutions. The effects of his views are widespread, for they also pose a problem for the subject
of communication. It follows that if we can only have knowledge of the phenomenal, then how
can we communicate what lies beyond that which is observable? How is it possible to
communicate what we cannot experience? Kant’s epistemology appears to leave no room for
this possibility.
Even further problems arise for communication from Kant’s philosophy when we take
into consideration the communication of theological ideas. Obviously, if reason acts as man’s
final authority, then there is no reason for him to be held accountable to God. Since God is
utterly unknowable and man’s reasoning ability seemingly autonomous, there is no exchange of
communication between God and man. To Kant, “the religious individual’s knowledge of God
is completely derivable from his understanding of moral law” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments
and Postscript 42). What is morally good, according to Kant in his categorical imperative, is
good will itself. In other words, reason alone constructs that which is good. Kant’s ground for
ethics lies in man’s reasoning capacity as it singlehandedly becomes the foundation for morality.
Kant writes, “In matters of religion, reason is the highest interpreter of Scripture” (qtd. in Green
180). In his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant asserts, “I take the following
proposition to be a principle requiring no proof: Whatever, over and above good life-conduct,
man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion and
pseudo-service of God” (Kant 158). It is obvious, as Kierkegaard4 would later write, that Kant
“declares the relationship to God to be a kind of mental weakness, a hallucination” (Kierkegaard,
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Journals and Papers Vol. 2 515). Kierkegaard understood that Kant’s moral rationalism had
reduced God “to a regulative idea and morality…to something already embedded in our actual
practices” (Hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy 13). To Kant, reason only works with that
which is rational. Any attempt to go beyond that, to a relationship with God, he deemed utterly
irrational. Kant also appears to minimize with the concept of divine revelation in the Scriptures.
He believes that Christianity can become discoverable apart from revelation and argues that
“faith in such a revelation is not essential, since the content of that revelation is accessible to
reason” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 240).
One can easily observe how Kant’s thought played a pivotal role in the reversal of
traditional concepts as man’s reason became sovereign. The philosophy produced by the
Enlightenment challenged knowledge of anything beyond reason and in doing so, set limits on
communication as well. If God is unknown and revelation is a mere product of “religious
illusion,” then belief is of little use. Of what use then is communication of God if He is forever
completely unknowable? It was Hamann who would offer a scathing critique of Kant’s radical
ideas, for according to him, Kant had overlooked several key communicative aspects in his
thought. No one was more capable of leading the attack against Kant than was he.
An Answer to the Enlightenment: Hamann’s Language Theory
This researcher gave earlier a brief outline of Hamann’s conversion to Christianity and
showed how this experience shaped his subsequent thought. As a contemporary critic of the
Enlightenment, Hamann recognized that Kant’s appeal to reason raised problems for the
understanding of communication both verbally and conceptually. However, he did not seek to
refute the enlightened philosophical ideals with philosophical arguments (Haynes ed. x). Rather,
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Hamann’s attack is more indirect in nature. He employs various literary devices to aid in his
attack. Irony, poetry, satire, and humor are all utilized as part of an overall strategy to lead away
from the teachings of the Enlightenment. Kenneth Haynes writes that in refuting the enlightened
view of reason, Hamann relies heavily on “mockery to deny a philosophical problem its status as
a problem, to be freed from its grip” (x). This by no means should indicate that Hamann is
unwilling to address any issue directly, for he often does so with biting wit and craftiness. For
example, near the opening of his Socratic Memorabilia (1759), Hamann warns that he has
chosen to write in Socratic fashion. “I have written about Socrates in a Socratic way. Analogy
was the soul of his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed. 7). In other words,
Hamann, who undeniably admires Socrates, wants to embody Socratic style of living when
writing about Socrates. Though Socrates himself was no writer, he used a great deal of analogy
and irony in his thought. In the same way, Hamann employs these literary devices throughout
his writings. This is one way through which he became a creative, original writer. It has been
debated as to whether or not Hamann was a philosopher, and indeed it is a label he would
doubtless vehemently refute, but this much is undeniable: he has a profound, almost subterranean
understanding of language as his support. Since Hamann seeks creativity and originality he will
employ all the methods at his disposal.
Hamann understood that language was originally molded on reality, and this
understanding served to encourage his love of linguistics (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the
Thought of Hamann 23). That is, language is not based on mere abstraction as voices of the
Enlightenment would claim, but is shaped in actuality. Kierkegaard would later claim that it is a
consideration of language in the abstract that leads us to doubt the possibility of communication
(Shakespeare 81). Language conveys meaning, which is in fact, the high purpose for which it
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was created (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann 23). To Hamann,
language is also symbolic. Symbols play a significant role in our understanding of language.
Symbols are powerful because they give us a sense of reality – they can communicate ideas to us
in an indirect manner. We associate symbols with both words and concepts. Therefore, symbols
can cause us to relate a certain thing to something else. Signs and symbols can be interpreted,
and here appears to be Hamann’s fascination with them in relation to language. Symbols, as
language, are given by God. In fact, Hamann’s “whole life can be summed up in the effort to
discover and interpret, and create ‘language’” (German 34). He also views language as being
analogous, and this theme of unity runs throughout his writings.

We have the ability to

communicate with each other and also with God. Hamann writes in his Aesthetica in Nuce
(Aesthetics in a Nutshell):
This analogy of man to the Creator endows all creatures with their substance and their
stamp, on which depends fidelity and faith in all nature. The more vividly this idea of the
image of the invisible God dwells in our heart, the more able we are to see and taste his
loving kindness in creatures, observe it and grasp it with our hands. Every impression of
nature in man is not only a memorial but also a warrant of fundamental truth: Who is the
Lord. Every reaction of man unto created things is an epistle and seal that we partake of
the divine nature, and that we are his offspring (Haynes ed. 79).
Hamann notes that God allowed man to name the animals at creation, and this is evidence of the
fact that God as the ultimate Creator has also given man the ability to become a creator. As man
is made in God’s image, so a certain analogy exists between God and creation. God “gives all
creatures their content and character” (Hamann, qtd. in German 40). To Hamann, the entirety of
nature echoes God as Sovereign Lord and Creator. The analogy between God and man exists in
man’s ability to “partake in the divine nature” and to be called “his offspring.” Therefore, the
communication between God and man is not a superficial one, but one of profound mystery.
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We could say that Hamann is concerned with two aspects of communication.
Throughout his authorship, he is “dealing first with the ordinary difficulty inherent in
communication among human beings and secondly with man’s communicative dependence upon
God” (German 142). He hails the creativity of man, but recognizes that all creativity comes from
God alone as the supreme Creator. Now, Hamann was entranced by both the written word and
the spoken word, and the best of example as to his formulation of language and communication
is that of Scripture. He believes that God, as the divine Word, has always existed. Through the
creative act of speaking, God brought all things into existence. He also inspired man, giving to
him the ability to write the Scriptures, His Word to mankind. Hence, man as the recipient of
God’s creation is also a creator, but only because God has allowed him to be so – for all
communication derives from God. “In Hamann’s eyes all divine activities in creation find as
their goal God’s honor and glory, for God is the acting force in creating” (German 158). As
much as anything, this is one idea that permeates Hamann’s writings. It is one concept he can
never get away from: God must receive glory for creating us and giving us the ability to create.
In fact, Hamann’s attack against the Kantian notion of reason is partly aided through his
conception of God as the almighty Creator. He saw that in general, the enlightened view of
reason posed a danger to the reality of faith and understood that many enlightened thinkers had
not taken language into consideration in their attempts to raise reason to new heights. While
expansive in nature, Hamann’s language theory is necessary to understand, for once it is grasped,
“an understanding of the rest of his thought inevitably follows” (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language
4). According to James O’Flaherty, language constitutes the ground for Hamann’s total
philosophy (4).
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In his major work Aesthetics in a Nutshell (1762) Hamann writes, “Speak that I may see
Thee!” We can gain tremendous insight into his language theory from this statement alone, for
as we shall see, it has multiple meanings. Hamann often asked of people “Speak that I may see
Thee,” because to him, “speech revealed his inner soul” (German 50). The theme runs
throughout the course of his works and his life as well. Author Terrence German points out that
Hamann sought the unification between his life and authorship. “Hamann sought to have every
word he wrote contain a quality that united it with his own physical personality. He thought as
much with his belly as with his brain. He attempted to give his words the physique of his own
physique” (German 10). Other writers can perhaps separate their work from their personal life,
their words from their way of living. But to Hamann, this is impossible. He attempts to live,
breathe and embody his communication with others. As Ronald Gregor Smith points out,
Hamann’s thought and actions are “thoroughly integrated” (J.G. Hamann 25). In communicating
with others, Hamann “does not make any distinction between his private and public life. He is
not different as an author from what he is in his ordinary life” (25). He must seek to live the
truth that he believes, and living the truth is for Hamann as important as communicating truth.
The German writer and philosopher Lessing, a key figure during the Enlightenment, had once
written, “What does the private life of a writer matter to us?” (qtd. in Haynes ed. 69fn.).
Hamann says in contrast, “True, one can be a man without finding it necessary to become an
author. But whoever expects his good friends to think of the writer apart from the man is more
inclined to poetic than to philosophical abstractions” (Haynes, ed. 69). Hamann has the sincere
desire to create, and as a product of the divine Creator he must live in a responsible manner. In
fact, he feels bound to do so by the Creator. “Speak that I may see thee!” By speaking through
the medium of print, Hamann is communicating his true self.
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Hamann’s attack against the enlightened view of reason is grounded in the importance of
language. It is language that appears to precede reason, inasmuch as reason would not be able to
express itself unless there was a means to do so. Language gives us an outlet for reasoning, but
reasoning has its limits. James O’Flaherty says that language was the “prismatic medium
through which Hamann saw experience or reality” (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 4). In his
Socratic Memorabilia, Hamann writes and dedicates to his friends, Kant and Berens (both of
whom tried in vain to bring Hamann back to rationalism after his conversion to Christianity), a
piece of literature that diametrically opposes their views of reason. Therein Hamann says, “Our
own existence, and the existence of all things outside us, must be believed and cannot be
established in any other way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181). Here he is making his claim for faith,
the foundation of which the rationalist thinkers of the enlightenment would seek to completely
separate from reason.
Hamann would eventually state that “Reason is language, logos” (Hamann qtd. in
German 7). As Terence German writes, “Reason is based on language as its organ, its source”
(53). Hamann himself, in a letter to his friend Herder, exclaims, “All chatter about reason is pure
wind: language is its organ and criterion…” (Hamann, qtd. in German 53). Hamann is not
saying that reason is the written language or even just the spoken language; instead, language
reaches down into the bones of man (German 7). Without language and its ability to be
communicated, reasoning or cognition would be nothing. Hamann mentions elsewhere that
language is as the mother of reason. It would seem that language gives us the ability to reason in
the first place. So by holding human reasoning and comprehension in such high regard, thinkers
of the Enlightenment had denied language as reason’s very source. Hamann understands that
language is given to man by God. He also suggests that reason is first and foremost an offense to
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itself (Anderson 114). That is, reason has its limitations. Hence, man cannot know everything
by the aid of reason alone. Those enlightened minds who seek to know everything by the
sovereign aid of reason are deceiving themselves. The deception lies in the fact that our reason
can reveal nothing to us directly. God is the ultimate creator and He has revealed Himself
through His Word. This is one way in which God, as Spirit, communicates with man. Hamann
writes in Biblical Reflections (1758), “It is the greatest contradiction and misuse of our reason if
it wants to reveal. A philosopher who, to please his reason, puts the divine word out of our
vision is like those Jews who, the more firmly they seem to cling to the Old Testament, the more
stubbornly they reject the New Testament” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 120).
Hamann encourages his reader to the particular embodiments and expressions of reason,
which consist in ways of speaking, acting and writing (Beiser 18). To the Magus, writing is a
wonderfully creative talent, but the art of speech is the embodiment of language. “The written
word is always deficient to in relation to the spoken word. The great writer must make the
written word re-express the sign of his speech” (German 51). The heart of language is its
spokenness (53).
Hamann believes that speech is the purest form of communication. Perhaps this insight
came about from his studies on speech patterns. He had examined the variance of speech
patterns amongst different people and different cultures (German 49). By doing so, he
understood how “speech varied in the streets, shops, schools, stadiums, and fields; people talked
differently on different occasions” (49). Hamann was enamored by both how and why the
common man, through and across different cultures, used language in the creative and
communicative act of speech. By doing so, he had come to realize the significance of language
not only in human beings, but in the rest of creation as well. As humans, we communicate

39

differently and speak various languages and dialects. Humans are diverse as is language, but this
diversity points back to the almighty Creator as the source. To Hamann, the tongue, mouth, and
lips all work together to form human speech with which we communicate with others and most
importantly, with God (49). He understood how languages change over time, how they differ
from culture to culture. However, speech is always the primary vehicle through which people
communicate with each other (54). According to Hamann we should always seek to speak better
(54). Therefore, we should constantly value our speech and use it correctly, for language and the
ability to communicate are gifts to mankind, gifts that “have value or worth” (45). Kierkegaard
often writes on the beauty of his native language and obviously values the speech process. He
writes, “Language is an ideality which every man has gratis. What an ideality – that God can use
language to express his thoughts and thus man by means of language has fellowship with God”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3 13). But Kierkegaard also sees in language a danger as
well. It is often by the use of language that man becomes viewed as a hypocrite. The gift of
language “permits a person’s life to express the lowest while his mouth prattles on about the
highest and to give assurances that this is what concerns him” (14). Kierkegaard understands
that when language is used incorrectly, it can be just as powerful in a negative way. “Language,
the gift of speech, engulfs the human race in such a cloud of drivel and twaddle that it becomes
its ruination” (14). Therefore, to both Kierkegaard and Hamann, language must be used
properly, for its power is great. Proverbs 18:21 says that “Death and life are in the power of the
tongue, and those who love it will eat its fruit” (NASV).
It is evident that Hamann was, according to Terrence German, “in love with the act of
communication” (42). He viewed life itself as a communicative, creating experience of flesh and
spirit (42). To Hamann, ordinary human language is “molded on reality” (O’Flaherty, Unity and
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Language 12) and is not merely abstract. Mankind is not autonomous, able to communicate and
create on his own accord as many in the Enlightenment would claim. Rather, he is dependent
upon God for all his abilities, and Hamann’s writings always recognize this fact. He knows his
abilities to communicate and create as a human being come from God alone, are formed and
given by Him. Hamann addresses this theme in “The last will and testament of the Knight of the
Rose-Cross,” (hereafter KRC) (1772), when he says that the “origin of human language” is
“certainly divine” (Haynes ed. 100).

Paradoxically, language is essentially and naturally human

as an activity involving relationships with others (Dickson 239). We cannot express ourselves in
any other way than humanly. Language cannot be extracted from our lives. Hamann
understands that language is designed by God as an interpersonal communication. Hamann
scholar Gwen Griffith Dickson points out that “language is a matter of human interpersonal
relations because of the fact that we require instruction in order to possess and use language”
(239). To Hamann, this paradox is seen in the principle of the communicatio idiomatum which
can be defined as the “interchange of properties” (Haynes ed. 99) or “intimate togetherness”
(O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128). The communicatio idiomatum is the theological
doctrine, made use of by Luther, ‘that while the human and divine natures in Christ were
separate, the attributes of the one may be predicated of the other in view of their union in the one
person of the Savior” (Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, qtd. in Haynes 99).
Hamann often uses this term to relate the close knit between the divine and human elements in
the process of language (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128). It is easily observable that
unity has a predominant role in Hamann’s authorship. In KRC He states, “This communicatio of
divine and human idiomatum is the fundamental law and the master-key of all our knowledge
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and of the whole visible economy” (Haynes ed. 99). Without the divine intervention of God into
human activities, there is no human knowledge, creation, or communication.
The totality of Hamann’s language theory can be viewed in light of his understanding of
God. Through God’s creation and condescension He communicates with us. Hamann can
admire the spoken word because God first spoke the Word into existence, both in creation and in
giving the Scriptures to man. God also speaks through His Son in the person of Christ. These
truths became the bedrock of Hamann’s linguistic philosophy; they are the ideas which he knows
his reason cannot explain, but ones that must be believed.
The Logos as Communication
The idea of the divine Logos so inspired and enthralled Hamann that he could say,
“Without Thee I am nothing; Thou art my entire being” (qtd. in German 5). Hamann was
changed completely by his perception of God, and the Logos dominated his thought and life.
Ronald Gregor Smith writes, “Everything was for Hamann a sign or symbol of the divine” (J.G.
Hamann 64). However, what exactly does Hamann mean by the Logos? This researcher has
found that Hamann’s conception of the Logos can be explained in at least three different ways.
First of all, when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to The Word in the form of
Scripture, both spoken and written. God spoke the word into existence (Genesis 1:3) and
continued to communicate His word as an author to men, who are also writers of Scripture.
Through His word to us, God teaches us how to live; through this word we gain a deeper
understanding of our sinful condition and of His grace. Through His word He has chosen to
reveal to us certain truths. Through His word, which communicates with us, we in turn learn
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how to communicate with Him.

Therefore, we can say that “the Word of God is God’s

speaking” (Barth 15).
Hamann understands that there can be no act of communication without God’s own
speaking. Terrence German writes, “The Holy Spirit was very condescending is His activity of
writing for man about man, but Hamann is always grateful to the Holy Spirit, because man in
himself is not capable of any form of communication with God unless God initiates the
communication” (135). God’s speech to us throughout Scripture is many things: a creation, a
declaration, a judgment, a love immeasurable, a poetic gift. While God’s speaking is all of this,
it nevertheless remains His mysterious speech. Hamann recognizes that our reason cannot begin
to grasp the unfathomable aspect of God’s intervention as the Author. The Author chose to
create through “poets and prophets” in the Scripture (Hamann, qtd. in German 148). These
poets, prophets, and writers are an “extension of the creative activity of God Himself” (148). To
Hamann, God is the ultimate Poet who often seeks to communicate with us through devices
(such as poetry and parables) we are capable of understanding. Scripture speaks to us through
poetry and parables, through prophets and disciples; these are the ones through which God has
chosen to convey His word. To Hamann, God’s word is not a dead work of art, but is instead the
word of truth which is powerfully alive.

God’s word continues to live through its being

proclaimed and preached. The theologian Karl Barth says, “…God’s Word is to be regarded as a
living, actual, and present factor, the Word of God which now both is and should be proclaimed
and heard” (15). Preaching is not merely communicating; rather, if done correctly, it is the
proclamation of Truth communicated to the individual.

Through the foolishness of man5,

Scripture is communicated as a living Word as it is received and penetrates the heart of man.
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Secondly, when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the word as spoken at
creation. Hamann places emphasis upon creation because he believes that creation itself speaks
volumes about its Creator. It surely must have been of interest to him that God himself, as the
Word, brought creation into existence by speaking. In KRC Hamann writes:
Every phenomenon of nature was a word, -- the sign, symbol and pledge of a new, secret,
inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship, and communion of divine
energies and ideas. All that man heard at the beginning, saw with his eyes, looked upon,
and his hands handled was a living word, for God was the word. With this word in his
mouth and in his heart the origin of language was as natural, as close and easy, as a
child’s game (Haynes ed. 109).
Hamann believes that God has placed his stamp upon creation, and that He intended a
“communion” or unity among creation and the divine. In the above quote he also relies heavily
on two scriptures passages. The first is I John 1:1: “What was from the beginning we have
heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands,
concerning the Word of Life” (NASV). The second is John 1:1: “In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (NASV). Both of these passages
speak of God’s presence at the beginning of creation. God spoke all things into existence and
placed language into both the mouth and heart of mankind. Terrence German is correct when he
says that “language reaches down into the bones of man” (7). Hamann understands that the
origin of language is easily discernable (“as a child’s game”) because all that man understood at
creation was the Word.
God speaks and says: “Let Us make man in Our own image, according to Our likeness”
(NASV). The writer of Genesis says, “God created man in His own image, in the image of God
He created them” (NASB). Hamann rejoices in this inscrutable idea of man being formed in
God’s image. In Aesthetics in a Nutshell he addresses the issue:
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The will of the Author in this unravels the most convoluted knots of human nature and its
destiny. Blind heathens acknowledged the invisibility which man has in common with
God. The veiled figure of the body, the countenance of the head, and the extremities of
the arms are all visible schema in which we move along; yet in truth they are nothing but
a finger pointing to the hidden man within us (Haynes ed. 64).
That which is hidden within us constitutes the image of God. David as the writer of the
Psalms pays homage to this fact by saying “I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and
wonderfully made” (NASV). Just as God’s word in the form of scripture is a communication to
us, so is His creation a communication. In fact, Hamann sees the entirety of creation as an act of
speech. “Speak, that I may see you! -- -- This wish was fulfilled by creation, which is a speech
to creatures through creatures; for day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows
knowledge. Its watchword traverses every clime to the end of the world, and its voice can be
heard in every dialect” (Haynes ed. 65). Hamann is referring here to Psalm 19:2-4, which says,
“Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech or
language, where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone through all the earth, and their words
to the end of the world” (NKJV). Hamann’s perception of natural language is founded upon this
view presented in Scripture. Natural language, as opposed to abstract language, carries with it
signs and symbols “for real objects and relations between them” (O’Flaherty, Unity and
Language 27). Nature is a sign or symbol through which God conveys and communicates His
authority as Creator. We see this in Romans 1:18-20. Paul writes: “For the wrath of God is
revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress truth in
unrighteousness, because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it
evident to them. For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power
and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that
they are without excuse” (NASV).

45

One way God has chosen to reveal Himself is via the natural world. It is this precept that
guides Hamann’s language theory. He seeks to communicate through his own writings the
message that God communicates to us each day. He is able to exclaim “Nature and Scripture,
then, are the materials of the beautiful, creative, and imitative spirit” (Haynes ed. 85), because he
understands that humans are created in God’s image, the same God that wishes to communicate
his handiwork through nature. Hamann senses that God formed within nature a necessary and
recognizable union. Humans are in unity with God because they are created in His image. Signs
and symbols are in unity with language because it is through them that we communicate. Form
cannot be divorced from content (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 17). Hamann writes, “The
senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images.
knowledge and happiness consists in images.

All the wealth of human

The first outburst of creation, and the first

impression of its chronicler; -- --the first manifestation and the first enjoyment of nature are
united in the words: Let there be light!” (Haynes ed. 64). The concept of unity plays a major
theme throughout Hamann’s writings. The culmination of unity is found in the Trinity – God the
three in one. In Him there is “unity in trinity and trinity in unity” (Barth 15). As Hamann says:
The book of creation contains examples of general concepts which God wished to reveal
to creatures through creation. The books of the covenant contain examples of secret
articles which God wished to reveal to man through man. The unity of the Author is
mirrored even in the dialect of His works – in all of them a tone of immeasurable height
and depth! A proof of the most splendid majesty and total of self-emptying! (Haynes ed.
75).
Again Hamann writes, “If one single truth like the sun prevails, it is day” (78). The Light of the
World communicates with us, both by His written word and spoken word.
God‘s very breathing into mankind constitutes communication. The concept of unity
further plays out in Hamann’s writings when we consider that God breathed the breath of life
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into mankind (Genesis 1:7). “The ‘breath’ of God gives union to body and soul. Body and soul
should not war against each other because they are in a ‘unity’ by the power of God’s breath as
He gives us our breath which flows forth from us in speech” (German 55). To Hamann, the
creative and communicative act of speech is only possible because God breathed life into us.
“Man speaks with his breath. His breath flows from his mouth in the spoken word to others. His
breath symbolizes the life which God gave to us” (55). It is remarkable that Hamann observes
God’s act of breathing life as communication, especially given the age in which he lived. Such a
viewpoint gives precedence to language and speech over the position of autonomous human
reasoning. Furthermore, the concepts of language and speech are amplified when we consider
their source as coming directly from God, who lovingly created man in his image.
Lastly, we see that when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the Word
Incarnate in the person of Christ. Hamann’s thinking is guided by the central Christian paradox,
the Word made flesh, which offers both forgiveness and restoration to mankind (Smith, J.G.
Hamann 65). In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann says:
How God the Son lowered himself! He became a man, the least among men; he took the
form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us. How
God the Holy Spirit lowered himself, when he became a historian of the smallest, most
insignificant events on earth, in order to reveal the decisions, the mysteries and the ways
of the godhead to man in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own ways (66).
God’s appearing through the person of Christ in the flesh we shall call the Communication of
Condescension. The very act of Christ’s condescension to us is the height of communication, for
God in the flesh speaks through Christ. Christ’s appearing in the form of man is also the
lowering of unfathomable love. Ronald Gregor Smith says, “The condescension of love is not,
however, a mere tour de force, to attract our attention or engage our admiration. But it is the
necessary mode of God’s speech with us” (66). The incarnation, as Hamann understood it,
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defies human cognitive powers. Kierkegaard would later deal with this same concept at multiple
times throughout his own authorship. Both Kierkegaard and Hamann would assert that the
incarnation cannot be described successfully by reason.

Sin has affected human reason.

Therefore, the incarnation stands as a paradox that must be believed and taken as faith. Rather
than assert (as would thinkers of the Enlightenment) that God is utterly unknowable, Kierkegaard
emphasizes a bridge between the empirical to the noumenal that – that of true faith.
This researcher has attempted to explain how Hamann understood that it cannot be
proven that God is the Author of creation or Scripture, but rather it must be believed. So it is
with the Incarnation. These things must be taken on faith. The individual is in need of Christ in
the flesh since because of sin the learner has “become untruth in time” (Kierkegaard, Concluding
Unscientific Postscript 32).

To restore this relationship which sin has damaged, the

Communication of Condescension is necessary. Sin has severely injured our being made in the
image of God. Hamann writes:
Here reason sinks down, and it is on this basis that the decision of God rests to save fallen
man, to restore this image. How much it has cost that I am saved! Unfathomable God,
thou hast nevertheless considered this race worthy of the costly ransom. And that we are
so worthy in our salvation is due to the worth which thou hast ascribed and
communicated to us in creation. To restore this likeness God had to assume the likeness
of men. Both are equally great mysteries (Smith, J.G. Hamann 125).
Here Hamann recognizes the inscrutable acts of creation and incarnation. Man was created in
the image of God, but sin separates man from the Creator. Christ comes into the world and says
“I am the Way”6 offering salvation. Through His “costly ransom” He renews man. It is
unfathomable to Hamann that Christ chose to take on human form and communicate with
humans as one of them. On this point he says, “You come to me? Oh! God and His Son are so
gracious that They come to us” (Hamann, qtd. in German 159). The Word becomes flesh, and
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communicates with created beings in order to “make all things new.”7 “God not only created
heaven and earth for us, but He came into the world to be with us in flesh and blood. The
creativity of this act consists in His self-communication” (German 159).
It is interesting that Hamann and Kierkegaard both refer to Christ as a “stumbling block”
and a “sign of offence,”8 (as further expounded upon in this chapter under the heading
“Christianity as Indirect Communication”). In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes:
Reason is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him.
It does not wish to know him – and what is even more astonishing, when it does know
him it ceases to serve him. This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for
he knows that knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offence to man, that he is
foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and
make himself known (Smith, J.G. Hamann 136).9
That is, Christ’s revealing of Himself, His communication with us in the flesh mankind views as
foolishness. Man cannot understand the paradox of the God-man. We can harken back to
Hamann’s idea that “reason is first and foremost an offence to itself” (Anderson114). Human
reason takes offence at the very Creator who gives man the ability to reason in the first place.
Kierkegaard deals with Christ as a sign of offense in the pseudonymous works Philosophical
Fragments and Training in Christianity. In Training Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym AntiClimacus) sets out two distinct ways in which the offence takes root. The offence either has to
do with the God-Man’s “loftiness” and “exaltation” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 84,
96) or it has to do with His lowliness, “that He who is God is this lowly man, suffering like a
lowly man” (84). Man is offended in the first sense by the fact that the man speaking claims to
be equal with God (84). Here, human reason is offended and may say, ‘An individual man like
us wants to be God’ (105). In the second instance man is offended by His lowliness, by the fact
that “one who gives Himself out to be God shows himself to be the poor and suffering and at last
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the impotent man” (105). The man who takes offence at God’s lowliness in the flesh may speak
thus: “Supposing for an instant that thou art God, what folly and madness it is that thou art this
lowly, poor, impotent man!” (105). To Hamann, Christ chose to reveal Himself regardless of His
knowledge of man’s offence towards Him. Hamann would stand in agreement with Kierkegaard
who writes, “The possibility of offence is…every instant present, and constitutes at every instant
the yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man, across which only faith can reach”
(139).
The Error of Human Reason
This researcher has explained how the Enlightenment sought to heighten the reason of
man while defining God as utterly unknowable. In refutation, Hamann sought to combat the
Enlightenment’s views with his own theory of language which was based in the divine Logos as
Creator and Redeemer of mankind’s fallen nature. In order to do so, Hamann placed great
importance upon God as the origin of communication with mankind. Enlightened reason would
seek to counter this viewpoint. Hamann sought to combat rationalism in his own day while
Kierkegaard focused on the errors of Idealism during his time. However, Kierkegaard and
Hamann would both seek to present man’s reasoning capabilities as flawed by depravity.
Hamann’s critique of thinkers of the Enlightenment, as has been shown, centers on the concepts
of language, the Logos, and faith. To him, the Enlightenment’s fundamental flaw was to deny
these three concepts their proper roles.
To Hamann, the rationalists constantly search for truth. However, their searching is in
vain because they believe God as the Truth remains unknowable. In Aesthetics in Nuce Hamann
writes, “Yes, you delicate critics of art!, you go on asking what is truth, and make for the door,

50

because you cannot wait for an answer to this question” (Haynes ed. 77). Since rationalism has
chosen not to consider the Divine, it can only offer hopeless solutions. To the rationalists,
human reason offered freedom from existing norms. However, Hamann would say, “All the
colors of the most beautiful world grow pale once you extinguish its light, the firstborn of
creation” (78). Without God there would be no reasoning ability in the first place. To Hamann,
everything becomes dim when we seek to place faith solely within our reasoning and cognitive
powers. The world then indeed appears a much different place, for we have then failed to take
into account its Creator and the sustainer of all life. This Creator seeks to communicate with us,
but the rationalists fail to take this into account.
Enlightened philosophers are content in their attempts to follow their own system.
Hamann says that even “The devils believe and tremble!—but your senses, crazed by the
subtlety of reason, tremble not” (Haynes ed. 90). Rather, “You congratulate yourself secretly on
your blindness when God on the cross is numbered among the criminals…” (91). The one who
thinks he lives by reason alone is foolish, blind, and arrogant. He has not taken into account
God’s laws or His communication with mankind. He does not understand that God gave him the
ability to become a creator, that God gave him language which proceeds reason. The rationalists
do not understand the concept of language in the biblical sense. “The enlightened rationalists
who seek to explain speech without recourse to the breath of God interfere with God’s
manifestation to us through speech” (German 56). God does speak, through signs and symbols;
He speaks through nature, through the Scriptures, through His Son, and through the continuing
proclamation of his Word. The rationalists are the “healthy who need no physician” (Smith, J.G.
Hamann 121). God communicates with mankind, but that does not mean that all things are
revealed to us. In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes, “The curiosity to know things which
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are too high for us, which are beyond our horizon, which are unfathomable precisely because of
the weakness which makes the future so obscure to us, has led men into many such ludicrous
methods and errors” (123). The Enlightened philosophers deny their own human weaknesses
and fail to understand that they are living in error. The same reason which they seek to exalt has
erred and failed them.

Still, they vehemently deny the possibility of communication with

anything beyond the empirical realm. Hamann writes in KRC, “Come on, do you not know by
now, philosophers!, that there is no physical connection between cause and effect, means and
intent, only a spiritual and ideal one, that is, blind faith, as the greatest earthly chronicler of his
country and of the natural church has proclaimed!” (Haynes ed. 103). To Hamann and (as we
shall see) Kierkegaard, individual faith is the key to a personal, communicative relationship with
Christ. It is the Son of Man who came to communicate His message of redemption and salvation
from the fall, from depraved reason. Therefore, we are commanded to fear Him and keep His
commandments, which is the whole duty of man10.
Indirect Communication in the Thought of Kierkegaard
Parabolic Communication: A Relational Tool
Excepting his use of pseudonyms, one of the most easily recognizable forms of
indirectness in Kierkegaard’s authorship is his use of parables. Kierkegaard had an amazing
ability to tell stories, and from his parables we can glean many invaluable truths. In fact,
Thomas Oden has remarked that no writer in Western tradition has made more persistent use of
the parable as a means of communicating moral and spiritual insight than Kierkegaard (Oden
vii). According to Oden, “Kierkegaard is one of the few writers…who was himself a literary
critic, who himself offered a detailed theory of (indirect) communication that accounted for his
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writing in parable and story form under pseudonyms, and who clearly envisioned parabolic
communication as an integral part of his philosophical method” (Oden viii). Above all, parabolic
communication is a relational tool to Kierkegaard. It is a device that constitutes indirectness
since it removes the communicator and allows the recipient to focus on that which is being
communicated.
That Kierkegaard used stories to illustrate his message I think, can be traced back to a
very influential period of his life—his childhood. Kierkegaard’s father had a unique gift of
story-telling as well, and his manner of doing such was influential to Kierkegaard as a young boy
(Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1 32). So at an early age he learned the art of epic narrative, drama,
and dialectics. They all became sources of his story-telling when he became an author.
One of Kierkegaard’s best known parables comes from his private journals and has to do
with the attack upon the Established Church of his time, which he believed failed to resemble the
Christianity in the New Testament. It is entitled “The Obedient Hound” and I quote it in full
here for two reasons: first, that it may show the power behind Kierkegaard’s parables as a
relational form of communication; secondly, to demonstrate that it can aid our perspective when
later in this chapter we discuss Kierkegaard’s attack upon established Christendom.
Imagine a big, well-trained hunting dog. He accompanies his master on a visit to a
family, where, as all too often in our time, there is a whole assembly of ill-behaved
youths. Their eyes hardly light upon the hound before they begin to maltreat it in every
kind of way. The hound, which was well trained, as these youths were not, fixes his eye
at once upon his master to ascertain from his expression what he expects him to do. And
he understands the glance to mean that he is to put up with all the ill-treatment, accept it
indeed as though it were sheer kindness conferred upon him. Thereupon the youths of
course became still more rough, and finally they agreed that it must be a prodigiously
stupid dog which puts up with everything. The dog meanwhile is concerned only about
one thing, what the master’s glance commands him to do. And, lo, that glance is
suddenly altered; it signifies—and the hound understands it at once—use your strength.
That instant with a single leap he has seized the biggest lout and thrown him to the
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ground—and now no one stops him, except the master’s glance, and the same instant he
is as he was before.—Just so with me (Kierkegaard, Attack Upon Christendom x).
The parable obviously has application to Kierkegaard’s attempt to speak directly, as he
did later in his career, about the problems in Christendom. Another such parable comes from
very early in Kierkegaard’s authorship and appeared in he beginning of Either/Or. Entitled “The
Happy Conflagration,” it shows “what happens to those who try to warn against the present age”
(Oden 3). “In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell the
audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and they became still
more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be destroyed—amid the universal
hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a joke” (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 30).
Now, according to Thomas Oden, Kierkegaard used parabolic communication for five
reasons (x). First, the practice was an “excellent weapon in his philosophical-polemical arsenal.
A second reason is that “he quite evidently relishes meeting his reader in this way. He takes
delight in leading his readers along a path, only to arrive at an unexpected junction where he
suddenly leaves them to make a decision about a set of events” (xi). This has the affect of
disarming the reader, “putting him or her in a non-defensive, receptive frame of mind that allows
the author to enter more deeply into personal communication with the reader” (xii). A parable
requires a deep self-examination (xii) and can be personally related to one’s situation very easily.
The third reason Oden believes Kierkegaard uses parables is that they are an essential
part of indirect communication, which is in turn a central part of Kierkegaard’s authorship.
“Each parable aims to challenge the subjective consciousness of the individual reader in its own
way” (xiii). Oden writes that parables fall clearly into Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication because “they confront us with a choice between possibilities of self-
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understanding, so that in the process of having to choose, we discover ourselves, or something of
ourselves” (xiii). The fourth reason has to do with the third, in that Kierkegaard uses parables to
bring about self-awareness in his readers. The fifth reason according to Oden is that “they are by
the author’s intention, designed to serve oral traditions” (Oden xvi). Oden explains:
As a distinctive literary genre, the parable, by definition, is intended to be remembered, to
lend itself to oral retelling. Memorability is thus a crucial criterion for any parable.
Therefore an austere writer of parables has precisely in mind the detachability of the
parable from its original context, otherwise his purpose is defeated. If, before telling or
commenting upon the parable of the prodigal son, one were required to place it in its
original historical context, the parable would seldom be told or remembered. But, it has
been remembered, and it has been appropriated in and out of many historical contexts…
(xvi).
The point here is that parables direct themselves particularly to memory, oral repetition, and
adaptation (xvii).
Kierkegaard’s use of parables certainly plays a major role in his indirect communication
model. While he frequently uses parabolic communication as indirectness, it is also obvious that
parables serve another purpose when they are used by the pseudonyms. When a pseudonym is
the author of a work, Kierkegaard is once removed from the communication. However, when a
pseudonym utilizes parabolic communication in a pseudonymous work, Kierkegaard is then
doubly removed from the communication instead.
Hamann also shows a love for parabolic communication. In Aesthetics in a Nutshell he
writes likely his most famous words: “Poetry is the mother-tongue of the human race, as the
garden is older than the ploughed field; painting, than writing; song, than declamation; parables,
than logical deduction; barter, than commerce” (Haynes ed. 63). Here, Hamann gives us an
example of his preference for analogical rather than logical thinking. James O’Flaherty explains
the importance of analogical thinking to Hamann. “Whereas the rationalist establishes a
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principle, whether deductively or inductively, and thereupon proceeds to draw inferences from it,
the intuitive thinker establishes a model on nonrational grounds, as, for example, instinct or faith,
and thereupon proceeds to draw parallels to the model” (O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87). Hamann
thinks “it is more natural for man to think in metaphors or parables, which involve analogical
thinking, than to arrive at deductions” (88). In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann writes, “All
mortal creatures are able to see the truth and essence of things only in parables” (qtd. in
O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87). Parabolic communication helps us understand things in an
indirect manner. Parables give us a mental image of that which is being communicated. Thus
Hamann writes, “Senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images” (Smith, J.G.
Hamann 196). Parables allow us to see things from a symbolic point of view. It is worth noting
here that Hamann and Kierkegaard after him both stress the importance of parabolic
communication, as form of indirectness.
Concepts of Indirectness in the Authorship
Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms throughout much of his career as an author is both well
known and extensively researched. However, its nature is often misunderstood. Throughout
postmodernity, as Kierkegaard’s thought has been interpreted and applied to various educational
disciplines, the Christian aspects of his thought have often been disregarded. In such cases, the
answer as to why Kierkegaard employed pseudonyms as part of his method of indirect
communication remains ignored as well. When Kierkegaard’s overtly Christian message is
either disregarded or misinterpreted, danger in turn arises; for without taking into account the
Christian message of his writings, the proper perspective for interpretation is lost. Louis Pojman
writes, “Sometimes Kierkegaard is interpreted as a poet, sometimes as the Father of
Existentialism, sometimes as the scourge of Idealism. The important thing is to see that

56

Kierkegaard’s fundamental purpose was to make eminently clear what Christianity is all about”
(Pojman 4). Conversely, such writers as Roger Poole have claimed that there is no correct way
to read Kierkegaard, whose writings will always remain ambiguous and mysterious since,
“Kierkegaard’s writing has made all solutions impossible” (Poole 1). From his perspective,
Poole groups Kierkegaard with such Deconstructionist thinkers as Jacques Derrida, by claiming
that Kierkegaard “demonstrates that a meaning can be so long deferred that it would finally be
merely naïve to ask about it” (2). According to Poole, “Kierkegaard writes text after text whose
aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify an issue, not to propose a definite doctrine, not to offer
some “meaning” that could be directly appropriated” (7). This view is an example of the kind of
misinterpretation which fails to take into account the Christian aspect of Kierkegaard’s
authorship, of which indirect communication plays an integral role. Rather than defer or fail to
present meaning, Kierkegaard takes his receiver on a journey through the categories of the
esthetic and ethical in order to arrive to the religious. A definite, concrete process, one through
which Kierkegaard seeks to move the individual reader toward Christianity, is pervasive
throughout the authorship.
Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” (1841-1846) he refers to as esthetic writings because
they represent not only various literary and poetic opinions of the pseudonyms, but also
characterize the categories in which most people live. In an amazingly short period time,
Kierkegaard wrote the bulk of his pseudonymous literature. From 1843 to 1846 his major works
included Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of
Anxiety, Stages on Life’s Way, and CUP, as well as the Discourses accompanying each work.
Until “A First and Last Declaration” was appended to the end of CUP in 1846, he had made no
“official acknowledgement” that the pseudonymous works actually belonged to him (Swenson
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17). Although the majority of Denmark regarded Kierkegaard as the author of the
pseudonymous works, his “Declaration” is nevertheless imperative to understanding the thought
behind the pseudonyms. Kierkegaard writes:
My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my person…but an
essential basis in the production itself, which, for the sake of the lines and of the
psychologically varied differences of the individualities, poetically required as
indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil, brokenheartedness and gaiety, despair
and overconfidence, suffering and elation, etc., which is ideally limited only by
psychological consistency, which no factual person dares to allow himself or can want to
allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality. What has been written, then, is mine,
but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creating,
poetically actual individuality in his mouth, for my relation is even more remote than that
of a poet, who poeticizes characters and yet in the preface is himself the author. That is, I
am impersonally or personally in the third person a souffleur [prompter] who has
poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces in turn are their productions, as their
names are also. Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I
have no opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning
except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since it is impossible to have
that to a doubly reflected communication (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript 625).
The opinions presented by the pseudonyms are theirs alone. In order to serve the purpose
of indirect communication, Kierkegaard must distance himself from the production of the
pseudonymous authors. This concept allows the array of pseudonymous authors such as
Johannes Climacus, Johannes de Silentio, Victor Eremita, Frater Taciturnus, Constantine
Constantius, and Vigilius Haufniensis to present their own opinions on such subjects as
philosophy, religion, poetry, art, and literature. Kierkegaard “is not the author of their opinions,
but only the responsible individual who has given poetic life to the authors, each one of whom
speaks for himself” (Swenson 17). The fact that Kierkegaard refers to his fictitious authors as
“individuals” is significant as well. The pseudonyms are individuals in the Kierkegaardian
sense. The opinions they represent are their own. Although the reader may be able to see traces
of Kierkegaard in some of the pseudonyms, it would not be fair to attribute their opinions to him,
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since at times the pseudonyms present life-views contrary to one another. Therefore, the
argument that Kierkegaard simply used the pseudonyms as a mask for presenting his own views
simply does not apply. David Swenson says:
One guiding idea runs through this maze. His purpose is to explain and solve the riddles
of the life of reason and freedom. Not, however, in such a way as merely to increase the
store of human knowledge. He had diagnosed the evil of his day as a confusion of
knowledge with life, and he did not intend to contribute to this confusion by adding a few
more paragraphs to help make a systematic result. It was necessary to teach men what it
means to live, and to this end he wished to place before them living personalities who
think and speak for themselves (Swenson 17).
Rather than using the pseudonyms to present his own opinions, Kierkegaard in effect, turns them
into living writers with opinions of their own. The pseudonyms represent different characters on
different paths of life. If the reader examines what the pseudonyms have to say, he or she may
recognize something of themselves (McPherson 158). In this sense, “Kierkegaard’s
pseudonymity is the curtain separating him from the drama he stages” (Taylor 102).
Kierkegaard’s aim throughout his writings is displayed in The Point of View.
Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” is often categorized as his esthetic production, while his “second
authorship” (1846-1855) represents the religious. However, as Kierkegaard writes, “The
religious is present from the beginning. Conversely, the aesthetic is present again at the last
moment” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 12). Clearly, he anticipated the denouncement that
he had become a religious writer only after running through the esthetic stage. “The first group
of writings represents the aesthetic productivity, the last group is exclusively religious: between
them, as the turning point, lies the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This work concerns itself
with and sets ‘the Problem,’ which is the problem of the whole authorship: how to become a
Christian” (13). Throughout The Point of View Kierkegaard maintains that he had been from the
beginning a religious author; he had not become one with age or passing time. That from the
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beginning of his authorship he had been a religious writer concerned with how the single
individual becomes a Christian is evidenced by the “Upbuilding Discourses.” Even during the
esthetic production, characterized by indirect communication, Kierkegaard published these
overtly theological writings under his own name, employing direct communication. The
Discourses, each one as an accompaniment to a major work were generally published around the
same time as the pseudonymous works. For example, the pseudonymous “twin” works
Repetition and Fear and Trembling found their way to the printer on October 16, 1843 under the
pseudonyms Constantin Constantius and Johannes de Silentio, respectively. On the same day,
the work Three Upbuilding Discourses appeared. This allowed Kierkegaard the ability to
publish the pseudonymous works as indirect communication while presenting his own thought in
the Discourses. The very structure of the authorship itself proves Kierkegaard a religious author,
indeed a Christian one. Here we have one example of a dialectical approach to Kierkegaard’s
authorship. On the one hand, we have Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings which are bound in
indirect communication and through which various life-views are often presented. (One must
remember the reason these life-views are presented: In order to bring the individual reader to the
point of choosing whether or not to accept Christianity.) On the other, the Discourses, to which
Kierkegaard readily attaches his name. In the introduction to Edifying Discourses, Paul Holmer
writes, “Each discourse is calculated to bring the reader, whatever his aesthetic and intellectual
capacity, into conversation about religious and Christian concerns” (Kierkegaard, Edifying
Discourses vii).
However, we cannot alienate the Discourses from the rest of Kierkegaard’s authorship.
Neither can we completely isolate his pseudonymous authorship from his direct, signed works.
Rather, it is important to view the entire authorship in totality. Only then can one begin to
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understand the fullness of Kierkegaard’s Christian message. Kierkegaard’s aim was to lead
away from speculative thought and from Christianity simply as objective adherence, as he
believed Christendom had become during his day. He understood that the majority of people in
his times considered themselves Christians; however, they did not know what it means to exist in
Christianity. To Kierkegaard, Christendom as he saw it in Denmark had become nothing more
than a ritualistic claim accepted by the mass public. Individuality had become widely ignored.
Christendom as a type of popular folk religion denied personal examination and appropriation
which is central to the very teachings of Christianity. We can easily make parallels to our own
times by understanding what Christendom had become in Denmark according to Kierkegaard.
He saw how “it is difficult for anyone to become a Christian in truth because everyone is a
Christian of a sort. Being a Christian is confused with being a nice, respectable person who
works hard, fulfills family responsibilities, and perhaps even goes to church on Sundays now and
then” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 4). In this respect, the truth of Christianity is
hidden from view. People may have objective knowledge of Christian principles, but they
deceive themselves into believing that these acts alone constitute the whole the whole truth of
what it means to be a Christian. “Such a Christianity makes no real difference to anything or
anyone, and Kierkegaard saw very clearly that its major function was simply to legitimize the
status quo of an emerging bourgeois culture” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 4). In
order to reform and “reintroduce Christianity into Christendom,” Kierkegaard understood that
the individual must be made aware of his or her existence, and ultimately see what it means to
exist as an individual in Christianity. Hence, we have Kierkegaard’s focus on subjectivity and
inwardness. It is individual and personal belief in God which brings about faith. Kierkegaard’s
focus on “the single individual” then, is an attempt to lead others toward what it means to exist
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“alone face to face before God” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 402). Kierkegaard’s
call to “live as an individual” always involves living as an individual before God. He writes,
“But the all-knowing One, who in spite of anyone is able to observe it all, does not desire the
crowd. He desires the individual; He will deal only with the individual, quite unconcerned as to
whether the individual be of high or low station, whether he be distinguished or wretched”
(Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart 185). One can certainly gain objective knowledge of Christianity
by being part of the crowd, but one can never become a Christian by its aid. Each man only
finds true faith by being alone before God. By mere objective knowledge, as we will see shortly,
one does not come to any personal appropriation of the truth. That is, objective knowledge
cannot make any eternal decision to accept Christianity. Christianity can only be accepted
subjectively through individual terms.
Hermann Diem points out that it is the “greatest possible misunderstanding” of
Kierkegaard’s teaching to say that he “seeks truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere” or
that he makes the subjective an object of personal feeling11 (Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of
Existence 38f). Rather, “the point is not to think truth but to live in truth. This means that truth
is no longer to be conceived as an objective statement about certain relations of being, but as a
form of existence in which such relations are actualized” (38). The pseudonym Johannes
Climacus writes, “Christianity wants to give the single individual an eternal happiness, a good
that is not distributed in bulk but only to one, and to one at a time” (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript 130).
Faith is not gained through the imposition of another’s belief into one’s own life. Rather,
the Gospel must be believed through inwardness and personal appropriation of the truth. In his
writings on communication, Kierkegaard distinguishes between objective knowledge and
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subjective existence and between direct and indirect communication by introducing “the
communication of knowledge” and the “communication of capability.” We can gain further
insight into the Kierkegaardian concepts of inwardness, objectivity, and subjectivity by
examining his understanding of communication.
Background to the Lectures: The Effects of the Corsair Affair on Kierkegaard’s View of
Communication
In 1847, Kierkegaard wrote as part of his planned lectures on communication:
But I also find everywhere that men are preoccupied with the WHAT which is to be
communicated. What occupies me, on the other hand, is: what does it mean to
communicate—of this I know I have read nothing at all in the productions of the modern
period, nor have I heard anything spoken about it. Once long ago, in antiquity, primarily
in Greece, I find that men occupied themselves with this problem (Kierkegaard, Journals
and Papers Vol. 1 304).
Drafted but never published or delivered, these lectures nevertheless play an important role in
Kierkegaard’s thinking concerning the area of communication. The date 1847 is itself important
because the author had already published CUP (nearly a year before), which addressed what it
means to become a Christian and in which he dealt with the problem communication in great
detail.

The lectures, then, did not constitute the complete formulation of his thoughts on

communication; rather, they serve to further illuminate the subject. Hence, the lectures are
extremely important in order to fully grasp Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.
Although the lectures on communication have traditionally been examined far less than many of
Kierkegaard’s major works, they are necessary to understanding his model of indirect
communication, for as he says, “If anyone were to ask me how I regard these lectures in
relationship to my whole effort as an author, I would answer: I regard them as a necessary
concession, for which I intend to bear responsibility” (302). Before examining the lectures in
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detail, we must catch a glimpse of an event which affected Kierkegaard’s life both personally
and as an author during 1846-47.
By 1847, Kierkegaard was in the midst of his attack on The Corsair, the Danish
comic/gossip newspaper of which it has been said, “…its real editors hid behind the blackguards
who were ready to suffer the penalties of the law for libel. All reputable men declared that it was
a scandal which ought to be abated—yet secretly read it with malicious enjoyment” (Lowrie, A
Short Life of Kierkegaard 176). Kierkegaard eventually would suffer a great deal of public
ridicule and became nothing more than a caricature at the hands of the powerful newspaper with
“the largest circulation in Denmark” (176). In fact, the paper had achieved a circulation that
greatly outnumbered any in Denmark (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 347). The weekly paper had
attained such vast readership and circulation by “providing for the common people the delectable
spectacle of the upper classes exposed to the vilest derision” (The Point of View 164). David
Swenson writes concerning The Corsair: “It dealt in attacks on public men, in caricatures and
satires, and even exploited the secrets of private life. Evidence is not wanting that it frequently
descended to the level of blackmail. No one respected it, but everyone feared it; it was read
everywhere, by high and low alike” (19). The Corsair appeared to never miss the slightest
chance to single out and slander certain individuals, much to the secret delight of the public.
Under the ownership and operation of Aaron Goldschmidt, a talented Jewish writer and
journalist (Bukdahl 147), The Corsair amassed such a large circulation by appealing especially
to the “lower classes” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 10). The paper mixed “fact,
rumor, and gossip” (Kjӕr-Hansen, qtd. in Jansen 10) in order to attract readership. Its power as a
product of mass consumption stemmed from the facts that it was not only read by everyone but
also feared by all, for “nobody knew when he or she would appear in it” (Jansen 10).
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Goldschmidt himself hid behind The Corsair, and he and his fellow journalists cloaked
themselves in anonymity. The paper’s “effectual editor,” P.L. Møller12, did the same. But how
could The Corsair operate under anonymity, given the fact that in Denmark “all periodicals were
obliged to supply the name of a person to be held legally responsible for everything that
appeared in the relevant issue” of a paper (Bredsdorff 129)? The answer is quite simple. During
Goldschmidt’s six-year reign at The Corsair, the names of at least fourteen different people
appeared as legally responsible editors (129). The names were those of real, existing persons;
however, these individuals were not connected to the paper or responsible for its content. As
Elias Bredsdorff explains, “Most of the editors at The Corsair were mere stooges: shop
assistants, sailors, and dock workers who were paid for the use of their names, thus covering up
for the real editor, whose name never appeared on the journal” (129). This anonymity afforded
Goldschmidt, Møller, and other journalists the luxury of spreading gossip and slandering others,
but it just as importantly removed them from being held responsible for the paper’s content. As
a result, no one dared stand up to criticize or ridicule The Corsair’s practices, for doing so meant
certain slander. The Corsair stands out as only one example of mass media in Kierkegaard’s
Denmark, but its importance cannot be overstated. It has been written of the state of journalism
at the time: “Proper journalists would hardly have worked for the daily press, which was in fact
served by failed students, mediocre people who did the job as a sideline, often somewhat
unsavory types” (Stangerup 124). Nevertheless, the press had an enormous impact on society.
As a widely-read newspaper, The Corsair specifically succeeded in affecting both the state of
journalism and the perception of journalism in Denmark at the time.
Goldschmidt himself was given to the political liberalism of the times, and he
“represented the young Denmark that had been inspired by the French revolution of July 1830
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and had now turned against what it called ‘men of stagnation’” (Bukdahl 84). His newspaper
demanded the complete abolition of the institution of monarchy (Bredsdorff 129). The contents
of The Corsair reflected its political leanings. “Without being linked to any political party it
expressed extreme radical views; in some respects it may even be regarded as a precursor of
socialist ideas. Most of all, The Corsair aimed at being witty – and often was, though many of
its jokes have lost their flavor today. Its humor ranged from the very crude to the very
sophisticated…” (130). Jørgen Bukdahl writes that “Kierkegaard viewed aristocratic National
Liberalism, with its army of journalists and its command of the press, as a deception of the
people, misleading and actually insulting to the common man…” (85). Goldschmidt was likely
motivated to appeal to the common man by pushing his agenda of national liberalism. The
paper’s popularity was doubtless aided in part by its political stance. Since The Corsair was
largely based on French radical periodicals, it was the kind of journal the likes of which
Denmark had never seen (Bredsdorff 128). It would certainly appear as if dawning liberalism
had found its mouthpiece (Stangerup 120).
The Corsair debacle had sweeping ramifications for all parties involved. As Howard and
Edna Hong acknowledge in the introduction to The Corsair Affair, the event has been called “the
most renowned controversy in Danish literary history” (Kierkegaard, The Corsair Affair vii).13
The events that unfolded between Goldschmidt, Kierkegaard, and Møller through the medium of
print reverberated throughout Copenhagen and “was as wrenching as it was decisive for each of
them in ways that were completely unexpected” (Perkins, The Corsair Affair xiv). For our
purposes, we shall see that the battle particularly had enormous effects upon Kierkegaard and his
subsequent thought. Throughout the entire affair we have two very distinct and separate views
represented. On the one hand we have Kierkegaard’s view that The Corsair disrupted and
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confused society with its appeals to the masses through disreputable content. It was well known
that The Corsair singled out and slandered certain individuals for the purpose of stirring up
gossip. This was all done in the name of readership and circulation. Kierkegaard believed that
the purpose of the paper was “merely to make money by fair means or foul” (Lowrie,
Kierkegaard Vol.2 348). He writes that the paper attacked “peaceable and respectable men, who
in honorable seclusion follow their vocations in the service of the state; excellent men, in many
ways deserving well, and in none having made themselves worthy of ridicule” (Kierkegaard, qtd.
in Swenson 98).
There is a sense in which journalism is a business like any other practice. Writers,
editors, and publishers alike rarely are willing to give away what power they have obtained. As
a result, they often adhere to those ideals which will best serve their own interests. One goal of
the daily press is to reach the greatest amount of people possible. Its power to influence public
opinion, to sway the masses, is almost unprecedented. So, on the other hand we have the views
of Goldschmidt and Møller, both of whom doubtless desired to remain shrouded in anonymity
and perceived Kierkegaard a threat to the basic tenets of journalistic practice. They were likely
comfortable with the status quo, for the greater the circulation, the more people they reached.
The greater the level of reach, the more influence the paper gained in society. The greater this
influence, the more money The Corsair could make. The practices of The Corsair represented a
dark side of journalism, but unfortunately a very real side—and one that is to a certain extent still
recognizable today.
Now, Kierkegaard scholars are somewhat at odds over exactly who should be held
responsible (Goldschmidt or Møller) for the leveling of Kierkegaard in the press (Perkins ed.
xxiii). The general view is that Møller initiated the attack while Goldschmidt perpetuated it.
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For our purposes it is necessary to shed light on the details of the affair, for it became a driving
force behind Kierkegaard’s view of communication.
Kierkegaard had previously received favorable reviews from The Corsair. Goldschmidt
had praised both The Concept of Irony (1841) and Either/Or and certainly respected Kierkegaard
as a brilliant author whose pseudonymous literature was unsurpassed in Denmark (Bredsdorff
131). For his part, Kierkegaard had befriended Goldschmidt when the latter lacked any person
of distinction with whom he could converse (Lowrie 348). In fact, it is clear that Kierkegaard
recognized Goldschmidt’s talent and often encouraged him to quit The Corsair (348). He likely
recognized that Goldschmidt was capable of producing literary material which could greatly
surpass any success through The Corsair. In any event, the two often discussed articles that had
appeared in The Corsair and Kierkegaard made suggestions for new subjects to Goldschmidt
(Bukdahl 83). However, we shall see that from Kierkegaard’s point of view newspapers should
appeal to the individual rather than the masses. They should strive to aid the individual’s
development in a positive way. He believed that a newspaper, even a satirical one like The
Corsair, could be used “to address the individual reader as a human being” (Jansen, “The
Individual Versus the Public” 11). “In The Corsair, or any other satirical newspaper,
Kierkegaard foresaw the possibility of using satire and irony to awaken the reader. But this is
precisely what Goldschmidt did not do. Kierkegaard thus accused Goldschmidt of cowardice:
instead of using the potentialities of his medium, Goldschmidt made himself a nonentity by
hiding behind The Corsair” (12). One mistake of the daily press was its insistence to write for –
and thereby actually create—a mass public. As Kierkegaard says:
The whole population of Copenhagen had become ironical and witty…This irony was of
course nothing but, in essence, vulgarity; and in spite of a not inconsiderable degree of
talent in the man who was its originating force, by passing over to these thousands of
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people it became, essentially, a mob trait which is always only too popular. In view of
the proportions of the little country, it threatened a complete moral dissolution
(Kierkegaard, qtd. in Swenson 96).
Denmark was a small country and could not withstand such a force as The Corsair in
Kierkegaard’s view. Goldschmidt may have been a talented young man, but he had helped to
produce a crowd that secretly welcomed the vulgarity of The Corsair. By allowing themselves
to be taken in by the publication, people were actually permitting it to control the way they
thought, acted, and lived.
Although The Corsair had been favorable to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous literature in
the past, he did not welcome the paper’s praise. Given his already dim view of The Corsair,
Kierkegaard would rather have his pseudonyms attacked than acclaimed—and he said so.14
Møller began the actual attack in 1845 by writing an unfavorable, overly-critical review of part
of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Stages on Life’s Way (1845), which appeared in the annual
publication Gœa. It was obvious that Møller had failed to rightly understand the work or the
view of one of its pseudonymous authors, Frater Taciturnus.15 Kierkegaard responded promptly
with a pseudonymous article of his own printed in the daily paper The Fatherland. In the article
he spoke of Møller’s position as The Corsair's effectual editor. In doing so, Walter Lowrie
writes that Kierkegaard thereby revealed Møller’s secret connection with the “disreputable
paper” (The Point of View 164) and ruined Møller’s opportunity to “attain the university chair he
so coveted” (164). However, there is some contention between scholars on this view. Robert
Perkins points out that there is evidence that Møller’s position at The Corsair could have at least
moderately been known to those with whom he sought such a decorated position months prior to
Kierkegaard’s response (The Corsair Affair xviii). According to Perkins, Goldschmidt himself
attempted to transfer the blame for Møller’s non-appointment to Kierkegaard, perhaps because
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he had personally told Kierkegaard of Møller’s involvement with the paper (xx). However, if
Goldschmidt had broken silence and related the issue of Møller to Kierkegaard, how many other
people had he told as well? Perhaps Kierkegaard’s article succeeded in making it more widely
known that Møller was intimately involved with the scandalous paper, but it would appear that
evidence of his association was already not lacking.
In any event, The Corsair struck back with ferocity, as Møller began the attack on
Kierkegaard that would last for an extended period of time. His first article, Lowrie notes,
included a caricature of Kierkegaard. Lowrie writes that “for the course of about a year almost
every number of the Corsair carried one or more caricatures designed to make Denmark’s
greatest writer ridiculous in the eyes of the vulgar” (A Short Life of Kierkegaard164). A week
rarely passed without the production of at least one or more (and sometimes four) articles
mocking Kierkegaard’s physical appearance (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 351). These articles
and caricatures were of such interest to society that other papers printed them as well (351).
Constant references were made to Kierkegaard’s unique attire and he was often depicted as
unkempt and slightly deformed in the caricatures. His pseudonymous characters were attacked
repeatedly, but always in such a way as to make it painfully obvious that Kierkegaard was the
intended subject of ridicule. As a result, he became a “standing comic figure” to the public.
Rather than understanding that The Corsair stooped to malice and slander in order to gain
readers, the public took delight in the depictions of Denmark’s greatest writer. David Swenson
says that the attack sunk deeply into the consciousness of Copenhagen (21). He writes, “The
articles were illustrated with pictures of Kierkegaard walking through the streets, his umbrella
under his arm, and one trouser leg depicted as considerably longer than the other. The result of
this campaign was that Kierkegaard could not show himself on the streets without being
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followed by a gaping and howling mob of boys and young men” (20). Elias Bredsdorff
describes the situation this way: “The Corsair’s cartoons had made SK the target of mob-ridicule
in Copenhagen. Prostitutes accosted him in the streets as ‘Mr. Either/Or,’ and people stared at
his trousers and laughed knowingly. SK suffered unspeakably” (141). The effects of the affair
far outlasted the debacle itself. Kierkegaard would publically suffer the effects for two more
years, and he was mocked, laughed at and taunted for the rest of his life (Lowrie, Kierkegaard
Vol.2 353). The derision begun by one newspaper had infected the mob (354). Kierkegaard
wrote of the struggle in 1848:
They have infected the air for me…Curiosity surrounds me everywhere. I travel five
miles out to my dear forest district—ah! everywhere curiosity. And so I am wasted upon
Denmark…My Christian name exists as a nickname for me which every school-boy
knows. Ever more frequently the same name is now used by authors, in comedies it now
appears regularly, and everybody knows that it is I (qtd. in Lowrie 354).
Lowrie relates the story of the attack which likely affected Kierkegaard the most. It deals with
the event in Kierkegaard’s life which caused him considerable suffering: the breaking of his
engagement to his fiancé Regina Olsen in 1841.
But to the most shameful of all the attacks of The Corsair (he was pictured sitting astride
a young girl and beating her, and the motto was ‘Frater Taciturnus chastises his girl’) his
reaction was anything but extravagant: “Here now, little Corsair! It is womanish to
torment a man with his love-affair; it is a womanish thing under the impression of love
disdained to continue to run after a person in the street and call him names. Be a man,
hold your peace” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 356).
In a separate depiction, Frater Taciturnus “is surveilling his battle forces (a pitiable crowd
without arms and legs,” and yet another shows Kierkegaard as “the centre of the universe”
(Bredsdorff 139).
During the period of the attack against The Corsair, Kierkegaard’s journals became
extraordinarily voluminous (Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard181). His writings on the press
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and the state of journalism in Denmark could fill multiple volumes and as a result could be
studied almost inexhaustibly. Indeed, “Few people have devoted so much time and space to the
press as did SK, and written as critically about it as he did” (Stangerup 119). Although
Kierkegaard had previously maintained an unfavorable view of the press in general and
journalists in particular, the affair of the Corsair appears to have considerably coarsened that
view. Through the Corsair, we see Kierkegaard’s most obstentious critique of the media.
During the period he wrote, “The tyranny of the daily press is the most wretched, the most
contemptible of all tyrannies; it is the begging tyranny—in the same way that a beggar to whom
we all say “No” eventually extorts something from us by running up and down the street after
us” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 478). It is clear from another journal entry a year
later that Kierkegaard believed the press possessed too much power – power to slander the
individual and negatively influence the public.
The government cannot prohibit the natural powers which a man possesses, but it can
forbid the possession of dangerous weapons, because they are too powerful and go
beyond the human. Accordingly, the government cannot prohibit oral communication,
which is a gift of God, but it could very well prohibit the daily press, because is it a much
too gigantic means of communication (479).
One must think that Kierkegaard specifically had The Corsair in mind when he wrote in 1847:
The daily press is and remains the evil principle in the modern world. In its sophistry it
has no limits, since it can sink to ever lower and lower levels of readers. Consequently it
stirs up so much foulness and meanness that no state can cope with it. There will always
be only a few who truly see the untruth in the existence of the daily press, but of these
few, again, there will be very few with the courage to express it, because it is outright
martyrdom to break with the majority and the large audience who will immediately
persecute the one that does (479).
Yet this is exactly what Kierkegaard did. He attacked the press for its hostility and in
turn found himself the subject of ridicule, which caused him much public and inward suffering.
Kierkegaard loved and valued interpersonal communication. His daily walks through the streets
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of Copenhagen were of great enjoyment to him because he could directly speak with common
people, whom he loved and appreciated. Jørgen Bukdahl gives an example of how important
personal communication was to Kierkegaard: “In matters concerning the common people he was
direct, without ulterior motives or condescension…He had a rare capacity for sharing the
thoughts of common people, for entering into their mental universe” (86). However, the same
public now stood to deride him. Rather than be pleased by his company, “people joined in the
general laughter with malicious glee, mocking the defenseless Kierkegaard…” (90).
Nevertheless, he remained a friend to the people (Bukdahl 90).
While there are countless references to the effects The Corsair had upon Kierkegaard’s
communication with others, it is necessary to point out two journal entries which sum up the
suffering he endured through the attack. The first is from 1849, the second from 1850.
O, the way I lived with the common man; there perhaps is not one in the whole
generation who could do it, and how few are they who understand him and understand
the callousness and cruelty of class distinctions that ordinarily underlie associations with
the common man. And then to have this forbidden me, to have it regarded as ridiculously
overplaying the part, and that I cannot ever do anything more for the common man,
because for him I exist as a sort of half-looney. And that this has come about by means
of those “who take the part of the common man against the aristocrats.” How tragic!
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6 231).
He goes on to lament the loss of this intimate interpersonal communication:
But the common man whom I loved! It was my greatest joy to express some measure of
love to the neighbor; when I saw this loathsome condescension toward less important
people, I dared say to myself, “I do not live like that.” It was my consolation to alleviate
this when possible; it was my pleasure, my blessed diversion. My life was made for that.
So when I have to bear the derision of the common man it saddens me indescribably.
There was in fact hardly anyone around here who loved the common man this way—and
now to see him turned against me in hostility. A journalist who tricks the common man
out of his money and in return give him confused concepts is regarded as a benefactor—
and the person who sacrificed so much, every advantage of solidarity with the upper
class, is represented as an enemy of the common man, as someone to insult (311).
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The effects of The Corsair attack were great, for even after the ordeal was long over,
Kierkegaard still endured humiliation from the very public to which he had reached out.
It has been noted that Kierkegaard’s battle with The Corsair is the hinge on which his
canon pivots (Bukdahl 83). Indeed, his confrontation with The Corsair and his view of the press
are both important for several reasons. First of all, I mention them here because they give the
backdrop to the times in which Kierkegaard wrote his lectures on communication. Kierkegaard’s
understanding of communication vastly differed from those typical of an age in which the natural
sciences had been accepted and “proclaimed as the way in which the human being, through
his/her own intellectual efforts, could discover the whole truth about himself/herself and his/her
world” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 5). He doubtless saw this shift as degrading
to the individual, for he “lamented this state of affairs by pointing out that the distinction
between knowledge (science) and the art of existence had disappeared and the art of existence
was now communicated as scientific knowledge” (5). The effects were detrimental to the
individual. “The individual, who had become anonymous as a result of social transformations,
could now be studied as an ‘object’ without any real intervening ‘spiritual qualification’” (5).
Second of all, the communication Kierkegaard writes about relates to inwardness, ultimately to
Christianity, and differed vastly from the type of communication offered by The Corsair as a
representative of the press, with its biases, libelous content and malicious insults. Kierkegaard
writes that the press, as a “disproportionate medium of communication” (Journals and Papers
Vol. 6 483), failed to understand or accept his teachings concerning the single individual (481).
If this is true, it also failed to recognize his teachings on inwardness, subjectivity, and existence.
Thirdly, The Corsair may have given Kierkegaard a renewed reason to continue with his
model of communication and further expound on the relation of indirect communication to
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Christianity. Whether or not this was the case, the affair with The Corsair eventually
rejuvenated him as an author. He had previously considered CUP to be his last work as an
author (hence the ‘Declaration’ in which he acknowledges himself to be the author of all the
pseudonymous works), and he had hoped to take a position as a pastor in the country (Lowrie,
Kierkegaard Vol.2 362). Now he knew he must endure and continue as an author. From
Either/Or, edited by the pseudonymous Victor Eremita, to CUP, by the pseudonym Johannes
Climacus, pseudonyms had been artfully employed as one function of indirect communication.
After the debacle with the Corsair things would be different. From then on Kierkegaard instead
mostly communicated directly with his audience and sought to deal exclusively with religious
themes. However, it is important to note that indirect communication still remained a decisive
theme in his writings inasmuch as he used direct communication to expound on this model of
indirect communication. The effects from the Corsair were severe, but they eventually gave
Kierkegaard renewed strength as an author. He realized he must stay the course and continue
writing. He still desired to communicate with the single individual “whom with joy and
gratitude” he called “his reader” (Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses 1). In particular, the entire
experience fixed his attention upon the influence of the press, which had the effect of reducing
individuals to a mass, “the public” (Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard 184). Through the
event with the Corsair, Kierkegaard reached an important conclusion well before our current
time. The power of the press, if unbridled and uncontrolled, could filter down through society,
influencing and changing the way people thought and acted. For example, he noticed that the
public did not claim responsibility for the content they had received, but then again neither did
the journalists accept responsibility for the content they printed and released to the mass public
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6 516). The concept of journalistic responsibility (or the
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lack of it) of the times is seen in the example of The Corsair. By hiding behind anonymity the
editors denied responsible for the paper’s productions. However, if the editors would not take
responsibility for the content, what kind of message was being sent to the public? Could it serve
to enrich the lives of others, or was it a collective effort of negative messaging actually working
against the interests of the people? In a strict sense, the objective of newspapers to get hold of
the public en mass was in direct opposition to Kierkegaard’s main goal of aiding the individual
to ponder his or hers’ existential relationship to Christianity through inwardness. Rather than
give up his authorship, he decided to stay the course. He felt it his duty before God to do so.
“There is a word which for me is a magic formula: Obedience is more precious to God than the
fat of rams. If my meager effectiveness, a nothing compared to the task, disappears, humanly
speaking, I shall still keep on: Obedience is more precious to God than the fat of rams” (Journals
and Papers Vol. 1 481).
Lectures on Communication and the Meaning of Indirect Communication
We have seen that Kierkegaard was concerned with what it means to communicate. To
expound further on this concept, we could say that he was concerned with communicating truth
subjectively, i.e. through personal appropriation to the truth. His pseudonymity is such an
excellent example of indirect communication because any interference from the communicator is
thereby removed, allowing the receiver to dwell on the communication itself. In order to
communicate indirectly, Kierkegaard realized that he must not hinder the communication by
being the focus of attention. Instead, the individual must personally relate to the communication.
This is especially true in matters of ethical-religious communication. This mode differs from the
purely objective one, through which the individual may learn and gain knowledge of concepts.
However, objective or direct communication does not require reflection upon the communication
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– it is simply knowledge without productive, personal results. In order to get hold of the
individual, Kierkegaard employed the indirect method through which he hoped to make people
aware of their conditions and to allow them to reflect personally on the message received. His
communication lectures assist us in better understanding this principle.
Section one of the lectures “describes the problem of communication in modern society,”
while the second part deals with the “dialectic of ethical and ethical-religious communication”
(Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117). Kierkegaard begins by presenting what he
understood as the dishonesty of his time-period. This dishonesty takes the form of self-deception,
rather than intentional deception. Society, as Kierkegaard saw it, lacked the proper perspective
of understanding the concept of existence. To him, the mass majority of people deceive
themselves into being unconcerned with their existence. Kierkegaard recognized that people
“cling to the generation,” or adapt themselves to that which the current generation deems popular
or essential. The “dishonesty of the modern age” is, in one sense, its “lack of primitivity”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 292). C. Stephen Evans says that Kierkegaard’s use
“primitivity” is best understood as “authenticity” (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 236). “It
does not mean that an individual should necessarily forego modern conveniences or ‘return to
nature.’ Rather, the idea is that there is something within the self that is not merely the creation
of society, a set of potentialities that is truly God-given. The individual must try to discover
what God intended him or her to be and must then become this…” (236). Kierkegaard observed
that modern society demands the attention of the individual. With each generation comes an
ever-changing, accelerated lifestyle. In such haste, the concept of the individual is ignored.
Rather than seeking what it means to live as an individual, one usually adapts to the demands of
the age. “One of the tragedies of modern times is precisely this –to have abolished the “I,” the
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personal “I” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1 302). The result is that everyone simply
becomes part of the crowd. There is no personal examination when one is simply part of the
crowd; one does not “occupy himself with the problem of what it is to be a human being” (304),
what it means to communicate, or with what it means to personally be a Christian. Kierkegaard
writes:
If I were to imagine a human being who was brought up in such a manner and lived out
his life in such a manner that he never got any impression of himself but always lived by
adaptation and comparison—this would be an example of dishonesty. And this is
precisely the state of affairs in modern times. The history of the generation runs its
course, it is true, but every single individual should still have his primitive impression of
existence—in order to be a human being (292).
As society becomes more advanced, confusion increases. People begin to devalue the meaning
of their own existence before an almighty God. They lack the authenticity individuals, and by
doing so, deceive themselves.
What haste, what confusion—as if by an earthquake! Young people, even children, are
aware of how fraudulent everything is and what nothingness it is to be a human being,
how everything depends on clinging to the generation, following the demands of the age,
which nevertheless are always changing. Thus the life of the generation hisses and fizzes
uninterruptedly; although everything is a whirlwind, a single-shot is heard, the ringing of
bells, signifying to the individual that now, this very second, hurry, throw everything
away, reflection, quiet meditation, reassuring thoughts of the eternal, or if you come too
late you will not go along on the generation’s expedition, which is just pulling out…
(293).
Kierkegaard’s critique of his times by no means indicates that he was “insensitive to new
possibilities for individual self-expression in his day” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the
Truth” 117). As Climacus writes in CUP, “…because of the copiousness of knowledge, people
in our day have forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness is…” (249). Climacus is
concerned in this passage with what it means to exist religiously. He writes, “If people had
forgotten what it means to exist religiously, they had probably also forgotten what it means to
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exist humanly” (249). Therefore, Kierkegaard deemed it necessary to bring the individual along,
step by step, towards Christianity, the highest mode of existence. In order to accomplish this
task, he had to employ an indirect method. “The movement described by the authorship is this:
from the poet (from aesthetics), from philosophy (from speculation), to the indication of the most
central definition of what Christianity is…” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 142). He believed
that personal appropriation to the truth had been lost in modernity. In addition, “Modernity
eliminates the possibility of religious subjectivity and inwardness which are definitive of
authentic existence” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117).
Thus, while technology and “the means of communication” can serve positive purposes,
they do not come without certain dangers when used incorrectly. It is clear to see from reading
the lectures that Kierkegaard was a critic of the mass media. To him, technology advances and
demands the individual’s attention. When what is needed is comprehension of individual
existence before God, reflection on Christianity and the Word, and “reassuring thoughts of the
eternal” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 293), instead the individual begins to regard science,
scholarship, and the news of the day as all-important themes worthy of the most acute attention.
He writes,
The means of communication become more and more excellent, printing can be done
more and more rapidly, with increasing speed—but the communications become more
and more hurried and more and more confusing. And if anyone dares, both in the name
of primitivity and God, to resist it—woe unto him! Just as the individual is seized by a
whirlwind of impatience to be understood immediately, so a generation domineeringly
craves to understand the individual at once. This produces dishonesty (293).
The dishonesty of which Kierkegaard speaks is the failure of the generation to be guided by a
higher power. Instead, it places faith in man’s achievements rather than taking into account the
slow process of becoming an individual in the Christian sense.
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Tracing the steps of this confusion, Kierkegaard interestingly points to scholarly
periodicals and the daily press as two great hindrances to becoming an individual. First, he
discusses how the scholarly periodicals in his day had deviated from their original course. “The
idea of the periodicals was to aid in perspective, but then the periodicals proceeded to become an
independent literature. This is the modern age’s misfortune. The periodicals became more and
more ephemeral; ultimately the demands of the age became the demands of the moment”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 294). According to Kierkegaard, the periodicals have “the
power of the moment and the power of circulation” (294). The scholarly periodicals had erred
from their original purpose by attempting to reach the masses rather than tailoring content toward
the individual. He explains that now “Journal literature abandons criticism and writes for the
mass” (294). We can see why Kierkegaard was so concerned with the state of communication.
He understood how people want to be communicated to directly in the moment; they want to
immediately grasp the communicated message without examining first what it means to
communicate. His critique of the modern age is that they demand everything “in the moment.”
Second, the daily press provides further means for instantaneous communication. It is
particularly fascinating to examine Kierkegaard’s critique of media from its historical
perspective. In our own times, as instantaneous communication via the mass media appears to
demand our attention more and more, Kierkegaard’s warning of the power of media to distort
and define human existence should be given attention. However, his position has been widely
ignored by the field of communication. It should be noted that the daily press was the only real
means of mass communication in Kierkegaard’s day. Hence, we have the popularity of
newspapers such as the Corsair, which could easily reach the masses. While newspapers have
dramatically changed in both style and content since Kierkegaard’s day, their power nevertheless
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has not decreased. Kierkegaard’s criticism of the daily press can still be applied today. Nerina
Jansen writes:
Nowadays public opinion can be employed effectively by the wielders of power—on an
international, national, or local scale—to control people’s thoughts and actions, and
nobody thinks of questioning the legitimacy of the explanations and justifications that are
offered; they operate in the name and in the interest of “the public”…The immense power
of the mass media in manipulating the content of people’s lives has not diminished since
Kierkegaard’s time; it has increased (Jansen, “The Individual versus the Public” 19).
The press focuses on the power of circulation (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 294) and fails to
take responsibility for its content. We have seen how Kierkegaard believed that neither the press
nor the public was willing to take responsibility for the content produced and received. In
particular, he witnessed how the journalist failed to take responsibility for the production of
content by hiding behind anonymity. But the journalist defends himself against all attacks by
pointing to the fact of daily readership. Kierkegaard writes, “…the journalist defiantly points to
his thousands of subscribers and his power at the moment. Nor is there a redeeming outlook for
the near future, for the journalist has become a type; the individual dies but the journalist never
dies—there only get to be more and more of them” (295).
The power of the press is its ability to create the crowd and then to control its thoughts.
In the swarming crowd, the individual becomes anonymous. Personal identity vanishes. “Faceto-face interpersonal communication between two people or a small group of people was no
longer the only form of communication. The daily press addressed a large audience that was
normally unknown both to the journalist and to the other readers” (Jansen, “The Individual
Versus the Public” 5). Kierkegaard had his pseudonyms, but we have seen how they serve the
purpose of bettering the existence of others by showing them in a personal way the categories in
which they abide, in hopes that they would become individuals and be transformed by the truth
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of Christianity. In stark contrast, the press operated sometimes under anonymity as a way of
avoiding responsibility for content. The daily press exposed the personal lives of others in a
strange mix of fact and fiction in the name of consumption. Kierkegaard writes that the press
was influential in forming public opinion, deceiving others into believing that their opinions
should mirror those of the press. In 1853 he wrote in his personal journals:
The demoralizing character of the press can also be seen in the following way. In each
generation there are hardly ten who, Socratically, most of all fear to think wrong, but
there are thousands and millions who are all too afraid of standing alone with an opinion,
be it ever so right. But when something is printed in the newspaper, this is eo ipso sure
proof that there is a goodly number who want to have or express the same opinion—ergo,
you may well venture to have the same opinion. In fact, if the daily press, like some
other occupational groups, had a coat-of-arms, the inscription ought to be: Here men are
demoralized in the shortest possible time, on the largest possible scale, at the cheapest
possible price (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 489).
And in 1848 he wrote:
That the press which has demoralized the states can also be seen in the following way:
Only a person of wide culture can read the newspapers and remain unscathed, and there
are not many of these in any generation—and the few there are scarcely read newspapers
any more. But the mass read the newspapers, the mass for whom this unwholesome diet
is in and of itself most pernicious. The same thing can be seen in another way. The press
wants to influence by means of coverage, but coverage is simply the power of the lie, a
sensate power of fists. One is reminded of Goethe’s words: We have abolished the devil
and gotten devils (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2 483).
The press operated under the assumption that it was a friend of the people, but it really worked
against them. It succeeded in deceiving men and women through lies, slander, and gossip.
There is an overwhelming amount of greed and lust for power at work here. As the daily press
became more popular and etched its mark into society, the generation became “trapped in the
perplexity of existence as never before” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 295). Because of the
press, people became increasingly concerned with what the papers had to say on issues such as
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social reform. They were more interested in stories of gossip than with what it means to become
an authentic individual self.
Above all, Kierkegaard denounced the press because he believed that as an organization,
it kept people from coming to genuine faith in Christ. People formed their opinions based on the
material presented in the pages of the newspaper rather than seeking out for themselves the truth
of Christianity. Kierkegaard’s scathing critique of the media points to its power to inhibit others
from realizing the essential quality of Christian inwardness. It led people into a demoralizing
existence and kept them from realizing that living in Christianity is the highest form of existence
attainable. In a journal entry from 1849 he writes:
Even if my life had no other significance, well, I am satisfied with having really
discovered the absolutely demoralizing existence of the daily press. Actually, it is the
press, more specifically, the daily newspaper, and the whole modern way of life
corresponding to it, which make Christianity impossible. Think of Christ. The idea that
he would use a newspaper to proclaim his teaching is nonsense and blasphemy on
seventeen grounds, and this is one of them: the imprint of the personality of the I who is
speaking must fall upon every word he says—but communication by means of journalism
is an abstraction, which supposedly is superior to individual personality—and with Christ
the very opposite is the case (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2 485).
It is worth recalling that Kierkegaard considered it his chief task in life to help others improve
the quality of their own existence. To him, the answer to the existential dilemma of life could
not be found within vogue philosophy, or in the press masquerading lies as truth. It could not be
found in the crowd, for it bred irresponsibility and loss of personality. Rather, to be aware of
one’s own existence is to consider one’s helpless state before the almighty God. The single
individual, therefore, is “principally a Christian concept, which played a decisive role in his
declaration of the sole re-medium, the only way in which it should be preserved; that is, through
the imitation of Christ. Only as the single individual is a man able to imitate Christ” (Thulstrup,
“The Single Individual” 11). As the press evaded the thoughts and opinions of others, it gained
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the masses. However, Kierkegaard considered the crowd to be untruth. Only the single
individual existing before God recognized and sought to obey truth. Kierkegaard gives a good
summary of what he means by ‘the single individual’ in his journals.
“The single individual”—of course, the single individual religiously understood,
consequently understood in such a way that every one, unconditionally every one, yes,
unconditionally every one, just as much as every one has or should have a conscience,
can be that single individual and should be that, can stake his honor in being willing to be
that, but then also can find blessedness in being what is the expression for true fear of
God, true love to one’s neighbor, true humanity, and true human equality…
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 415).
How this category is to be taught and communicated Kierkegaard deals with in the lectures.
There are two main categories we shall examine in detail within the lectures: the communication
of knowledge and the communication of capability.
The lectures are designed to contrast the communication offered by the mass media to the
majority of society with Kierkegaard’s own views on ethical and ethical-religious
communication. However, his main point is to present ethical-religious communication as the
highest form of communication, since it is communication of truth. Certainly he envisioned
actually presenting the lectures, for he writes that throughout the course of the address he would
communicate directly the concept of indirect communication (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
300). His purpose is to show how “the ethical and ethical-religious have to be communicated
existentially and in the direction of the existential” (301). We will see in this discussion how
Kierkegaard accomplishes this goal, and also that that which he considers “existential” differs
vastly from the conventional application of the term in postmodernity.
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The Communication of Knowledge
In his journals on communication Kierkegaard writes that “All communication of
knowledge is direct communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 308). Direct
communication is the communication of objective knowledge from the communicator directly to
the receiver. More specifically, direct communication aims at objective understanding (Evans,
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 96). In the communication of knowledge the object is
reflected upon. Objective thinking differs from subjectivity because the former “seeks to impart
truth by simply communicating results” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 630). In CUP the
pseudonym Johannes Climacus writes, “Objective thinking is completely indifferent to
subjectivity and thereby to inwardness and appropriation; its communication is therefore direct”
(Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 75). Objective thinking is concerned only with
results (73) rather than personal appropriation. The goal of objectivity is pure knowledge.
Reflection on that which is being communicated takes place in the objective sense when the
learner grasps the concepts intellectually (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97).
This differs from subjectivity, which requires double-reflection upon the communication.
Double-reflection, as we will see, is “rooted in the character of existence” (96). C. Stephen
Evans writes: “Direct communication, which aims at objective understanding, does not require
this doubleness. What is communicated directly is essentially intellectual content, and when the
recipient of the communication understands the ideas (possibilities), the communication is
successful. The recipient only has to grasp the possibilities intellectually (first reflection); no
double reflection is necessary” (96). Thus in CUP Climacus says, “To objective reflection, truth
becomes something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective
reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse
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oneself, existing, in subjectivity” (192). Double reflection in Kierkegaardian terms is “An
instance of indirect communication requiring artful suppression of the communicator, who as a
‘subjective existing thinker’ becomes aware on second reflection that the truth he has acquired
‘interests’ his existence, and that it cannot simply be appropriated by another without being
acquired by the same process of reflection, which the indirect method is designed to stimulate”
(Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 631). Reflection is a key aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought in general,
and plays a decisive role in his model of indirect communication.
For Kierkegaard, objective thinking is a theoretical and detached kind of thinking that is
indifferent to a specific individual person (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 118).
Kierkegaard does not want to do away with direct communication. Viewed as objectivity, it may
at times be a necessary form of communication. From CUP onward, he would employ direct
communication as a way of presenting religious truth. That is, he would speak to his audience
directly. Kierkegaard understood that direct communication is a “suitable mode for conveying
knowledge hitherto unknown to the recipient” (119). However, it has its limits in that it can only
convey knowledge. Jansen writes, “What is required from the communicator in direct
communication is competence and an ability to transmit knowledge to the recipient, while the
only requirement for the recipient is to be in a position to receive the knowledge” (119). As we
have seen from Evans, the communication is successful when the receiver does understand the
intellectual content being transmitted.
Kierkegaard does not think that direct communication should never be employed.
Indeed, it is a “necessary first step in ethical-religious communication where recipients need to
become acquainted with the contents of the Christian message” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of
the Truth” 119). However, Kierkegaard notes that this knowledge is only a preliminary step
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(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 289). He writes, “Here is an element of knowledge and to
that extent an object. But it is only a first thing. The communication is still not essentially of
knowledge but a communication of capability. That there is an element of knowledge is
particularly true for Christianity; a knowledge about Christianity must certainly be
communicated in advance” (289). So Kierkegaard is not denying that direct communication can
be used in matters pertaining to the objective knowledge of Christian principles. However, such
knowledge is only preliminary. If an individual does not subjectively appropriate the truth of
Christianity to his own life – if he remains unaware of the power of this truth to personally
transform his own existence, then the truth eo ipso does not become truth to him. Mere
knowledge of the ethical-religious is not enough to make one a Christian.
Kierkegaard’s argument against the objective in the lectures is based on the fact that “The
modern age has—and I regard this as its basic damage—abolished personality and made
everything objective” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 304). We have seen that in the lectures
Kierkegaard is concerned with what it means to communicate. He understood that by making
everything objective “men do not come to dwell upon the thought of what does it mean to
communicate but hasten immediately to the what they wish to communicate” (304). We will see
shortly that by making everything objective, the communicator is “saved from the pangs of
delay” (304). That is, the communicator ignores the fact that coming into subjective relation to
the truth proves to be a long, tedious process.
We have seen that the communication of knowledge has no care for the individual and
does not answer the fundamental problem of what it means to exist. Since it is unconcerned with
existence, objective thinking does not require a double reflection, whereby the individual
personally appropriates the message. In CUP Climacus writes:

87

The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into something accidental
and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something. The way to the
objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and subjectivity become
indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this is precisely its objective validity,
because the interest, just like the decision, is subjectivity. The way of objective reflection
now leads to abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds,
and always leads away from the subjective individual, whose existence or nonexistence
becomes, from an objective point of view, altogether properly, infinitely indifferent,
altogether properly, infinitely indifferent…(193).
Objective reflection leads away from the subjective individual and is indifferent towards him.
Objective reflection sees the individual as “something accidental,” merely as an object, rather
than an existing subject. When something is communicated objectively, the learner or recipient
may in fact gain quite a bit of knowledge. However, especially in the case of ethical-religious
communication, there is a difference between merely having objective knowledge and being able
to apply knowledge of something to one’s own life. In objective communication, “the learner
gains the ability to parrot what the communicator says but has no genuine understanding of the
content” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97).
In his communication lectures, Kierkegaard writes that the modern age has forgotten
what it means to exist because science and scholarship, which work in their proper sphere, have
invaded ethics. He writes, “Everything has become science and scholarship…there is a whole
aspect of art which science and scholarship have taken possession of—or wish to take possession
of—this is the ethical” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 268). However, science, as objective
understanding, cannot address the fundamental issues of man’s existence. An individual’s life
can only be qualitatively improved by receiving, reflecting upon, and appropriating ethicalreligious truth. Pure objective knowledge amounts to nothing in the realm of Christian truth
unless that knowledge is backed up by genuine faith. “Knowledge, theoretical sentences, can be
communicated in a way which is unsuitable for practical capability” (Bejerholm 54).
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Kierkegaard allowed himself to write under the pseudonyms for this very reason. He believed if
he had communicated that specific material directly, the point would be missed. “Then the
reader is led into misunderstanding—he gets something more to know, that to exist also has its
meaning, but he receives it as knowledge so that he keeps right on sitting in the status quo”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 260). The communication of ethical-religious truth is
concerned with individual appropriation, practical application, examination, and action. It is in
this sense that Kierkegaard views it as subjective.
The Communication of Capability
We have seen that direct communication has the ability to transmit knowledge of
concepts, but only in an impersonal way. However, ethical-religious truth is subjective in
Kierkegaard’s thought, since it is truth which has not only been received but has been doublyreflected upon. He understands truth as subjective because it relates to the individual – it desires
to get hold of the individual. It is existential truth because it concerns existence. It is imperative
to understand that that which Kierkegaard understands as ‘existential’ differs dramatically from
modern or postmodern interpretations of the term. Existential thinking is “dialectical and
paradoxical” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 631) and deals with “Christianity as a way of
existence” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 30). The one who has received the
ethical-religious as truth must be concerned with existence, must have come to the realization
that Christianity is a way of living. Obviously Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘existentialism’
relates to individual existence, the highest and most authentic form of which is existence in the
truth. However, human beings are flawed. Therefore, existence is “namely finitude,
imperfection, process of becoming, and effort” (Lønning 147). Existence is a continual striving.
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In the lectures Kierkegaard writes, “All communication of capability is more or less
indirect communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 308). He then proceeds to break
down the communication of capability into three parts: 1) The communication of esthetic
capability, 2) The communication of ethical capability, and 3) the communication of ethical
capability (282). It is necessary for us to view these three types of indirect communication as
distinct from one another. Kierkegaard’s model calls for the breakdown in the following way:
1. When the emphasis is equally upon the communicator and the receiver, then we
have the communication of esthetic capability (283).
2.

When the emphasis is predominately upon the receiver, then we have the
communication of ethical capability (283).

3. When the emphasis is predominately upon the communicator, then we have the
communication of religious capability (283).
For our purposes we shall examine the last two modes of indirect communication in detail.
Kierkegaard describes ethical communication as “training or upbringing” (279). The
emphasis is upon the receiver in communication here because the communicator is in the
Socratic sense acting as a midwife, assisting in the birth of knowledge. Kierkegaard differs from
Socrates in that Socrates believed that “basically every human being possesses the truth”
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 13). Kierkegaard would take a different approach to
Socrates, and this is especially seen in Philosophical Fragments. Kierkegaard explains that the
learner is not truth but is untruth. Only the teacher (God) is truth, and between the learner and
God there is an infinite qualitative distinction. In a journal from 1849, Kierkegaard writes,
“There is an endless yawning qualitative difference between God and man. This signifies, or the
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expression for it is: A man can do nothing at all, it is God that gives all, it is He how bestows
upon man faith, &c. This is grace, and here lies Christianity’s first” (qtd. in Lowrie 9).
However, in the communication of ethical truth, the communicator comes into a maieutic
relationship with the receiver, who learns to “stand alone by another’s help” (Kierkegaard 280).
While the communicator or teacher offers assistance to the learner, the learner must come to the
knowledge of truth in a personal way. The maieutic keeps the communicator from merely being
mimicked and instead the receiver of the communication personally appropriates the truth
(Jansen “Deception in Service of the Truth” 121). The communicator as the object is removed,
he “in a sense disappears, steps aside” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 283). The maieutic
teacher is in a sense a servant. He “makes himself serve only to help the other to become” (307).
Ethical communication is indirect communication because the communicator drops away. The
communication of the ethical takes place in “the medium of actuality” (275), meaning that “the
communicator or teacher himself exists in it and in the situation of actuality, is himself in the
situation of actuality that which he teaches” (275). The ethical requires that the communicator or
teacher must live what he communicates as truth.
“When the ethical communication also contains initially an element of knowledge, we
have the ethical religious, specifically Christian communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and
Papers 307). Kierkegaard describes ethical-religious communication as direct-indirect. This
differs from ethical communication which is “unconditionally indirect” (Jansen, “Deception in
Service of the Truth” 123). There is some objective knowledge, as we have seen, that is
necessary in Christianity. Jansen writes, “Although the communication of religious capability is
indirect, a direct communication of some knowledge is first required. After the initial
communication of knowledge the same relationship as in the ethical obtains” (123).

Unlike
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objective communication, ethical-religious communication (the communication of Christian
truth) reduplication is necessary. Evans writes, “Here the aim of the communication is selfunderstanding. The individual in this case must not only understand the intellectual content (first
reflection) but also relate that content to her own existence (second reflection)” (Kierkegaard’s
Fragments and Postscript 97). However, “being in truth implies a process which is never
complete” (Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence 38). Therefore, “the communication
cannot simply be in the form of ‘results,’ but must itself reflect the ‘process,’ ‘the way’…
(Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97). The receiver is “not only aware of certain
possibilities (ideas), but in her existence actualizes those ideas reduplicates them” (97).
Kierkegaard interestingly points out that ‘receiver’ is an active word, rather than a passive one
(Journals and Papers 270). The term implies that the receiver is acting upon the communication,
appropriating it. This is not to say that truth can be whatever one wants it to be, but rather that
the receiver appropriates truth to the extent that he makes it personal, relating to it in a personal
manner. Through the process of examination, he or she accepts it as truth and then begins to live
in that truth.
In ethical-religious communication the emphasis is on the communicator. According to
Kierkegaard, the teacher has authority in ethical-religious communication “with respect to the
element of knowledge which is communicated” (Journals and Papers 289). However, the
communicator of ethical-religious truth must realize that God is his master. The true
communicator is the One who has given men the knowledge and ability to communicate (271).
Kierkegaard writes in the lectures, “There remains only one communicator: God” (272). This
brings important questions as to whether or not the communicator has the right to influence
directly. Kierkegaard writes, “The communicator always influence only indirectly, (1) because
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he must always express that he himself is not a master-teacher but an apprentice and that God, on
the other hand, is his and every man’s master-teacher, (2) because he must express that the
receiver himself knows it, (3) because ethically the task is precisely this—that every man comes
to stand alone in the God-relationship” (273). God is truth and because He has chosen to reveal
Himself to us, we can live in truth. Evans writes, “…The point of the story is that we humans
lack the truth, and that we need a divine Teacher who not only brings us the truth, but transforms
us into the kinds of beings who are capable of receiving the truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith
and the Self 13). Truth does not lie in the subject, and hence the maieutic form by itself is not
enough in the communication of Christian truth. As Kierkegaard writes:
Yet the communication of the essentially Christian must end finally in “witnessing.” The
maieutic form cannot be the final form, because, Christianly understood, the truth doth
not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in revelation which must be
proclaimed. It is very proper that the maieutic be used in Christendom, simply because
the majority actually live in the fancy that they are Christians. But since Christianity still
is Christianity, the one who uses the maieutic must become a witness. Ultimately the
user of the maieutic approach still remains rooted in human sagacity, however sanctified
and dedicated in fear and trembling this may be. God becomes too powerful for the
maieutic practitioner and then he is a witness, different from the direct witness only in
what he has gone through to become a witness (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
383).
Kierkegaard makes an important point here that the Christian communicator must eventually
become a witness for the truth. By becoming a witness, the Socratic maieutic takes on a new,
higher form.
From reading Kierkegaard’s lectures on communication we can come to a deeper
understanding of his ideas on indirect communication and Christianity as ethical-religious
communication. It must be noted, however, that the process of becoming an authentic individual
may indeed be a long process. One does not immediately become that, but does so over time.
This is Kierkegaard’s viewpoint and it is presented near the end of the first communication
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lecture. He says that those who hasten to communicate their message are “happily saved from
the pangs of delay” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 304). Pure objective thought ignores a
basic Christian concept—that of individual reflection and primitivity (or authenticity).
Primitivity in Kierkegaard’s thought is based on being an individual before God. Becoming an
individual before God can change our conception of communication. Communication then
becomes a way of existence as the individual comes to terms with his existence before his
Creator. Evans writes:
The importance of the idea that God calls us to be individuals is that it keeps in focus the
primacy for human beings of the task of relating to God. Furthermore, it reminds us that
God is a personal being, and that we can relate to him in a personal way, not merely as
the issuer of universal edicts or commands, or the creator of universal traits and qualities.
God’s omniscience is quite capable of conceiving a task for every individual as that
unique individual (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 236).
To Kierkegaard, an individual who seeks primitivity may not advance in his communication and
his living as quickly as others. That individual would rather reflect on what it means to
communicate, what it means to be a human being, what it means to be a Christian—for these are
the “certain fundamental questions which otherwise are usually so taken for granted that it does
not occur to anybody to dwell upon them” (Kierkegaard Journals and Papers 305). The primitive
individual would rather seek out what it means to communicate or what it means to live in
Christianity, because then he will not attempt to advance unknowingly through life, but will
rather have a better idea of what it means to be a Christian. Kierkegaard writes:
Take the ultimate. How would it go in life with the person who only moderately
seriously took Christ’s command to seek first the kingdom of God. I wonder if he would
not soon come to stand as if abandoned and infinitely far, far behind all the others! For
the others scramble for the take; everyone takes his share of the finite and usually takes it
first; but poor pious poky Peter, he immerses himself more and more in this “first the
kingdom of God.” And even if he does not take hold of God’s kingdom, it will always
have the result that his life becomes tried in the spiritual trials of Christianity. For soon,
soon he will be ridiculed, pitied, laughed at, he who became nothing at all—and this one
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becomes for sure by taking seriously seeking God’s kingdom first. –But this seeking first
the kingdom of God is nevertheless real primitivity (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
305).
Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication: References to Hamann
Earlier in this chapter this researcher investigated the concepts of reason and language
and showed that Hamann and Kierkegaard shared a certain understanding in these areas. We
then took leave of Hamann in order to examine Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.
Now, we shall see how the relationship between the two runs deeper than has previously been
mentioned. Kierkegaard references Hamann on multiple occasions throughout both his
published works and personal journals.

The content of Kierkegaard’s references to Hamann

coupled by his use of Hamann’s major concepts suggests that the relationship is one of
exceptional importance. For our purposes, there are four ways to investigate Hamann’s
influence on Kierkegaard’s thought: Socratic ignorance, the idea of humor, indirect
communication, and Christian existence. Indirect communication as it relates to Christian
existence is discussed mainly under the heading “Christianity as Indirect Communication.”
Some scholars raise interesting questions by suggesting that Kierkegaard became less and
less reliant upon Hamann as time went by.16 However, Hamann appears in Kierkegaard’s
journals from 1836 to 1850. This means that Kierkegaard had read Hamann well before
defending his thesis, The Concept of Irony with continual references to Socrates, and was
affected once again by the Magus’ thought during the writing of Training in Christianity.
References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s major works are to be found in Either/Or, Fear and
Trembling and Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety (1844), and CUP.
The concepts he may have learned from Hamann were well in place by the time he wrote
Training in Christianity, in which Kierkegaard deals in detail once again with indirect
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communication. According to Craig Q. Hinkson, we cannot exclude the possibility that
Kierkegaard read Hamann exhaustively (Hinkson 17). In a journal entry corresponding to
Training in Christianity (hereafter Training), he harkens back to a previous journal entry from
1839 when he writes: “Here a passage in one of my oldest journals (from the time I was reading
Hamann) could be used: Young man, you who still stand at the beginning of the way, oh, turn
back in time” (Hay 99). Here we see two important points. First, that even as late as 1850,
Kierkegaard was still making use of Hamann’s writings. Kierkegaard had not by-passed
Hamann; rather the latter had affected him so that he still recalled Hamann’s words. Secondly,
Kierkegaard notes the specific period when he was engrossed with reading Hamann (Hay 99).
Whether or not he read Hamann during the latter period of his writing career, it is clear that
thoughts of Hamann nevertheless lingered. Another reason Kierkegaard appears to have read
Hamann comprehensively is found in a journal article from 1844-45. One immediately will take
note of how closely Kierkegaard appears to have read Hamann. He writes, “There is something
rather curious about this: Hamann says that God forgets nothing but that there are ideas and
flashes which men get no more than once in a lifetime—and this statement appears twice in the
third and in the fifth volumes. I have marked them in my copy” (Kierkegaard, Journals and
Papers 204).
As well as offering references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, this chapter seeks to
uncover the myriad ways in which the former influenced the latter. Since Socratic existence, the
concept of humor, and Christian existence are all major themes throughout the entirety of
Kierkegaard’s works, it would seem that Hamann’s influence was not merely a passing phase.
When one admires another so much, as Kierkegaard did Hamann, the influence does not simply
cease. The proposal of this thesis, to state again, is to find Hamann’s influence upon
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Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication. Although Kierkegaard himself used direct
communication exclusively in his “second authorship,” he nevertheless still applied indirect
communication to Christianity. If he was so strongly influenced by Hamann in the area of
indirect communication, then Hamann’s importance cannot be underestimated.
Opposition to System
Now, one way in which Kierkegaard uses the writings of Hamann is, according to
Terence German, as part of his arsenal to discredit the philosophy of Hegel17 in matters of
language and religion. By the time Kierkegaard began his writing career, Hegelian philosophy
had already entrenched itself in European thought. Its basic tenets were visible in Denmark as
well, and reverberated throughout the Church and Christendom. But Kierkegaard offered a
definitive break from the Hegelian movement, and in doing so, he presented a view of
Christianity markedly different from the present age. To Hegel, “all history was governed by a
completely undeviating development following certain laws, a development which it is possible
with absolute certainty to show in an irrefutable and convincing way” (Thulstrup 58). Hegel’s
philosophy was characterized by the claim to have raised philosophy to the level of science by
making it systematic (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 18). From this point of
view it becomes at least vaguely apparent that Hegel wished to show through his system how
philosophy leads to truth, truth that is both knowable and definite. As he says, “true philosophy
leads to God” (Hegel, qtd. in Crites 99). Such a viewpoint stands in direct opposition to
Kierkegaard, who says, "Away from speculation! from the system, etc., -- to become a Christian”
(Kierkegaard, The Point of View 75).

97

Whether or not Hegel intended to do away with philosophy all together, he certainly
attempted to sum it up via his elaborate System. For this reason Mark C. Taylor writes, “All of
modern philosophy is a footnote to Hegel” (ix). A pivotal figure in the history of Western
thought and culture, Hegel developed a system that marks both a noteworthy closure and a
seminal opening (Taylor ix). Indeed, Hegel’s system of philosophy directly influenced
nineteenth-century thinkers such as Fichte, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher, while notably, and
most importantly, providing the basis of Marxist doctrine (ix, 9). Hegel’s detailed system of
thought did not only affect philosophy, but was carried on and applied to other fields of study.
Taylor explains that the pioneering work of Hegel has left an indelible impress upon the areas of
philosophy, religion, sociology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, structuralism, and
liberal Protestantism (9). From a communication standpoint, Hegel’s influence also extends to
the area of cultural communication, or, “how communication actually makes communities”
(Shepherd & Rothenbuhler 9).
Based on his broad interpretation of Kant towards ethical-religious matters, Hegel
formulated the idea of a “folk religion” and proposed the idea that the duty of religion must be to
“nourish the common spirit of a whole culture” (Crites 35). Kierkegaard had observed firsthand, and therefore knew well, the affects that such a brand of Christianity had on believers in
his day. In Hegel’s view, religion then becomes a cultural expression (35), and is markedly
rooted in the existence of the group, or system. Kierkegaard claimed that as the individual
became more wrapped up in Hegel’s system, he lost the individual mark of Christianity; that is,
Christianity became a fashion instead of the type of inward reflection necessary for the
individual to understand his existence and duty before the eternal God.
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We have seen how Hamann developed a severe hatred of the system of the
Enlightenment after his conversion to Christianity. Just as he struck out against the
Enlightenment, so Kierkegaard opposed German Idealism and particularly the effects of the
Hegelian system of existence. Indeed, both men shared a hatred of the “system” and of
speculation (Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 54). In CUP, Climacus discusses how
Hamann’s genius has gone unrecognized, mainly because his thought has been summarized and
categorized by Michelet, the historian. The injustice done to Hamann is great, since he who
fought against the system merely becomes part of the system. Climacus writes:
I will not conceal the fact that I admire Hamann, although I readily admit that, if he is
supposed to have worked coherently, the elasticity of his thoughts lacks evenness and his
preternatural resilience lacks self-control. But the originality of genius is there in his
brief statements, and the pithiness of form corresponds completely to the desultory
hurling forth of a thought. With heart and soul, down to the last drop of blood, he is
concentrated in a single word, a highly gifted genius’s passionate protest against a system
of existence. But the system is hospitable. Poor Hamann, you have been reduced to a
subsection by Michelet. Whether your grave has ever been marked, I do not know;
whether it is now trampled upon, I do not know; but I do know that by hook or by crook
you have been stuck into the subsection uniform and thrust into the ranks” (Kierkegaard,
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 250).
Climacus expresses grief over Michelet’s systematizing of Hamann into a single
paragraph, through which the historian thereby enlists him in the ranks of the existential system.
Both Kierkegaard and Hamann abhorred the idea of the system in which the individual is
ignored. Climacus writes, “…the system is hospitable—there is plenty of room” (250).
Terrence German writes, “Kierkegaard disliked historians who sought to describe earlier creative
thinkers within the confines of a paragraph of their uncreative thought, just as Hamann despised
so-called historians who could encapsulate earlier ages in a systematically constructed, unliving
fashion” (10). James O’Flaherty points out on numerous occasions Hamann disclaims a desire
for system on the grounds that it is a hindrance to the truth (Unity and Language 4). Perhaps
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Hamann’s detestation of system is found in its attempt to sum up everything in whole – a power
which lies beyond human cognition. O’Flaherty writes: “On his [Hamann’s] view, unaided
reason cannot arrive at an adequate conception of the whole, for reason is essentially analytic and
divisive in nature. Appealing to Paul’s word concerning the atomistic nature of reason (I
Corinthians 13:12)18 Hamann says, ‘Our thoughts are nothing but fragments. Indeed we know in
part’” (Unity and Language 5). Hamann was also highly critical of those who constructed and
held to the system of the Enlightenment. Enlightened thinkers not only clung to Reason as their
god, but sought to gain and confuse the crowd. Here, the parallel to Kierkegaard runs even
deeper. Both men despised the system: Hamann the Enlightenment, Kierkegaard the tenets of
Idealism and the influx of Hegelian thought into Christendom. Hamann believed that the
Enlightenment had brought about a dramatic change in society, whereby people stopped thinking
for themselves. He thought that ‘the public’ had lost the very kind of written and spoken
experience it needed (136). He sought to “lead people to see that they should view their
existence in this world in time in a new manner” (136). If people rather than having faith in their
own cognitive powers realized that their existence depended solely upon God, they would be led
to a higher form of living.
Socratic Ignorance
Any discussion of Hamann and Kierkegaard would be incomplete without examining the
importance of Socrates to both thinkers. We noted in chapter one of this thesis that Hamann’s
Socratic Memorabilia was written to Kant and Berens in an attempt to show them the error of
their ways in regards to the enlightenment. For this reason, Socratic Memorabilia has been
dubbed a “desperately serious declaration of war upon the spirit of his age” (Smith, J.G. Hamann
53). That Hamann had the claims of enlightened thought and Kant and Berens in mind is evident
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from the title page of the work, which reads: “With a double dedication to Nobody and to Two”
(Haynes ed. 3). Denis Thouard says that Hamann’s double dedication plays on the relationship
with the reader and provides for oblique channels of communication (Thouard 421). The
‘Nobody’ is Hamann’s double dedication represents ‘the public,’ which accepts en mass the
teachings of the enlightenment without examining its major tenets. German writes, “’Nobody’
stands for the god who really is a nobody because he (it) is composed of the ignorance of the
public masses. It (he) is the spirit of the age which worships something which really cannot be
found in the nothing which it really is. Everybody knows this Nobody and yet Nobody cannot be
identified” (33). The danger of enlightened reason is its ability to set up a false god instead of
worshiping the one true God as the giver of life and reason.
In the dedication is an example of Hamann’s dialectical “coincidence of opposites” in
that the work is written to “Nobody and to Two.” It is as if the title, Socratic Memorabilia, and
the dedication itself are both “the face of the work, but a masked face” (Thouard 421). This
keeps in unity with Hamann’s use of pseudonyms throughout his career. The second part of the
dedication is aimed at Kant and Berens, with “the hope that it can free them from Nobody” (33).
But why write to Kant and Berens about Socrates? Socrates was “much in vogue in the
Enlightenment” (Thouard 414). Thinkers of the enlightenment misinterpreted Socrates and
claimed him as their own. They claimed to understand Socratic ignorance and applied it to their
own rationalistic views (German 34). Doubtless Hamann, as an admirer of Socrates, wanted to
show how rationalism had erred in choosing Socrates to be its representative. However, by
choosing to write about Socrates, Hamann turns the tables on the enlightenment by showing how
Socratic ignorance differed dramatically from modern-day perceptions. This in turn afforded
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him the opportunity to show the error of human reason and proclaim faith as the highest form of
existence. O’Flaherty writes:
It is highly significant that Hamann formally commenced his attack on the Enlightenment
in the year 1759 with the Socratic Memoirs. For precisely by choosing Socrates, the
favorite philosophic paragon of the rationalists, he declared most effectively his purpose
“to deceive others in their faith.” While his contemporaries…were being swept along by
the flood tide of confidence in human reason, pregnant with “eternal truth,” Hamann
alone raised his voice in defiant protest. This protest took the form of a reinterpretation
of Socrates to the eighteenth century reader…just at the time when the Enlightenment
was at its zenith, to offer, like a bolt from the blue, such a challenge to the pervading faith
of the age (Unity and Language 42).
In order to write about Socrates correctly, Hamann had to take on a different persona19. Thouard
says, “…in the refusal of the ideas of his time Hamann takes on the disguise of his preferred
precursor, Socrates…” (421). When Hamann says that he has “written about Socrates in a
Socratic way,” he is essentially employing the Socratic ideas of analogy and irony as forms of
communication. “The analogy is supposed to direct the reader towards a typological
interpretation, elements within the work being related to elements outside it, e.g. Socrates
himself. Irony works here as a parody of rhetorical accommodation, the adaption of the orator’s
discourse to his audience” (Thouard 422). Of Socrates Hamann says, “Analogy was the soul of
his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed.7). Both analogy and irony are two
forms of indirect communication, which Kierkegaard recognizes Socrates as exemplifying
through the concept of the maieutic. Hamann recognizes that the irony in Socrates’ thought was
essentially his ignorance. He had not only coined the phrase “Know Thyself!” but sought to live
it out. In order to teach others to become cognizant of their existence, Socrates always claimed
he was ignorant—he could only aid others in coming to the truth. As Kierkegaard, via Climacus,
would suggest, the way of the Socratic presents an interesting approach to the interpersonal,
communicative relationship between teacher and learner. Climacus writes, “Between one human
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being and another, this is the highest: the pupil is the occasion for the teacher to understand
himself; the teacher is the occasion for the pupil to understand himself” (Kierkegaard,
Philosophical Fragments 24). The maieutic allows for the wall between teacher and learner to be
broken down, because the teacher recognizes that he has not the power to directly lead the
individual to the truth. If the learner is to come to the truth, he must do it himself. Craig
Hinkson writes that “Socrates came to regard the attainment of self-knowledge as his divinely
imposed mission. Moreover, he held that this was the life-task of every human being. But what
was the point of such self-knowledge? For Socrates, it could be but one thing: to serve as a
guide to how one should live” (Hinkson 2). Climacus notes that Socrates “refused to accept
honor or honorific appointments or money for his teachings” (23) because he considered himself
merely the occasion for learning.
Hamann recognizes ignorance to be a genius quality belonging to Socrates, and it is the
idea of this ignorance which he uses against Kant and Berens. He writes, “Socrates, gentlemen,
was no mean critic…he distinguished what he did not understand from what he did understand in
them, and he made a very equitable and modest inference from the comprehensible to the
incomprehensible” (Haynes ed. 8). So through Socrates, Hamann is showing the limits of human
reason. The very notion of Socratic ignorance is the recognition of a distinction between what
one knows and what one does not know (Hay 106). Hamann’s portrayal of Socrates doubtless
made an impression on Kierkegaard. He “not only credits Hamann with being the one who
really understood the meaning of Socratic ignorance, but he also interprets Hamann as a living
example of it” (Hay 107).
Now, Kierkegaard recognized Socrates to be the greatest ironist who ever lived, and
Hamann as the greatest humorist. In a journal entry in 1844, Kierkegaard writes:
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Is it not remarkable that the greatest master of irony and the greatest humorist, separated
by 2,000 years, may join together in doing and admiring what we should suppose
everyone had done, if this fact did not testify to the contrary. Hamann says of Socrates:
“He was great because he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not
understand.” If only Socrates could have had an epitaph! Many an innocent person has
drained the poisoned cup, many a one has sacrificed his life for the idea, but this epitaph
belongs to Socrates alone: Here rests Socrates; he distinguished between what he
understood and what he did not understand. Or perhaps better simply to quote Hamann’s
words (Journals and Papers Vol. 2 203).
In another entry from the same year, Kierkegaard writes:
The age of distinction is long past, because the system abrogates it. He who loves it must
be regarded as an oddity, a lover of something that vanished long ago. This may well be;
yet my soul clings to Socrates, its first love, and rejoices in the one who understood him,
Hamann; for he has said it best that he taught young people and made fun of the Sophists
and drained the poisoned cup; Socrates was great because he distinguished between what
he understood and what he did not understand (204).
In making a distinction between what he knew and did not know Socrates points to the fact that
human reason has its limits. In the above quote, Kierkegaard laments the fact that the ‘system,’
seeks to sum up and define everything in its own terms. But to Kierkegaard, both Hamann and
Socrates stand in stark contrast to those who would hold to any ‘system.’ Hamann rightly
recognizes that Socrates’ genius was in his ignorance; in distinguishing what he understood from
what he did not understand, Socrates shows the limits of human reason. Hinkson writes,
“Whether his ignorance was pretended or not (and Kierkegaard believes that it was genuine),
antiquity’s use of the term to describe Socrates indicates that his stance was not merely one of
ignorance wishing to be instructed, but ignorance used to unmask the sham ‘knowledge’ (3).
Hamann uses Socrates in just this way, in order to appeal to Kant and Berens, both who both
make bold claims for knowledge (Hay 103).
The point is that Socrates, by aid of the maieutic, was able assist others in an indirect
manner. Rather than lecture, he conversed (Hinkson 3). This allowed the learner to come into a
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personal relationship with that which was being communicated. Socrates, Hamann and
Kierkegaard stand in agreement that “the ethical individual is not one who merely talks about the
ethical: he or she lives it” (4). Hamann’s purpose in praising Socrates is to show that reason is
not unbridled but indeed has its limits. As will later be discussed at length, faith steps in where
our reasoning ability fails. To Hamann, Socratic ignorance is of utmost importance because it
shows that reason is flawed and thereby limited. For this reason he could write, “Our own being
and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be established in any other
way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181).
Kierkegaard shows in his journals how Hamann is regarded by his generation in much the
same way as Socrates was regarded by the Sophists of his own time. He writes, “Hamann’s
relationship to his contemporaries—Socrates’ to the Sophists (who could say something about
everything)” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 201). Hamann recognized that the
rationalists of his day deceived themselves into making Socratic ignorance something it was not.
He writes in his Socratic Memorabilia:
The views of Socrates may be put in these raw accents when he said to the sophists, the
learned men of his time, ‘I know nothing.’ That is why these words were a thorn in their
flesh and a scourge on their backs. All the ideas of Socrates, which were thrown out as a
piece of his ignorance, seemed as terrible to them as the hair on Medusa’s head, the
centre of the aegis. The ignorance of Socrates was sensibility. But between sensibility
and a proposition is a greater difference than between a living animal and its anatomical
skeleton. The old and new skeptics may wrap themselves as much as they please in the
lion-skin of Socratic ignorance, they still betray themselves by their voices and their ears.
If they know nothing, does the world need proof of it? Their hypocrisy is ridiculous and
shameless (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181).
Socratic ignorance is therefore important because is shows us that our reasoning ability is
not autonomous. Neither then is our communicative ability. There are some things which
cannot be reasoned to or communicated completely, because they cannot be understood
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completely. Rather, they must be believed. In his journal entry from 1836-37 entitled
“Something About Hamann,” Kierkegaard pays homage to Hamann by noting that “…in our
time when the most recognized achievement of thought holds that the important thing is to live
for one’s age…” Hamann rather refused to simply conform to the times (Kierkegaard, Journals
and Papers Vol. 2 200). Rather than praise man’s reason and knowledge to the highest degree,
Hamann understands that faith in God goes beyond reason. In a letter to Jacobi on November 2,
1783, Hamann says, “You know that I think of reason as St. Paul does of the whole law and its
righteousness—that I expect of it nothing but the recognition of error, and do not regard it as a
way to truth and life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 248). Hamann then references I Corinthian 220 to
back his point that “there is wisdom which is not of earth, or of man, or of the devil, but a secret
and hidden wisdom of God which God ordained before the ages to our glory—which none of the
rulers of this world can understand.”(248). In 1836, Kierkegaard writes:
Hamann draws a most interesting parallel between the law (Mosaic law) and reason. He
goes after Hume’s statement: “The last fruit of all worldly wisdom is the recognition of
human ignorance and weakness.” Hamann goes on to say “Our reason…is therefore just
what Paul calls law—and the command of reason is holy, righteous, and good; but is it
given to make us wise? Just as little as the law of the Jews justified them, but is to bring
us over from the opposite, how unreasonable our reason is, that our faults should increase
through it, as sin increased through the law” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 199, 575).
In another entry from 1849, Kierkegaard says:
Hamann rightly declares: Just as “law” abrogates “grace,” so “to comprehend” abrogates
“to have faith.” It is, in fact, my thesis. But in Hamann it is merely an aphorism;
whereas I have fought it through or have fought it out of a whole given philosophy and
culture and into the thesis: to comprehend that faith cannot be comprehended or (the
more ethical and God-fearing side) to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended
(205).
As pointed out earlier, Hamann writes in Socratic Memorabilia, “Faith is not a work of
reason and therefore cannot succumb to any attack by reason; because believing happens as little
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by means of reasons as tasting and seeing” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 182). To Hamann, faith lays
“outside the sphere of our powers of cognition” (258), and is in fact a mode of existence.
Through faith we are led into a communicative relationship with God and are able to
communicate the Word as witnesses to the Truth.
References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s Early Authorship
That Hamann played a major role in Kierkegaard’s development as a Christian thinker, I
believe cannot be denied. That he meant much to Kierkegaard’s development as a writer early in
his career is especially important, as we have pointed out. For our purposes here, it is necessary
to examine three early works by Kierkegaard in which Hamann is referenced. These are
Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Repetition.
In the first part of Either/Or the pseudonymous writer “A” quotes Hamann “to illustrate
the connection between a reader and writer” (Hay 101). “That is, if a person belongs to ‘the
reader’s sect,’ if he in one way or another distinguishes himself as an alert and diligent reader,
others begin to nurture the notion that a minor author might emerge, for as Hamann says: ‘out of
children come adults, out of virgins come brides, out of readers come writers’” (Kierkegaard,
Either/Or 245). Hamann certainly was in love with the communicative power of language, and it
shows in the above quotation. Kierkegaard equates diligence with being a good reader and also
with becoming a writer. I do not think it a stretch to say that one can see Hamann’s concept of
unity as visible and at work in this quote as well. Just as children become adults, so good readers
are capable of becoming writers. An age-old adage is evident: if an individual wants to become
a better writer, he/she must not only practice writing, but read vociferously as well.
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In the introduction to Fear and Trembling, the “dialectical lyric” in which Kierkegaard
(using the pseudonym Johannes de silentio) deals with Abraham as the ultimate model of faith,
he uses an obscure quote from Hamann: “What Tarquinius Superbus said in the garden by
means of the poppies, the son understood but the messenger did not” (Hay 101fn). Lowrie
explains this epigraph in the editor’s introduction to Fear and Trembling:
In Fear and Trembling the very name of the pseudonym, Johannes de silentio, suggests
mystery, and the motto on the back of the title page, which he got from Hamann, recalls
the well-known story of old Rome, which relates that when the son of Tarquinius
Superbus had craftily gained the confidence of the people of Gabii he secretly sent a
messenger to his father in Rome, asking what he should do next. The father, not willing
to trust the messenger, took him into the field where as he walked he struck off with his
cane the heads of the tallest poppies. The son understood that he was to bring about the
death of the most eminent men in the city and proceeded to do so (Kierkegaard, Fear and
Trembling xvii).
Ronald M. Green writes:
From the outset, by means of the famous epigraph drawn from Hamann, Kierkegaard
signals that not everything that follows is at it seems. Beyond this, there is evidence that
Kierkegaard designed Fear and Trembling as a text with hidden layers of meaning. In
The Point of View on My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard tells us that the most important
ethical and religious truths cannot be communicated directly, as though one were writing
on a blank sheet of paper. They demand instead creative endeavor by the author and a
corresponding effort by the reader that involves “bringing to light by the application of a
caustic fluid a text which is hidden under another text” [PV 40] (Green 257).
Indeed, not everything is as it seems. In Fear and Trembling, it appears that the pseudonym
Johannes de silentio uses the epigraph from Hamann not only to alert the reader to the task of
thinking dialectically, but also to show the faith of Abraham in his willingness to sacrifice his
son Isaac. That which appeared as nonsense, Abraham took instead in faith. His faith surpassed
mere reason. By faith, Abraham trusted that he was to offer his only son Isaac as a sacrifice, and
believed God able to raise him from the dead21. Only when Abraham had bound Isaac on the
altar was it revealed that God had rewarded his faith by providing the sacrifice.22 Johannes de
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silentio uses the story of Abraham’s unsurpassed display of faith as an example of how faith
supersedes human reason. According to Green:
The use of Abraham also conveys a new emphasis on faith as a way of life. This
emphasis is meant to replace the centuries-old understanding of faith as merely an
acceptance of dogmatic truths. Abraham is a fitting choice to communicate this lesson
because his hallmark is not intellectual achievement but a prodigious ability to live
trustingly and obediently. In the margin of a draft of the “Eulogy on Abraham,”
Kierkegaard makes this point even clearer by ending the section with a definition of faith
“not as the content of a concept but as a form of the will” (Pap. IV B 87 p. 2). The
emphasis on willing and acting rather than thinking and reasoning is also highlighted by
the sheer irrationality of Abraham’s faith, his belief “by virtue of the absurd” that he will
get Isaac back (Green 259).
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym communicates to the reader that Abraham is the ultimate
example of faith’s ability to eclipse reason. That Hamann is used at the outset of this endeavor is
indeed intriguing since a basic Hamannian theme is the inability of the rational to reach into the
realm of faith. “Without faith we cannot understand even creation and nature” Hamann writes in
his Biblical Reflections (Smith, J.G Hamann 137). In fact, to Hamann, reason is inclined to
untruth. He regards our knowledge as fragmentary and prone to doubt. However, faith that is
grounded in something other than God leads to untruth as well. Only faith in God can lead to
truth. Without faith, the world cannot receive the truth. As Hamann writes in his Golgotha and
Scheblimini:
All our knowledge is in part, and all human grounds of reason consist either of faith in
truth or doubt of untruth, or of faith in untruth and doubt of truth…But if the
understanding believes in lies and enjoys it, doubts truths and despises them with disgust
as bad food, then the light in us is darkness and the salt in us has lost its savor—religion
is pure church parade, philosophy is an empty word-display, superannuated and
meaningless opinions, out-of-date rights without power…What is truth? A wind that
blows where it lists, whose sound one hears, but does not know whence it came and
whither it goes—a spirit whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor
knows him (Smith, J.G. Hamann 231-32).

109

That is not to say that faith does away with reason completely. To Hamann, both reason and
faith are necessary for one’s own instruction and for teaching others (255). “Faith cometh by
hearing, and hearing by the word of God” (NASV).23 Faith is not the product of human reason,
but faith is given to man by God.
In the twin work Repetition, Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym Constantin
Constantius) references Hamann once again. Constantius refers to his work as “an essay in
experimental psychology” (Kierkegaard, Repetition 1). In CUP Climacus gives us a better
understanding of this experimental mode. “The significance of this experimental form is that by
this means of communication ‘itself forms an opposition (to itself), and the experiment
establishes a yawning chasm between reader and author, puts the separation of inwardness
between them, so that direct understanding is made impossible’” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s
Fragments and Postscript 22). C. Stephen Evans notes that this experimental form is related to
indirect communication. “Not only does Kierkegaard attempt to distance himself from the reader
via the pseudonyms; some of the pseudonyms attempt to do the same thing by writing in the
form of an experiment” (22). It follows that if readers of the pseudonymous literature are to take
the contents of the book as true, they will be forced to stake themselves to that truth and take
responsibility for it (22). In other words, the reader will be unable to simply accept the contents
as truth without first personally examining them. The removal of Kierkegaard and to a certain
degree the pseudonymous Constantius, allows the reader to personally grasp the content, rather
than simply accepting it because a credible source writes it.
In Repetition Constantius writes:
Let everyone pass what judgment he will upon what I have said with regard to repetition.
Let him also pass what judgment he will upon the fact that I say it here in this way,
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expressing myself after Hamann’s example ‘in diverse tongues’ and speaking the
language of Sophists, of quibbles of Cretans and Arabians and Creoles, babbling
indifferently rebus and principles, arguing now in a human way, now in an absolute way
(Kierkegaard, Repetition 35, 163).
Kierkegaard’s use of Hamann here indicates that he is employing basically the same type of
literary devices as Hamann. That Hamann spoke ‘in various tongues,’ I think, can be understood
in a few different ways. First of all, Hamann, as a philologist, did speak in different tongues.
However, he also did so metaphorically, as a way to communicate his message to thinkers of the
Enlightenment, who likely were not willing to give him a proper hearing or at least, doubtless
misunderstood his purposes. He took on a different style of communicating when writing about
Socrates, and appears to do so as a relational tool at other times. It is interesting that Hamann
always writes under pseudonyms, creating a style that must have influenced Kierkegaard a great
deal. Both Hamann and Kierkegaard also wants their readers to realize that following their
writings can prove an enormously difficult task (Hay 102), because they use all the linguistic and
literary tools available to effectively communicate their ideas. In Repetition, Constantin
Constantius does the same thing. He expresses himself in different ways, some of which may
not be immediately recognizable to the reader, or which may even appear contradictory at times.
The Concept of Humor
As has been mentioned, Kierkegaard viewed Hamann as the greatest humorist to have
ever lived. This is evident from an earlier quote in which Kierkegaard ties Socrates and Hamann
together as “the greatest ironist” and “the greatest humorist,” respectively (Kierkegaard, Journals
and Papers Vol. 2 203). In a journal entry from 1837, Kierkegaard identifies Hamann as a
humorist. I quote it in full because it shows best Kierkegaard’s perception of humor and how
Hamann can be viewed as such.
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Hamann could become a good representative of the humor in Christianity (more about
this another time), but in him the trend toward humor necessarily developed one-sidedly
(a) because of the humor intrinsic to Christianity, (b) because of the isolation of the
individual conditioned by the Reformation, an isolation which did not arise in
Catholicism, which since it had a Church could oppose “the world,” although in its pure
concept as Church it probably was less able to be predisposed to do this, and in any case
it nevertheless could not develop humor to an apex opposing everything and thereby
rather barren, at least devoid of prolific vegetation and bearing only a dwarfed scrawny
birch (the reason this was not the case with Hamann is to be found in his profound
sensibility and enormous genius, which had depth corresponding to the degree of its
narrowness in width—and Hamann found a real delight in inviting his knowledge-greedy
contemporaries, platter-lickers, to his long-necked stork flask—but just the same he can
be a very good representative for the true center of this position), and (c) because of his
own naturally humorous disposition. Thus one can truthfully say that Hamann is the
greatest humorist in Christianity (meaning the greatest humorist in the view of life which
itself is the most humorous view of life in world-history—therefore the greatest humorist
in the world) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 251-52).
It is important for us to remember that by humor we are referring to that which is witty or absurd.
Humor can be described as “that quality which appeals to a sense of the ludicrous or absurdly
incongruous” (Palmer ed. 497). To Kierkegaard, humor revolves around what he calls a
“contradiction” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 11). Evans notes that ‘contradiction’
in this way is best understood as ‘incongruity’ (13). He writes:
The kind of humor that strikes us as deep humor does so because it reminds us of or even
illuminates the deep incongruity that lies at the base of our own nature. Every honest
human being experiences a “contradiction” between the ideal self and the actual self.
The people whom we regard as the greatest saints are precisely those who do not view
their own accomplishments all that seriously because they are keenly conscious of how
far short of their ideals they fall (12).
Humor is then a communicative tool used by Kierkegaard throughout his writings to help the
reader realize the importance of personal existence. Hamann is such a great example of a
Christian humorist to Kierkegaard precisely because he understands the condition of human
existence and what it means to strive towards a higher meaning of existence in Christianity.
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According to Evans, there are three different types of theories related to humor: relief
theories, superiority theories, and incongruity theories (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 82).
Relief theories “generally focus on humor as a pleasurable experience, which consists in or is
casually related to a discharge of accumulated tension or energy” (82). Superiority theories see
humor as a pleasant experience of oneself as superior (82). Incongruity theories view humor as
that which “arises through some contrast between what we would normally expect and the actual
course of our experience. The incongruity must be one that is experienced as pleasant, of
course” (82). Kierkegaard’s own use of humor is a version of incongruity theory, however, he
incorporates elements of both relief and superiority theories into his writings as well (84). “The
notion of superiority is significant in relation to humor because it is the possession of a superior
position that enables an individual to experience incongruity as pleasant rather than painful.
Also implicit in his [Kierkegaard’s] view is the notion that humor provides a relief from the
vexations of life” (84). In order to gain a deeper understanding of the communicative and
literary role played by humor in Kierkegaard’s authorship, we will briefly examine the
pseudonym Johannes Climacus, “author” of both Philosophical Fragments and CUP.
Now, Climacus himself is not yet a Christian, but he wishes to become one. Therefore,
he is not ideologically opposed to Christianity. However, Climacus is a speculative individual.
In CUP we see that Climacus became an author partly because his studies “had led him to the
conclusion that there was confusion lurking in the relation between Christianity and
Hegelianism” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 23). Climacus wants to
investigate this to see how true Christianity differs from the vogue Hegelianism of the time.
Still, Climacus represents an individual who knows what Christianity is but does not necessarily
understand what it is to be a Christian. Evans writes, “Climacus respects Christianity because, if
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true, it is the most serious and important thing a person will face in existence, since Christianity
claims that a person’s relationship to it will determine his eternal destiny. He also respects
Christianity because he can see that it is a strenuous way of life; existing as a Christian requires a
rare courage and determination” (24). Climacus’ speculation is found in the fact that he is an
“existing humorist” (65). By using Climacus as a humorist, Kierkegaard is “aiming at the
illusion of ‘Christendom’” (52). “This illusion is grounded in the idea that being a Christian is
something easy, something that everyone is as a matter of course” (52). Kierkegaard uses
Climacus as a communicator in order to remove this illusion from the reader. Christianity is
extremely difficult to live. It is not something that can be taken lightly, that everyone can claim
by tradition and without examination. The communicator’s primary tools for removing the
illusion are irony and humor (105). Humor in Climacus’ sense then, is found in its ability to
communicate “unity of jest and seriousness” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
81), which becomes a riddle to the recipient—a riddle that the recipient must solve for himself
(Evans 107).
Humor in the thought of Kierkegaard is to be understood in relation to the existence
stages of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Humor lies between the ethical and the religious
spheres. It lies before one reaches the religious, not after, as speculative thinkers would claim.
In CUP Climacus writes:
Thus humor is advanced as the final terminus a quo in relation to the Christian-religious.
In modern scholarship, humor has become the highest after faith. That is, faith is the
immediate, and through speculative thought, which goes beyond faith, humor is reached.
This is a general confusion in all systematic speculative thought, insofar as it wants to
take Christianity under its wing. No, humor terminates immanence without immanence,
still consists essentially in recollection’s withdrawal out f existence into the eternal, and
only then do faith and paradoxes begin. Humor is the last stage in existence-inwardness
before faith (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 291).
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“Humor arises from juxtaposing the God-idea with the sundry concerns of daily living”
(Hinkson 13). Humor is also the “outer costume” of the truly religious individual (Evans,
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 12). Kierkegaard intends to describe humor as a pervasive
feature of human existence and a special “boundary zone” that lies between the ethical and
religious spheres (12). Kierkegaard links humor to the ethical way of life and ultimately to
Christianity because he understands that the humorist “has taken the humor which is a general
element of life and made it the fundamental ground of his distinctive way of life…The humorist
in Kierkegaard’s special sense has learned to smile at the whole of life, because she has learned
to smile at herself” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 87).
Kierkegaard uses humor as indirect method of relating to the reader. Humor is also
indirect communication in the sense that it is used at times through the pseudonymous authors.
Humor in the religious sense takes on a “higher perspective” than humor as it is normally
thought of (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 89). Evans writes:
This apparent higher perspective, which in the case of the pure humorist is illusory, can
only be found in the Christian doctrines of grace and forgiveness. If there is a place for
humor in Christianity, it must surely rest on these two doctrines. Despite the fact that life
is earnest for the Christian, there is also a place for the humorous smile and even for
laughter. (Perhaps it is partly because of the fact that life is earnest; I think that the
incongruities which strike us as most deeply humorous usually relate to what we care
deeply about.) That place or humor is provided by the grace of God and the forgiveness
which is offered freely in Christ. It is this which makes it possible for the earnest
individual to smile at the contradiction between his life and the ideal he sees in Christ
(Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 89).
The Christian humorist is able to understand and relate the concepts of contradiction,
incongruity, and paradox—all of which are important elements in the Christianity presented in
the New Testament through the life of Christ. Hamann, as we shall see, is the representative of
the ultimate humorist because he recognizes Christ, the God-Man, as the paradox and sign of
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contradiction. Hamann uses these themes in an amazing display of wit to combat thinkers of the
Enlightenment and to show that the highest form of existence—faith —is to be found in that
which is seemingly absurd.
In a long journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard writes,
The humorous, present throughout Christianity, is expressed in a fundamental principle
which declares that the truth is hidden in the mystery, which teaches not only that the
truth is found in a mystery (an assertion which the world generally has been more
inclined to hear, since mysteries have arisen often enough, although the ones initiated
into these mysteries promptly apprehended the rest of the world in a humorous vein), but
that it is in fact hidden in the mystery. This is a view of life which regards worldly
wisdom humorously to the nth degree; otherwise the truth is usually revealed in the
mystery…The humorous in Christianity appears also in the statement: My yoke is easy
and my burden is not heavy, for it certainly is extremely heavy for the world, the heaviest
that can be imagined—self-denial. The ignorance of the Christian (this purely Socratic
view, as in a Hamann, for example) is, of course, also humorous, for what is its basis but
a forcing of oneself down in this way to the lowest position and looking up (that is,
down) at the ordinary view, yet in such a way that behind this self-degrading there lies a
high-degree of self-elevating (the humility of the Christian which in its polemical form
against the world increases his own wretchedness, while on the other hand it its
normative form it involves a noble pride (the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater
than John the Baptist) or in its abnormality a haughty isolation from the course of events
(the historical nexus) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 253).
Kierkegaard is certainly not regarding Scripture as humorous here in our normal
definition of the word. Rather, he is saying that the true humorist not only realizes just how
contradictory Scripture appears to the unbeliever, just how the truth goes against what we as
humans would expect it to be. Kierkegaard also gives reference here to the life of the humorist
which he expounds upon in a later journal entry from the following year: “The humorist, like the
beast of prey, always walks alone” (263). The true humorist is embodied in Hamann precisely
because he did not give in to the demands of the age and remained an individual. For instance,
after his conversion to Christianity, he sensed how offensive his new-found faith had become to
his family and friends (Anderson 113). “Hamann countered these affronts to his integrity with
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biting wit. The audacity of invoking unacceptable manners and morals, and particularly of
human sense and reason in the face of divine revelation, appealed to his sense of humor—a sense
he discerned as fundamental to his posture” (114). Hamann does not want to prove his faith. He
felt it ludicrous “to try to defend Christianity with evidences of human sense and reason
comparable to the grounds his opponents had chosen” (114). One sees evidence of Hamann’s
humor here also. It would indeed be ridiculous to want to prove by the aid of fallen reason that
God exists. Hence, Hamann employed Socrates (114) as one of the greatest thinkers of all time
because he recognized the limits of his reason. Hamann holds instead that faith has no need to
prove God’s existence (an idea further expounded upon later in this thesis). It suffices to say
here that for an individual to want proof when belief is all one can have, appeals to Hamann’s
sense of humor (128). Albert Anderson points out that the best example of Hamann’s humor is
his “discovery (which he returns to many times) of how often a particularly prominent writer or
spokesman will, without his knowledge and even against his will, witness to some profound
aspect of Christian reality” (124). Hamann believes that examples of this are evident in
Scripture and in the everyday world. It is a testament to the communicative power of the
Scripture to reach men in ways which defy reason.
While Kierkegaard sees Hamann as the world’s greatest humorist, he thinks that Hamann
goes too far in one of his more humorous statements. In a journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard
writes: “Isn’t Hamann being extremely ironical when he says somewhere that he would rather
hear the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee against his will than from an angel or apostle?”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 202). In another entry Kierkegaard makes it clear that he
believes that Hamann has gone too far in this witty statement. “Humor can therefore approach
blasphemy; Hamann would rather hear wisdom from Balaam’s ass or from a philosopher against
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his will than from an angel or apostle” (257). Here we witness a break between Kierkegaard and
Hamann. However, Hamann’s point may be that the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee would
be precious simply because of its rarity. Nevertheless Kierkegaard believed Hamann bordered
on the blasphemous with the statement.
Humor in the Kierkegaardian sense, is a form of indirect communication along with
irony, and both are “employed by persons whose subjectivity has been sufficiently developed
that they are aware of the infinite ethical demand and/or the absolute nature of the Godrelationship” (Hinkson 14). That Kierkegaard enlists Hamann as the greatest example of a
Christian humorist is imperative to our understanding of Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s
model of indirect communication.
Christianity as Indirect Communication
In the first part of this chapter, this researcher focused on the subject of communication
and examined the idea of God, the Logos, as the creator and sustainer of human communication.
There the idea was presented that both Hamann and Kierkegaard placed emphasis upon language
and believed human reason to be both depraved and incapable of expression were it not for
language. Throughout this thesis, this researcher has investigated Kierkegaard’s model of
indirect communication and shown its importance to his authorship and to both the practice and
theory of communication. No discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought and/or relation to
Christianity, however, would be complete without understanding Christianity as indirect
communication. Also, in order to examine to the fullest extent Kierkegaard’s relation to
Hamann, it is necessary to consider the role of communication in the concept of faith. In
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particular, I examine how the Word is revealed through the person of Christ in the form of
indirect communication and the role of faith as existence-communication given this revelation.
Existence and Christianity
To say that Christendom in Kierkegaard’s day was a reflection of true Christianity would
indeed be a pure prevarication. Rather, Christendom had become the most severe of distortions.
Christendom had claimed to raise Christianity to the form of mere objective adherence, and the
result was that the masses claimed to be perfectly fit Christians, but had not the slightest inkling
of what it meant to exist in Christianity. To Kierkegaard, the majority of people simply sought
to keep the “rules” of Christianity while they collectively ignored Christ’s teachings. Since he
believed this to be the case, he viewed Christendom as a dangerous misrepresentation of the
Christianity demanded by the New Testament. Hermann Diem writes that “the church itself had
watered down the Christianity of the New Testament, adapting it to the weakness of the natural
man” (Kierkegaard: An Introduction 101). Kierkegaard believed that established Christendom
was not even remotely in the character of striving in the direction of the Christianity in the New
Testament (Garff 747).
The result of this misappropriation of truth in Demark at the time was that people, while
saying they were perfecting Christianity, sought to “cheat God out of Christianity” (Kierkegaard,
Attack upon Christendom 33). A century before, Hamann had sought in his onslaught against
autonomous reason, to make his contemporaries aware that their reason was limited and flawed.
By placing primacy upon language and the Word as communicative acts given and constituted
by God, Hamann hoped to lead individuals to understand that the highest mode of existence was
composed of faith. In his attack, Kierkegaard attempted to address the hindrance posed to
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Christianity by Christendom, thereby making people aware of their situation. He felt compelled
by “providence” to do as much (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107). However, he did not
consider himself a reformer or prophet, but rather likened himself unto “an unusually talented
police detective” (Garff 748). “His job was only to reveal the present state of Christendom in the
full depth of its deception” (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction107).
So, it was that in 1855, while engaged in his attack on the State Church and established
Christendom, Kierkegaard wrote in an article published in The Fatherland:
And this in my opinion is the falsification of which official Christianity is guilty: it does
not frankly and unreservedly make known the Christian requirement—perhaps because it
is afraid people would shudder to see at what a distance from it we are living, without
being able to claim that in the remotest way our life might be called an effort in the
direction of fulfilling the requirement…So then we “Christians” are living, and are loving
our life, just in the ordinary human sense. If then by “grace” God will nevertheless
regard us as Christians, one thing at least must be required: that we, being precisely
aware of the requirement, have a true conception of how infinitely great is the grace that
is showed us (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 38).
Before going further, the question must be raised as to why Kierkegaard viewed Christendom the
way he did. Certainly he had a keen sense of the Danish mind and culture, for he was “Danish to
the core of his being” (Skjoldager 147). We have seen how interpersonal communication was to
him the greatest enjoyment and played a major role in his conception of the common man. He
knew his fellow countrymen, understood the troubles they faced, and recognized the faults
within society. However, the matter can be taken to a deeper level. Kierkegaard understood
human nature and existence. He also knew that conforming to the requirements of Christianity
proves to be a rigorous and life-long process. Therefore, it was his purpose to indirectly help
individuals overcome the categories in which they lived and the meaninglessness in which they
strove, in order to help them understand the truth. To the end of his life he felt it his providential
task to communicate truth (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107), even if it meant attacking
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established Christendom in the process. To Kierkegaard, Christendom had forgotten what it
means to deny the self. In a journal entry from 1854 he says, “…to such a degree has self-denial,
the point of Christianity, been forgotten and to such a degree have earthly well-being and
comfortable mediocrity been idolized” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3 217). He goes
on to write:
Religion in this country consists essentially of getting married and then being active in
earning a living, acquiring for oneself and his own, and yet—this is characteristic of
Denmark—not without sympathy for those in need, especially the needy with families,
for the business of family and livelihood is the earnestness of life. And if one is so
fortunate as to acquire wealth, it is assumed in Denmark that he is particularly beloved by
God. And then, incidentally, one goes to church occasionally, once or twice a year to
communion, pays the pastor his dues—and that is Christianity (217).
Certainly this must be viewed as the height of irony: that which is the actual state of
Christianity, Christendom, in no way resembles Christianity. If Kierkegaard is correct in his
assertions, then it would follow that those who outwardly express that they exist in Christianity
and yet are guilty of living in categories foreign to it, really know not what it means to exist in
relation to Christianity at all. Living as such is self-deception. One can also be deceived into
living in such a way if Christianity is communicated improperly, as Kierkegaard believed was
often the case. It is clear, then, that Christianity in Kierkegaard’s day was equated with being a
decent human being. However, in order to understand Kierkegaard’s rejection of the established
norms of Christendom we must briefly investigate what ideas and practices in particular he
understood as being in opposition to Christianity.
That Christendom had come to represent something entirely different than the
Christianity of the New Testament is evident in the popular teachings of several individuals of
Kierkegaard’s time. For instance, first we have the teachings of J.L. Heiberg24, the poet and
literary critic who “brought the treasure of Hegelian philosophy up from Germany” (Kirmmse
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139). Heiberg held the culture which flourishes in literature and philosophy in high esteem,
while viewing religion merely as “a matter only for the uncultured” (Heiberg, qtd. in Kirmmse
143). Secondly, there was H.L. Martensen25, who as author Bruce Kirmmse asserts, was a
modified Hegelian. With Martensen, speculative thought stormed, albeit briefly, through the
university scene (171). Martensen maintained “religion is a communal activity, a common
understanding, not a private, individualistic relation to God” (180). Thirdly, but certainly of no
less importance, was Grundtvig26, who has been titled “the most gigantic and protean figure of
the Danish Golden Age” (198). Grundtvig sought to blend society and history with religion and
can be properly viewed as one who brought about a new understanding of Christianity and as “an
awakener of national popular culture” (198). As far as religion in concerned, Grundtvig would
emphatically hold to the notion that reason has within it the power to lead us directly to the
“boundaries of revelation” (205) and believed that the powers of Christianity rested within his
own communal, folk interpretations (213).
For our purposes, it is important to understand how these ideas were communicated to the
public and how they became entrenched in Christendom; for they had profound implications on
Christian existence, i.e., the way that people thought and lived in Christendom. To Kierkegaard,
Christendom had succeeded in gathering the whole of society, and the whole of society
considered itself Christian. However, people commonly lived in marked contrast to Christianity
because Christendom taught them that examination and personal appropriation to the truth were
unneeded. The dominance of folk religion was all too real—for it gathered the crowd and then
failed to teach them the basic truths of Christianity. Therefore, being a Christian was
synonymous with being a decent, respectable person. Kierkegaard’s purpose, to repeat, was to
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act as a “corrective.” For him, to exist as a Christian was to seek to exemplify the life of Christ.
Christendom had erred from this in many ways, only a few of which we shall examine.
First of all, Kierkegaard understood that in Christendom, the mass of people were
comfortable with their lifestyle and with the teachings that Christianity was a “gentle, lifebeautifying, and ennobling ground of comfort” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 199).
Secondly, people were born into Christendom; that is, from birth they had considered themselves
Christians simply because they lived in a “Christian land.” For one to consider him/herself a
Christian by these requirements is to Kierkegaard utter nonsense. He writes, “We are all
Christians by birth—in Christendom” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 164). By hailing
Christianity as to be precisely this—that one is born into it and quite comfortable—is to make
Christianity itself into “complete nonsense” (164). That being a Christian is viewed in this way
may attract a greater number of people, but has the effect of secularizing Christianity and
lowering its strict requirements. Instead of following Christ and imitating him, one gets the
notion that by simply by living a moral lifestyle, one might find earthly happiness through
Christianity. Kierkegaard writes:
Imitation, the imitation of Christ, is really the point from which the human race shrinks.
The main difficulty lies here; here is where it is really decided whether or not one is
willing to accept Christianity. If there is emphasis on this point, the stronger the
emphasis the fewer the Christians. If there is a scaling down at this point (so that
Christianity becomes, intellectually, a doctrine), more people enter into Christianity. If it
is abolished completely (so that Christianity becomes, existentially, as easy as mythology
and poetry and imitation an exaggeration, a ludicrous exaggeration), then Christianity
spreads to such a degree that Christendom and the world are almost indistinguishable, or
all become Christians; Christianity has completely conquered—that is, it is abolished!
(Kierkegaard, Judge for Yourself! 188).
Instead of making clear the unconditional requirement of Christianity – that one cannot serve two
masters – those who communicated the message instead taught that Christianity guaranteed “the
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greatest possible earthly advantage, enjoyment, etc. (189). “This is a cheap edition of what it is
to be a Christian. Yet this is the actual state of affairs, because the preachers’ declaiming about
the lofty virtues etc. during a quiet hour on Sunday does not alter the actual state of affairs on
Monday, since people account for such a proclamation as being the preacher’s official job and
his livelihood, and since many a clergyman’s life certainly is not different from that actual state
of affairs…(189). The abasement of Christianity meant that “a whole man’s life is secularized,
his every thought from morning until evening, his waking and dreaming” (Kierkegaard, Journals
and Papers 165). As such, there were no clear lines between Christianity and secularism. To
Kierkegaard more and more people may have taken part in established Christendom, but they did
so without examining what it means to exist as a Christian or understand its requirements. He
writes, “let us not gloss over the Christian requirement, so that by suppression or by falsification
we may bring about an appearance of decorum which is in the very highest degree demoralizing
and is a sly death-blow to Christianity” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 39).
Christian existence is markedly different from human existence, as shown by the life of
Christ. Christian existence means that one may indeed be forced to suffer; it means that one
must live in contemporaneousness with Christ; it means that one is aware of the eternal as having
infinitely more meaning than this present life. Rather than focusing on the blessedness of the
eternal, established Christendom focused on the advantages and gains one could experience from
Christianity. In a journal entry from 1853, Kierkegaard discusses this difference. “Christianity
teaches that this life is a life of suffering—but then comes eternity…Christendom has invented a
refinement: Christianity is to enjoy this life, raised to a higher power because there is an eternity”
(Journals and Papers Vol. 4 471). To Kierkegaard, Christendom took the teachings of eternity
and applied them to earthly life (470), the result of which could only be that those who
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considered themselves Christians existed happily and comfortably in their ignorance of what it
meant to truly be a Christian. In a journal entry from 1854-55, Kierkegaard writes how
Christendom differs dramatically from the Christianity of the New Testament.
God wants to be loved. This is why he wants Christians. To love God is to be a
Christian. God, of course, knows best how agonizing this is, humanly speaking, for a
man. He says it as clearly as possible. To love God is possible only by clashing with all
human existence (hating father and mother, hating oneself, suffering because one is a
Christian etc.) “Man’s” rascally interests these days center on securing millions of
Christians, the more the better, all, if possible, for in this way the whole difficulty in
being a Christian vanishes; being a Christian and being a human being are synonymous,
and we stand where paganism left off (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3 58).
Paradox and Absolute Paradox
As J. Heywood Thomas points out, the idea of paradox runs throughout Kierkegaard’s
authorship (“Paradox” 192).

The idea, however, has special prominence in Philosophical

Fragments, CUP, and Training. Paradox can be defined as that which is “contrary to
appearance, plausibility, or probability” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 633). Both Hamann and
Kierkegaard speak of the paradoxical nature of God, and on this point it can said that there is a
link between the two in the area of indirect communication. In Philosophical Fragments, the
pseudonym Johannes Climacus uses Socrates as an example of a paradoxical thinker. To
Kierkegaard, Socrates always sought to better know himself, a claim evidenced by the Socratic
maxim. It was Socrates’ paradoxical nature which inclined him to examine “whether he…was a
more curious monster than Typhon or a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing
something divine. This seems to be a paradox” (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 37).
Climacus goes on to write, “But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the
passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a
mediocre fellow” (37). In dealing with the idea of paradox in relation to Socrates, Climacus is
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thereby setting the stage to show the fallibility of human reason in understanding Christ as the
Absolute Paradox. A paradox in general challenges both our reasoning capacity and our ability
to communicate.
To both Kierkegaard and Hamann, paradox takes on its highest form in Christ as the
God-Man. It appears likely that Kierkegaard found Hamann’s treatment of paradox fascinating,
and both thinkers would advocate that “paradox was the very thought-form of religion” (Thomas,
“Paradox” 201). To Hamann, paradox is the “vehicle for the expression of spiritual truth”
(O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90). As James O’Flaherty points out, “Since God has condescended
to reveal Himself in lowly, even contemptible form—as the Scriptures everywhere attest—the
paradox possesses the highest possible legitimation” (90). In Biblical Reflections Hamann
writes, “One must view with astonishment how God accommodates Himself to all small
circumstances, and prefers to reveal His government through the everyday events of human life
rather than the singular and extraordinary events…” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90).
Hamann was so impacted by the idea of the paradox that he would come to an understanding of
paradoxical language as being markedly opposed to that of rational communication. “As a
natural idiom of the spirit, paradoxical language stands in strong contrast to logical discourse,
which seeks to eliminate the paradox entirely, and in doing so becomes in Hamann’s eyes merely
empty discourse” (90). In Socratic Memorabilia (in which it must be recalled how Hamann used
Socrates to discredit the rationalists of his day), Hamann points out that “even the Greeks
accepted the paradox as a matter of course when they spoke of the gods, and that it was only the
rationalists among them who rejected it” (90-1). Hamann believes that the paradoxical nature of
Christ as the God-Man is seen in the fact that He reveals Himself to us in the strangest way
possible, a way which defies human reason. He writes:
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What man would, like the Apostle Paul, venture to speak of the foolishness of God, of the
weakness of God. None but the Spirit which searches the deep things of God would have
disclosed this prophesy to us, the fulfillment of which is evident in our own day more
than ever: that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called
to the Kingdom of Heaven, and that God willed to reveal His wisdom and power in that
he chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, that he chose the weak
things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, that he chose what is low
and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to naught those things that
are…(Hamann, qtd. in O’Flaherty 90).
It appears that to Hamann, the Paradox defies human understanding; it can only be
believed upon rather than reasoned to. Revelation in Christ is cast in the form of a paradox
(157). Craig Hinkson notes that Erwin Metzke, the Hamann scholar, elicits a few phrases
Hamann uses to describe God (6). “He is the ‘hidden,’ ‘invisible’ one, the ‘incomprehensible’
one, ‘the great and unknown’ ‘God’…. There is an ‘infinite misrelationship of man to
God’….God is the ‘transcending’ and ‘annihilating of all human concepts’” (qtd. in Hinkson 67). The Paradox then does not directly appeal to man’s reason, for paradox by its very definition
implies illogicality. Kierkegaard, heavily impressed by Hamann’s views of reason as being
inferior to faith, appears affected by Hamann’s idea of the paradoxical nature of faith. In a
journal entry (referred to earlier) from 1849, Kierkegaard makes mention of Hamann’s statement
“Just as ‘law’ abrogates ‘grace,’ so ‘to comprehend’ abrogates ‘to have faith’ (Kierkegaard,
Journals and Papers Vol.2 205). Kierkegaard remarks that this very idea is his thesis, and what
he has struggled to show is “to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended” (205).
Now, just as Hamann realized that the enlightened thinkers of his day would do away
with the paradox, so Kierkegaard found himself defending the paradox against the likes of
Idealism represented in his day by the Hegelians. “Kierkegaard contends that the Hegelian
thinkers wanted to dissolve the paradox by saying that viewed eternally it was not a paradox”
(Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 112). Perhaps this is one reason Kierkegaard stresses the
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paradox throughout his writings and especially in Philosophical Fragments. Another reason
would evidently be found in his contention that many throughout Christendom had forgotten
what it meant to exist in Christianity. “It seems indubitable, then, that the point of talking about
the Paradox in the Fragments is that it is an answer to the question which was Kierkegaard’s
great question, namely, ‘What does it mean for me to become a Christian?’” (111).
Kierkegaard’s own treatment of the God-Man as the paradox appears to have been influenced by
Hamann. For example, after making mention of Hamann in Philosophical Fragments, Climacus
writes that the paradox is “the originator who hands over all the splendor to understanding”
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 53). The divine Paradox gives us the ability, or inability,
to reason in the first place. Having seen the basics of how the concept of paradox plays an
important role in both Kierkegaard’s writings and Hamann’s, it is necessary to deal with the idea
from the standpoint of the God-Man as the offense, through which we gain greater insight into
indirect communication.
The God-Man and Indirect Communication: The Sign of Offense
In the first part of chapter four, this researcher coined the phrase “the Communication of
Condescension” to describe how God, through the person of Christ, communicates with us. The
term is meant to imply that Christ, through his condescension, not only communicates with
mankind in the ultimate way, but is the very meaning, the definitive structure of communication
itself. As the Word, He is communication. In order to properly understand Kierkegaard’s model
of indirect communication, we must examine his concept of the God-Man.
With the publication of Training in Christianity in 1850, Kierkegaard began his
campaign against official Christendom (Kirmmse 379). Training marks the beginning of the
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movement in which he “no longer takes time to discourse in detail upon ethics or Christian love
or the psychology of the individual but moves steadily into an increasingly open posture of
conflict with the established Church and the Golden Age notion of Christian culture” (379). In
the outline on the contents page of the book, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the purpose of
Training is partly “for revival and increase of inwardness” and a “biblical exposition”.
Specifically, it sets forth the requirements of Christianity, as noted by Kierkegaard in the editor’s
preface. “Yet indeed the requirement ought to be uttered, plainly set forth, and heard”
(Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 7). To Kierkegaard, people should be aware of the
rigorous requirements of Christianity, regardless of whether or not they chose to accept them.
One thing was certain: these requirements were not be upheld by the established Order. Thus, it
has been written that Training was “a sort of time bomb that could only be diffused with an
‘admission’ or ‘confession’ …that the religion preached officially in Denmark was a
domesticated, mild form of ‘the Christianity of the New Testament’” (Kirmmse 380). In
Training Kierkegaard deals with such concepts as: Christianity as the Absolute, the suffering of
Christ, absolute paradox, the sign of offense, Christ’s use of indirect communication, and His
desire to draw all unto Himself.
Technically, Training is written by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, with Kierkegaard
appearing as the editor. Disagreement exists as to exactly how Anti-Climacus stands in relation
to the other pseudonymous works. In the introduction to The Sickness unto Death, Howard
Hong writes, “Obviously the pseudonym Anti-Climacus has a special relation to the pseudonym
Johannes Climacus…The prefix ‘Anti’ may be misleading, however. It does not mean ‘against.’
It is an old form of ‘ante’ (before), as in ‘anticipate,’ and ‘before’ also denotes a relation of rank,
as in ‘before me’ in the First Commandment” (Hong, qtd. in Perkins, International Kierkegaard
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Commentary: Practice in Christianity 2). The idea then would be that Anti-Climacus comes
before Johannes Climacus in the sense that he has taken the necessary step of becoming a
Christian. Some scholars, such as Robert Perkins, assert however that the pseudonym is
explicitly set against Johannes. Whatever the case, whereas, Johannes is a skeptic, AntiClimacus “looks at Christianity from an ideal, committed stance (Evans, Kierkegaard’s
Fragments and Postscript 216). Kierkegaard conceived of Anti-Climacus as an ideal character,
and therefore he was fit to address the severe errors of Christendom27. Anti-Climacus’ attack
then is actually a direct one, for since he is a Christian, he can address from within (Kierkegaard,
Journals and Papers Vol. 6 175). As Kierkegaard wrote of his new pseudonym in 1849:
Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common: but the difference
is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says himself that
he is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he regards
himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level…his portrayal of ideality can be
absolutely sound and I bow to it. I would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus,
lower than Anti-Climacus (174-75).
It is clear then, as C. Stephen Evans states, that Anti-Climacus is distinctively different
from the earlier pseudonyms and must be considered separately (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and
Postscript 6). It is important to note also that Kierkegaard chooses to communicate through
Anti-Climacus since he expresses the views that “lie at the core of Kierkegaard’s own thought”
(Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 8). By 1855, five years after the publication of
Training, Kierkegaard noticed how the situation in Christendom had become even more
dreadful. In an article published in The Fatherland that year he writes that if Training could be
written over, he would have not communicated through the pseudonym but would have done so
directly. The article gives us a glimpse of his earlier thoughts as concerns the rebellion of
Christendom against the Christianity of the New Testament.
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My earlier thought was: if the Establishment can be defended at all, this is the only way,
namely, by pronouncing a judgment upon it poetically (therefore by a pseudonym), thus
drawing upon “grace” raised to the second power, in the sense that Christianity would not
be forgiveness for merely what is past, but by grace would be a sort of dispensation from
following Christ in the proper sense and from the effort properly connected with being a
Christian. In that way truth would enter into the Establishment after all: it defends itself
by condemning itself; it acknowledges the Christian requirement, makes for its own part
an admission of its distance from the requirement and that it is not even an effort in the
direction of coming closer to it, but has recourse for grace “also with respect to the use
one makes of grace” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 54).
Now that we have a proper understanding of how Kierkegaard viewed Christendom in his
day, we turn to his concept of the God-Man and His communication with us through his
condescension.
In Training, Kierkegaard places emphasis upon Christ as a stumbling-block28 and the
sign of offense.29 To those who refuse to accept Him, he is also viewed as “the sign of
contradiction.”30 It is precisely the embodiment of indirectness that Christ is a sign. Signs
convey meaning to us, but only if we understand their meanings. Kierkegaard writes that “a sign
is a sign only for one who knows that it is a sign, and in the strictest sense only for one who
knows what it signifies” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 124). To Kierkegaard, a sign is
the negation of immediacy; that is,” it is not the immediate thing it is” (124). “A nautical mark is
a sign. Immediately it is a post, a light, or some such thing, but a sign it is not immediately, that
it is a sign is something different from what it immediately is” (124). I may recognize something
to be a sign. But to Kierkegaard, the very fact that I recognize it as such means that the sign
signifies something. This means that the sign is indeed something else than that which it is
immediately (124). A sign of contradiction is that which “draws attention to itself, and then,
when attention is fixed upon it, shows that it contains a contradiction” (125). It is the greatest
contradiction, “the highest, the qualitative contradiction,” to be both God and an individual man
(125). Christ is therefore the sign of contradiction, since He as a man, claims to be God.
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“Immediately He is an individual man, just like other men, a lowly, insignificant man; but the
contradiction is that He is God” (125). Kierkegaard uses a variety of terms to describe the GodMan: the sign of offense, the Absolute Paradox, the absurd. C. Stephen Evans writes, “Christian
faith is faith in the incarnation, the fact of the God-man, which he [Kierkegaard] sees as the
“Absolute Paradox.” The paradox is called the absurd, and brings with itself the possibility
offense” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 118). It is imperative to understand here that
the God-Man as the Paradox is viewed as being absurd by human reason. “Instead of the
paradox being the absurd, it is the understanding that is the absurd or has been made the absurd
by the paradox” (Walsh 36). In Philosophical Fragments, Climacus tells us that human
understanding alone cannot fathom the paradox. He poses the question: is a paradox such as this
conceivable? (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 47). Climacus goes on to say:
The understanding certainly cannot think it, cannot hit upon it on its own, and if it is
proclaimed, the understanding cannot understand it and merely detects that it will likely
be its downfall. To that extent, the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, on
the other hand, in its paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will its own
downfall. But the paradox, too, wills this downfall of the understanding, and thus the two
have a mutual understanding, but this understanding is present only in the moment of
passion (47).
In other words, reason cannot understand the paradox and therefore takes offense at it.
The “mutual understanding” of which Kierkegaard speaks takes place when the paradox wills the
downfall of human reason in the moment the learner accepts the paradox in faith as Truth. Here
one sees how faith reaches beyond reason in matters pertaining to Christianity, since depraved
reason is unable lead one to true faith in Christ. This is in fact, to reiterate once again, Hamann’s
main point: faith is different from reason, and therefore the primacy must be placed upon belief
(Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 57). Howard Hong points out that to Kierkegaard, the sphere
of knowledge and the sphere of faith are qualitatively different (Journals and Papers Vol.2 845).
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This idea is one of which Hamann would doubtless approve. In a letter to Jacobi, Hamann says
that he expects nothing from reason “but the recognition of error, and I do not regard it as a way
to true life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 248). Hamann says, “Without the word—no reason, no
world” (248). While he is referring in this passage to language, the term ‘word’ could easily take
on a double meaning. That is, without the Word, God as the Creator of all communication and
who Himself is the ultimate Paradox, human reason would not have the possibility of existence.
The Absolute Paradox of which Kierkegaard speaks appears as a contradiction.
According to Evans, Kierkegaard is not referring to what we would think of today as a logical
contradiction (120). Rather, he suggests that “contradiction” can best be thought of as
“incongruous” (120). Certainly, to the unbeliever, both Christ and His teachings must be absurd,
since they require and demand faith, the character of which offends human reason (Thomas,
“Christianity as Absurd” 58).
Incognito and Indirectness: The Form of a Servant
Christ’s indirectness is also seen in his incognito, or what Kierkegaard terms his
“unrecognizableness.” He writes: “What is unrecognizableness? It means not to appear in one’s
proper role, as, for example, when a policeman appears in plain clothes. And so
unrecognizableness, the absolute unrecognizableness, is this: being God, to be also an individual
man. To be an individual man…is the greatest possible, the infinitely qualitative, remove from
being God, and therefore the profoundest incognito” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 127).
Kierkegaard is not saying that God has not revealed Himself to us, but rather that God veils
Himself by revealing Himself through the person of Christ in the appearance of a man. To
appear in this way is Christ’s “almightily maintained incognito” and His will “His free
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determination” (131). This is evident in that Christ took on the form of a servant to become man.
Philippians 2:7 says, “But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a
servant, and was made in the likeness of men” (NKJV). To Kierkegaard, Christ appears in this
fashion because He must be the object of faith (137). Hamann himself makes mention of Christ
as a servant on many occasions. In his Aesthetics in a Nutshell, Hamann writes that the first sign
by which Jesus reveals His majesty is “in his form of a servant” (Haynes ed. 87). And again he
writes, “How God the Son lowered Himself! He became a man, the least among men; he took on
the form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us” (qtd. in
Smith, J.G. Hamann 66). Hamann also recognizes that Christ did so in order to reveal to
mankind the mysteries of the godhead “in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own
ways” (66).
If it was immediately and directly recognizable that Christ was God, no faith in Him
would be required. To Kierkegaard, Christ binds Himself to His incognito, he wills to be the
offense and the sign of contradiction in order to save men. “It was Christ’s free will and
determination from all eternity to be incognito” (128). In another passage from Training,
Kierkegaard writes, “It is a strange sort of dialectic: that He who almightily…binds himself, and
does it so almightily that He actually feels Himself bound, suffers under the consequences of the
fact that He lovingly and freely determined to become an individual man—to such a degree was
it seriously true that He became a real man; but thus it must be if He were to become the sign of
contradiction which reveals the thoughts of the hearts” (131). So Christ binds Himself to His
almighty incognito to the point where it is not directly observable or knowable that He is God.
To Kierkegaard, Christ does this so as to be the object of faith, whereby man is then faced with a
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choice of whether to believe or be offended at Christ. This is one of the points Kierkegaard
believed established Christendom failed to recognize. He writes:
But they confuse the Christian conceptions in every way. They make Christ a speculative
unity of God and man; or they throw Christ away all together and take His teaching; or
for sheer seriousness they make Christ a false god. Spirit is the negation of direct
immediacy. If Christ is very God, He must be unrecognizable, He must assume
unrecognizableness, which is the negation of all directness. Direct recognizableness is
precisely the characteristic of the pagan god (135).
To Kierkegaard, Christ wills to be the essence of indirectness because He is the object of faith.
“He requires faith, requires that He become the object of faith” (142). Because Christ requires
faith in Him, He wants all to believe in Him, and therefore He cannot be directly recognizable.
No matter how much we as human beings want Christ to be directly recognizable, He must
remain unrecognizable in order to be the object of faith. By being the object of faith, He shows
that human reason has its limits. Kierkegaard writes,
But now in the case of the God-Man! The true God cannot become directly
recognizable; but direct recognizableness is what the merely human, what the men to
whom He came, would pray and implore of Him as the greatest alleviation. And it was
out of love He became man! He is love; and yet every instant He exists He must crucify
as it were all human compassion and solicitude—for He can only be the object of faith
(Training in Christianity 137).
Christ’s unrecognizableness is inexplicably connected to His indirect communication
with us, and these two concepts are an offense to reason, they pose the question as to whether or
not the learner will receive His communication. To want God to appear in a recognizable
fashion is to elevate human reason to its highest peak. However, faith in God defies human
reason, and therein stems the fact that Christ is the object of offense. Kierkegaard writes that
Christ “was very God, and therefore to such a degree God that He was unrecognizable, so that it
was not flesh and blood, but the exact opposite of flesh and blood which prompted Peter to
recognize Him” (128). Rather than appeal to our reason, Christ demands faith for belief in God.
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There exists “a yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man” (139). In
Training, Kierkegaard refers to the cause of this gulf as the possibility of offense, while at other
times he refers to this divide as caused by sin. God’s perfect divinity is the “infinite qualitative
distinction” between God and man. Since man’s reasoning capabilities are flawed by sin, he
cannot reason to God. Only faith can reach across the “yawning gulf” and bridge the divide
between God and man. God is accessible, but only through faith. Here, one can hear echoes of
Hamann, for he specifically denounced human reason and its inabilities.
Offense can be defined as “a temptation in the sense of trial which might deter one from
faith” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol. 2 632). To Kierkegaard, every paradox of faith is a stumblingblock to our understanding, but the greatest offense is the incognito of the God-Man (632). It is
likely that Kierkegaard was affected by reading Hamann’s approach to reason’s offense at the
God-Man. What Hamann has to say in this area sounds almost Kierkegaardian in nature. He
writes in his Biblical Reflections:
This is one of the countless contradictions in our nature which we cannot solve. Reason
is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him. It does
not wish to know Him—and what is even more astonishing, when it does know him it
ceases to serve him. This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for he
knows that the knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offense to man, that he is
foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and
make himself known to him. When Jesus said that he was the Son of God, thus
disclosing the most comforting, important and new truth, the Jews lifted stones, rent their
garments, and condemned him as a malefactor (Smith, J.G. Hamann 136-37).
To Kierkegaard, everyone must pass through the offense and there can only be two
results: either an individual is offended and remains in sin, or one accepts Him. “The possibility
of the offence is not to be avoided, thou must pass through it, and thou canst be saved from it in
one way only—by believing” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 100).

For our purposes,
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we will examine two distinct types of offense through which we as humans view Christ, his life,
and his communication with us.
The first type of offense we examine here has to do with Christ’s loftiness (Kierkegaard,
Training in Christianity 87). Here, “the possibility of offense is the fact of being an individual
man, a lowly man—and then acting in a way suggestive of God” (99). Niels Jørgen Cappelørn
dubs this type of offense the first stage of offense proper. He writes, “…this first stage appears
when human beings understand Christ to be a completely ordinary person who lacks means and
whose low status is well known, and yet claims to be God. Here, the designation “human” or
“man” in “God-man” is taken for granted, and offense arises because of the category “God”
(Cappelørn 113). The believer is not immune from being offended of God in this sense. Rather,
“In reality, offense is possible anytime. For the believer, it can break out at any moment”
(Cappelørn 113). Kierkegaard points to Matthew 11:6, which he parallels with Luke 7:23, as
examples of offense at Christ’s communication.31 Kierkegaard relates the story of how an
imprisoned John the Baptist sent messengers to Christ to ask whether or not He was the promised
Savior.32 Christ only answers: “Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see;
The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the
dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them. And blessed is he, whosoever
is not offended in me” (NKJV). Christ does not directly answer John’s question. Kierkegaard
writes:
So Jesus does not answer directly. He does not say, Tell John that I am the Expected
One. That is, He requires faith, and therefore to an absent person cannot make a direct
communication. To a person who was present He might well say it directly, because a
person on the spot, beholding the speaker, this individual man , and because of the
contradiction involved in His appearance, would not in fact receive a direct
communication, inasmuch as the contradiction intervenes between what is said and what
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is seen, viz. what the speaker is, judging by appearances (Kierkegaard, Training in
Christianity 96).
Kierkegaard’s point here is that Christ did not answer in a straightforward manner
because it was not directly obvious to the human eye that Christ was indeed who He said He was
(97). The offense, to reiterate, takes place in this instance when an individual perceives that
Christ equates Himself with God (His loftiness). Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym AntiClimacus, dwells on Christ’s miracles and teachings, which are usually taken as proofs of
Christianity (Cappelørn 113). John certainly understood by Christ’s answer that He was God,
but are Christ’s miracles proof that Christianity is Truth? Christ’s concluding sentence to John,
“blessed is he who is not offended in me,” Kierkegaard takes as a “decisive expression: Christ
invokes these proofs, but in the same breath, he rejects the idea that they can serve as the basis
for establishing a true relationship with Him” (Cappelørn 113). However, the whole aim of
apologetics is to want to communicate and prove Christ’s validity. Kierkegaard writes, “But
behold how different is the custom in Christendom! There they have written these huge folios
which develop the proofs of the truth of Christianity. Behind these proofs and folios they feel
perfectly confident and secure from every attack; for the proofs and the folios regularly with the
assurance, ergo Christ was what he said He was” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 98).
However, to attempt to prove what Christ demands we take upon faith is to do a disservice to
Him. For He says, “Blessed is He who is not offended in me.” Kierkegaard writes, “That is, He
makes evident that in relation to Him there can be no question of any proofs, that a man does not
come to Him by the help of proofs, that there is no direct transition to this thing of becoming a
Christian, that at the most the proofs might serve to make a man attentive, so that once he has
become attentive he may arrive at the point of deciding whether he will believe or be offended”
(Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 98).
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Proofs cannot lead a man to faith in Christ. The only way to come to faith in Christ is to
believe. Hamann stands with Kierkegaard on this point. In a letter to Jacobi in the winter of
1786, Hamann wrote, “For if it is fools who say in their heart, There is no God, those who try to
prove his existence seems to me to be even more foolish. If that is what reason and philosophy
are, then it is scarcely a sin to blaspheme it” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 253). In his Biblical
Reflections Hamann writes, “it is the greatest contradiction and abuse of reason when reason
itself tries to reveal” (119). To Hamann the fact that Christ is God is the communicatio
idiomatum, the “interchange of properties” to which we made reference earlier. The
“communication of idioms” finds its origin in Luther’s “The Word Made Flesh” (Haynes 99f).
This can also be seen as a dialectical statement; for something that is the Word, is also something
that is the Flesh. How can we as human beings offer proofs on how such a divine act is
possible? It supersedes our reason, so that we can only make two choices, as Kierkegaard would
point out: either believe or reject Christ. In his work Philological ideas and doubts, Hamann
writes that “Nothing could be more ridiculous than to conduct a proof that is the contrary of a
truth that has been not firmly proven” (Haynes, ed. 119). Hamann writes in Socratic
Memorabilia, “Our own being and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and
cannot be established in any other way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181). A few sentences later he
expounds on this statement. “What one believes has for that reason no need to be proved, and a
proposition can be irrefutably proved without for that reason being believed” (182). To Hamann,
to want to prove something is to do so strictly by the aid of reason. If it could be proven that
Christ was the God-Man then belief in him would not be required. To want to prove this matter
is to turn Christ’s indirect communication into direct communication, doing away with the
necessity of belief. This does not mean that God can only be speculated of or is somehow a
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theory. Rather, quite the opposite is the case. He is nevertheless the Truth, but He is Truth
which must be believed. “Flesh and blood are hypotheses,” writes Hamann. “The Spirit is truth”
(qtd. in Smith, J.G. Hamann 54-5). According to Ronald Gregor Smith, Hamann would seek to
show that “truth is not to be measured by human opinions, or taste, or probability” (54). Hamann
writes, “Lies and novels, hypothesis and fables, must be probable; but not the truths and basic
teachings of our faith” (qtd. in Smith 54). It is this statement that Kierkegaard would uphold in
making his claim on the indirectness of faith. The Truth comes only through faith, despite the
desire of human reason to prove that which can only be believed. Thus Hamann and
Kierkegaard stand in agreement that rather than being proved, Christianity must be believed,
with Christ as the object of faith. Kierkegaard makes clear that proofs such a miracles can only
aid the receiver to become attentive of the Absolute Paradox (Kierkegaard, Training in
Christianity 98). The cause of this offense, to reiterate again, is in this sense that a man equates
Himself with God. To Kierkegaard, one who is offended in this situation may say ‘An individual
man like us wants to be God’(105), and therein lies the offense.
The second form of offense in Training has to do with Christ’s lowliness. Here, one is
offended by the fact that God is man, or that “the one who gives Himself out to be God shows
Himself to be the poor and suffering and at last the impotent man” (Kierkegaard, Training in
Christianity 105).

In His lowliness, Christ suffers (106). In His lowliness Christ communicates

to us that He is actually God. To question this is to take offense. Christ’s lowliness is seen in
the fact that He is poor and must suffer. One takes offense at these qualities because Christ is
God. Our reason might be inclined to say that He should not have to suffer in this way, or that
He should be rich rather than lowly. However, once again Kierkegaard writes that Christ must
be the object of faith. It is His divine will to be so.
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Revelation as Communication: God’s Own Speaking
Throughout this thesis I have shown how Hamann was enamored by the spoken and
written word. He also places primacy upon language, which is given to man by God and used by
Him to communicate with us. To Hamann, God’s speech with us is seen throughout nature and
through the Word, both written and embodied in the form of Christ. God’s veiled revelation to
us in the person of Christ is to Hamann the most mysterious of all paradoxes. Ronald Gregor
Smith writes that Hamann is adamant that Christ’s condescension is not meant merely “to attract
our attention or engage our admiration. But it is the necessary mode of God’s speech with us”
(J.G. Hamann 66). Hamann rejoices in the fact that the God-Man would condescend to our level
and communicate with us. Kierkegaard, in a journal entry from 1839, shows how affected he
was by Hamann’s conception of the God-Man. He writes:
Precisely because there is such a thing, one must say that the God-man idea is not merely
an object of cognition but is also an edifying or up-building thought which disperses all
dissatisfaction with the world, rectifies every mistake, a thought which steps forth
consolingly when even the great in the world seem so petty, when the mind is alarmed
over how the insignificant in the world can still get their rights, too (Kierkegaard,
Journals and Papers Vol.2 201).
That Christ indirectly communicates with us as one seemingly insignificant is an astounding
paradox.
Kierkegaard makes further use of his communication model to describe Christ’s
indirectness through His own speaking. Parabolic communication, which Christ uses quite often
in Scripture, is an example of indirect communication. However, Christ’s indirectness can be
seen through all that he says. For example, in Training Kierkegaard uses the example of the
statement “I and the Father are One” to express Christ’s indirectness. The fact that Christ
expresses He is God is indeed a direct statement. However, when Christ makes this statement,
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He who is Himself the essence of indirectness, the statement is communicated indirectly.
Kierkegaard writes:
When one says directly, ‘I am God; the Father and I are one,’ that is direct
communication. But when he who says it is an individual man, quite like other men, then
this communication is not just perfectly direct; for it is not just perfectly clear and direct
that an individual man should be God—although what he says is perfectly direct. By
reason of the communicator the communication contains a contradiction, it becomes
indirect communication, it puts to thee a choice, whether thou wilt believe Him or not
(134).
In a journal entry from 1850, Kierkegaard deals with indirect communication. He also
acknowledges that he has begun to doubt whether or not he, as a mere human being, had the right
to use indirect communication.
It is not true that direct communication is superior to indirect communication. No, no.
But the fact is that no man has ever been born who could use the indirect method even
fairly well, to say nothing of using it all his life. For we human beings need each other,
and in that there is already a directness. Only the God-Man is in every respect indirect
communication from first to last. He did not need men, but they infinitely needed him;
he loves men, but according to his conception of what love is; therefore, he does not
change in the slightest toward their conception, does not speak directly in such a way that
he also surrenders the possibility of offense—which is his existence in the guise of a
servant (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 384).
Another journal entry from two years earlier gives us another example of how the God-Man
embodies indirect communication and how indirectness can be used in Christianity.
Unqualified indirect communication belongs to being more than human, and no man,
therefore, has the right to use it. The God-man cannot do otherwise, because he is
qualitatively different from man. In paganism it is demonic, but this has no place in
Christendom. In paganism, therefore, the abstract indirect method could certainly be
used, for the possibility of offense was not present. And also thus in relation to
Christendom (which is very far from being purely Christian, but is closer to paganism) [it
may be used] by one who has not unconditionally stepped forth as personally being
Christian in the decisive sense. For where the proportions are such as these, offense
cannot become more than a kind of awakening (383).
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Christ’s indirectness represents problems for our understanding of communication both
verbally and conceptually. Even Christ’s claim in John 8:32, “And ye shall know the truth and
the truth shall set you free” is certainly uttered directly, but when Christ utters it, it becomes
indirectness. What truth? Whose truth? Christ’s truth. The Absolute Truth. But how shall we
know it? By our cognitive abilities? No, we have already seen how human reason cannot reason
the things of God. We know this truth indirectly because of faith. The truth can only be
understood indirectly, since it is communicated indirectly.
Christ at all moments binds himself to his incognito (Training in Christianity 131), so that
He must communicate indirectly. To Kierkegaard, He can do no other, since He must be the
object of faith. The fact that He is the object of faith is an offense to reason. However, if Christ
communicated directly, He would then cease to be the object of faith (140). So, He equates
Himself with God, but it cannot be proven that He is God, for He appears on earth as an
individual man. To attempt to prove Christ is God is to do so by human reason, a reasoning
ability which is fallen and sinful. But Christ would dispel all human reason by offering the
existing individual faith. Christ’s indirect communication with us is an attempt to draw us to
Him in faith. It is one central point in which Hamann and Kierkegaard stand together. Primacy
is placed upon faith as the highest mode of existence. We receive this faith through indirect
communication.
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Chapter Five: Results
Results are of crucial importance to the historical-critical study. This project has yielded
several findings which can prove beneficial to the field of communication. Specifically, I have
attempted to deal with communication from a Christian perspective, and this study has produced
findings in that area as well. The following results come after presenting this research in light of
Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication, and understanding this content from an
historical-critical point of view.
First of all, the results of this study show that language has primacy over reason. This
has sweeping ramifications for our conception of communication. Hamann’s thesis, that
language has primacy over reason, means that we communicate through language and not solely
through our ability to reason. That is, reason cannot communicate without language (whether it
be spoken, written, or communicated through symbols) as its guide. In presenting Hamann’s
language theory as one based on communication, this research clears the way for the possibility
of further study in this area.
Secondly, Kierkegaard’s view of the press allows for an historical and critical look at the
media, which can easily be applied to the way the media operates in our own time. I have shown
how Kierkegaard’s criticism of the media is worthy of study, although it typically receives scant
attention at best. Kierkegaard’s belief, that the media had the power to destroy individuality
while creating a mass public, amounts to a serious look at mass media. This researcher has also
found that Kierkegaard’s battle with the press greatly affected his theory of indirect
communication.
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Thirdly, this study has resulted in the application of the Scriptural idea of God as the
Divine Logos to communication. To Hamann, God as the Logos is the greatest form of
communication. This led to this researcher’s examination of the various ways in which God
communicates to mankind. “The Condescension of Communication,” a term which has been
coined by this researcher, has resulted from the depths of this research as well. Kierkegaard’s
conception of the God-Man as indirect communication has implications far beyond that which
this researcher could previously imagine. This researcher was surprised to find the importance
of this concept to Kierkegaard’s model. As a result, Kierkegaard’s presentation of Christ as the
essence of indirectness perfected has implications for how communication is typically viewed as
well.
This research has shown several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be influenced by
Hamann in the area of indirect communication. My findings show that Kierkegaard and Hamann
share a certain understanding of the importance of parabolic communication as a form of
indirectness. They both see that parables are a significant mode of indirect communication in
that parables relate to us a moral or truth in an indirect manner. Parables are analogical in nature,
and cause us to see things differently than simply by “discursive thinking” (O’Flaherty, J.G.
Hamann 87). Another way Kierkegaard was influenced by Hamann is in the area of humor.
Kierkegaard placed humor in a high position between the ethical and the religious spheres, and
this is likely due to the impact Hamann made upon him as a humorist. Ultimately, humor is a
communicative tool that plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s model of indirect
communication.
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A connection also exists between Hamann and Kierkegaard (as mentioned in the first part
of Chapter Four), in the area of language. Language is a powerful tool given by God, and plays
an important role in the communicative processes of writing and speaking.
This study has also found a link between Hamann and Kierkegaard which goes beyond
simply the fact that they shared an understanding of certain concepts. This link is understood
only after researching Kierkegaard and Hamann in their historical contexts and understanding
how they combated certain thinkers. This thesis set out to examine the influence of Hamann on
Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. One link is found in Socrates, whom both
thinkers admired. The importance of Socratic ignorance to both Hamann and Kierkegaard
cannot be downplayed. My research points to the fact that Kierkegaard was affected by
Socrates’ method of indirectness, seen most clearly in the concept of the maieutic relationship
between communicator and recipient. Hamann also pays homage to Socrates. Here the link
between Socrates ad Kierkegaard appears to extend to Hamann as well, for Kierkegaard takes to
heart Hamann’s view of Socratic ignorance. This finding is backed by Kierkegaard’s mention of
Hamann’s understanding of Socrates in his journals.
Lastly, the greatest link to indirect communication between Hamann and Kierkegaard has
been found in concept of faith, inasmuch as faith leads to a personal relationship with Christ,
whereas human reason, because it is fallen in nature, is unable to do so. This research has shown
that faith is a form of indirectness to both thinkers. Hamann is concerned with existence in much
the same way as Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard himself shows in CUP faith is existencecommunication. We can understand this concept by saying that communication becomes a mode
of living, and faith a form of existence. Doubtless Hamann, who himself possessed an
extraordinary view of communication and recognized the primacy of faith, would stand in
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agreement with Kierkegaard on this point. Faith is a product of accepting Christ as the paradox
which surpasses human reason. Furthermore, Christ demands belief through his indirect relation
to us. Therein lies the necessity of indirect communication.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions
Implications
Both Kierkegaard and Hamann practiced indirect communication with excellence. On
one hand, they share a common bond of pseudonymity. While Kierkegaard writes occasionally
under his own name, Hamann writes exclusively under pseudonyms. However, Kierkegaard (to
this researcher’s knowledge) goes to much greater lengths both to explain his pseudonymity and
to allow his pseudonyms to be living, breathing characters with opinions of their own.
Hamann’s pseudonymity is a relational tool, but this researcher has found no evidence that
Hamann actually attempted to create characters for the same reasons as did Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard himself perfects this mode of indirectness to such a degree that he could stand at a
distance, allowing the pseudonyms their poetic license. To get hold of the individual, to make
him/her aware of Christianity appears to be Kierkegaard’s ultimate goal. In this researcher’s
opinion, misinterpreting Kierkegaard as an irrationalist, as one who advocated complete
subjectivity, or as the originator of existentialist doctrine, ignores a major fact. Kierkegaard
sought to make people aware of their existence by using themes with which they were familiar:
poetry, literature, ethics, and concepts like irony and humor. By presenting both the aesthetic
and the ethical positions, he shows not only how most people exist in these categories, but also
how these categories (while not all together bad) nevertheless differ from the religious and
overtly Christian mode of living. This can be compared with Hamann’s purpose throughout his
writing career, which is to dispel the notion that human reason is an all-encompassing faculty
with the ability to transcend or even regulate faith. For Hamann, rather, faith is the highest form
of existence, a claim Kierkegaard would later assert himself. However, as J. Heywood Thomas
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has pointed out, Kierkegaard cannot be seen as a mere parody upon Hamann (Thomas,
Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings 59). Heywood’s point is an important one:
Kierkegaard was influenced considerably by Hamann, but also sought out his own unique path.
Kierkegaard’s admiration of Hamann is not to be viewed as merely a “slavish imitation”
(Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 57).
Nevertheless, this research has yielded several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be
affected by the thought of Hamann. Another area Kierkegaard and Hamann share in common
when it comes to indirect communication is the influence of Socrates. We have seen in this
thesis how Socrates, through aid of the maieutic method, practiced indirect communication in a
nearly flawless manner. Both Hamann and Kierkegaard respected Socrates and speak of him
with reverence. However, they both differed from Socrates in that Socrates would hold that the
learner possessed the truth in some form and all that the teacher had to do through
communication was bring that truth to life. Hamann and Kierkegaard on the other hand, focus
on man’s depravity and inability to attain truth without the power of God. Nevertheless, Both
Kierkegaard and Hamann owe tremendous debts to Socrates.
Perhaps the greatest connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann has to do with faith.
Hamann would say that faith is not an operation of reason, as we have seen. Kierkegaard would
stand in agreement with this statement, adding one fact. Man is separated from God by sin.
Hence, there is a divide between man and God that man cannot reach by any capability of
reason. Only faith can bridge the gap between God and man.
Kierkegaard’s conception of both faith and communication are expanded when one takes
into account the concept of existence. In CUP, Kierkegaard refers to the fact that faith is

149

existence-communication (358). In other passages, this researcher has seen that Kierkegaard
actually refers occasionally to communication as a form of existence. This is a striking
conclusion, since he also places such emphasis on existence. The highest form of existence for
the individual is living a life of faith as a follower of Christ. So, it appears that when
Kierkegaard refers to faith as existence-communication, he is saying that faith is the highest form
of existence which can be communicated. However, it is also imperative that the one
communicating Truth be viewed as a subject and understand his subjective relation to the Truth.
This means that the one communicating the Truth has personally appropriated it to his/her life.
This is not complete subjectivity as many would claim. Rather than taking the Truth for the
purpose of drawing one’s fanatical conclusions of it, subjectivity to Kierkegaard means that the
individual personally appropriates himself to the Truth in relation to God. The individual stands
only before God in his/her relationship with Him. All men who wish to become Christians must
ponder their existence, for sin has affected man’s very existence. Kierkegaard’s authorship
shows how the highest form of existence, faith in Christ, is possible.
This researcher has attempted to show that Hamann had a tremendous influence upon
Kierkegaard and specifically point out how Kierkegaard’s communication model is valid to the
field of communication. Having dealt with the affair of The Corsair, I have dealt with
Kierkegaard’s relation to the media and also proposed that his own model differs vastly from
many others in the fact that it is overtly Christian. It deals with how we communicate knowledge
and how we communicate Truths which transcend reason. Lastly, as faith is existencecommunication, Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication is not a model by which we
simply assess communication, but is a model by which we should seek to live. In this thesis we
have understood that God is the highest form of communication and that the highest form of
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existence is that of personally being a Christian. As Christians, our communication is to differ
dramatically from the rest of the world. Scripture gives the model for communication in the
person of Christ, who in indirectly relates himself to us, who loves us, and who lives His life to
die for us.
Suggestions for Further Research
Further research certainly remains to be done in this area. However, Hamann’s writings
are still very obscure, and it remains difficult to find very solid interpretations of his work. This
could pose a hindrance to further research concerning Hamann. One must then deal with the fact
that Hamann is difficult to interpret. However, Hamann has much to say about communication,
and I have attempted to, in effect, clear the path for further exploration of his thought from the
standpoint of communication. In an age in which our communications get faster and faster, one
could examine Hamann’s statements concerning reason and correlate them accordingly. For if
Hamann was so against the enlightened thinkers of his day, what would he think of science,
scholarship, and mass communications in our own? We could ask nearly the same question of
Kierkegaard as well. He who battled with the media so much in his day, who attacked it, viewed
it with scorn, and was a severe critic of the media—how would he view the media and their
claim of objectivity today? How would he view the movements we have made in all forms of
communication away from Christian principles? Kierkegaard research continues to grow
considerably. However, his communications model has not been successfully integrated into the
communication field and his theories have been widely ignored, as I have shown. However,
faith as existence-communication is one of the most arresting thoughts which could be explained
and appropriated to Christian communication. This researcher has attempted to guard against
interpreting Kierkegaard and Hamann from a postmodernist point of view, for it appears that
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would neither thinker justice and would only succeed in taking enormous liberties with their
thoughts. Therefore, any discussion of Hamann and/or Kierkegaard in the future, should take
this to heart, should seek to interpret each man from a theological or religious point of view. It is
God which dominates both men’s thoughts. Therefore, any research in the field of
communication must take Christianity into consideration and seek to incorporate each writer’s
major themes into the research.
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Notes
1. In his work Golgotha and Sheblimini (1784), Hamann appears under the pseudonymous
writer who describes himself on the title page as a “Preacher in the Wilderness” (Haynes ed.
164).
2. Terrence J. German explains in the Preface of his Hamann on Language and Religion that
Hamann was frequently called the “Magus” or “Wizard of the North” “because his works
appear to be enigmatic and perhaps unclear” (vii).
3. Hamann’s conversion experience is laid out in full by Ronald Gregor Smith in J.G. Hamann
which serves as a mini-biography on Hamann. It also serves a great purpose by presenting
excerpts of many of Hamann’s best-known works. See also James O’Flaherty’s Johann
Georg Hamann for further research into Hamann’s conversion.
4. For a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s critique of Kant, see Jerry H. Gill’s “Kantianism” in
Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 6: Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. Copenhagen: C.A.
Reitzels Forlag, 1982, and Ronald M. Green’s “Kant: A Debt both Obscure and Enormous,”
Stewart, Jon, ed. Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: Tome I: Philosophy.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007.
5. 1 Corinthians 1:21: “For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not
God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe,” (KJV).
6. John 14:6: “Jesus saith unto him, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto
the Father but by me,” (KJV).
7. Revelation 21:5: “And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new. And
he said unto me, Write; for these words are true and faithful,” (KJV).
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8. 1 Corinthians 1:23: “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and
unto the Greeks foolishness.”
1 Peter 2:7-8: “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are
disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner,
And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them who stumble at the word,
being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed.”
9. Hamann died on June 21, 1788. The inscription on his tombstone is 1 Corinthians 1:23, 25.
Verse 25 reads: “Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God
is stronger than men.” The story is recounted in James O’Flaherty’s Johann Georg Hamann
(1979) pp. 29.
10. Ecclesiastes 12:13: “Let us hear the conclusion on the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his
commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.” Hamann makes reference to the verse at
the conclusion of Aesthetica in Nuce, directly before making mention of Revelation 14:7. He
writes: “Let us now hear the conclusion of his newest aesthetic, which is the oldest: ‘Fear
God, and give the glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come: and worship him that
made the heaven, and earth, and the sea, and the fountain of waters!’”
11. Diem refutes and quotes So H. Höffding, S. Kierkegaard als Philosoph, 1922, pp. 74ff.
Höffding says that Kierkegaard “sought truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere,” and
that he “made it an object of personal feeling.”
12. Peder Ludvig Møller (1814-1865) the Danish writer and critic, was the “effectual editor” of
the Corsair. Møller was secretly involved with the paper, writing for it anonymously.
13. Here, the Hongs, in their introduction, quote Paul Rubow’s Goldschmidt og Nemesis, pg.
118.
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14. The Corsair had praised one of the pseudonyms, Victor Eremita of Either/Or, claiming him
to be immortal to literature. Kierkegaard replied directly to the paper under the guise of the
pseudonym: “…cut short these sufferings—slay me, but render me not immortal.” Walter
Lowrie deals with this account at length in his two-volume biography on Kierkegaard.
15. Møller writes concerning the section ‘Guilty!’/’Not Guilty?’: “He does not care about the
reader, for he writes for his own comfort; he is not concerned about being known as a classic
author, for he writes without form. He moves about in the language as an English clown,
walking on his hands and turning somersaults in it, but he has no style, for he uses
superfluous words and says everything that comes to his head,” (Hong, ed., 100).
16. See, for instance: Smith, Ronald Gregor. “Hamann and Kierkegaard.” Kierkegaardiana.
Vol. 5.4 (1962-1964), 53-67. Smith believes that Kierkegaard moved away from the
teachings of Hamann, and incorrectly posits that Kierkegaard ended his life an antirationalist. He writes: “What I wish to maintain is that concurrently with the weakening of
Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard reached a more and more unsatisfactory
understanding of Christian existence” (54). Smith is basically alluding to the possibility that
not only did Kierkegaard cast off any Hamannian influences later in life, but also that by
doing so, Kierkegaard became disenchanted with Christianity. This viewpoint fails to take
into consideration Kierkegaard’s purpose of acting as a reformer, albeit one without
authority. It also misses the point that Kierkegaard always saw Christianity as the highest
attainable mode of existence attainable.
17. Georg Frederick Hegel (1770-1831), the German idealist philosopher of whom Kierkegaard
was severely critical. In Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, Vol.2, Howard Hong writes,
“Kierkegaard’s writings contain from the beginning a polemic against the Danish Hegelians,
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but they also constitute a reckoning with Hegel’s basic philosophic ideas. In contesting
Hegel, Kierkegaard treats him as the chief representative of the trend in the modern world
which is undermining the beliefs of Christianity” (577). Scholarship within the last few
years has emerged, however, to show what an extreme debt Kierkegaard owed Hamann. See
John Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered.
18. I Corinthians 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then, face to face; now I
know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known” (NKJV).
19. Hamann appears in Socratic Memorabilia as the pseudonymous “Lover of Boredom.” The
entire phrase as it appears on the title page is: “Collected for the Boredom of the Public by a
Lover of Boredom.” This appears to be both an attempt at humor and irony. According to
Terrence German, Hamann foresaw the possibility of his writings being grouped together
with other ‘enlightened’ works (31). Having previously been a child of enlightenment
himself, he “had spent much time in the boring pursuit of the enlightened search for
knowledge through the reading of vast amounts of material which in itself was trite” (32).
The irony in the statement appears in the sense that Hamann was actually a “lover of
creation” (32) and “most assuredly could not be a lover of the type of activity which
produces the boredom which consistently oppresses the ‘Pubic’” (32).
20. I Corinthians 2: 6-8: “Yet we do not speak wisdom among those who are mature; a wisdom,
however, not of this age nor of the rulers of this age, who are passing away; but we speak
God’s wisdom in a mystery, the hidden wisdom which God predestined before the ages to
our glory, the wisdom which none of the rulers of this age has understood; for if they had
understood it they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (NASV).
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21. Genesis 22:1-2. “And it came to pass after these things, that God did test Abraham, and said
unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold here I am. And he said, Take now thy son, thine
only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there
for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.”
Hebrews 11:17-19. “By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac; and he that
had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, Of whom it was sad, In Isaac
shall thy seed be called; Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead,
from which also he received him in a figure.”
22. Genesis 22: 11-13. “And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and said,
Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad,
neither do anything unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not
withheld thy son, thine only son from me. And Abraham lifted up him eyes, and looked, and,
behold, behind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns: and Abraham went and took the
ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son.”
23. Romans 10:17.
24. Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860).
25. H.L. Martensen (1808-1884), the “modified Hegelian” whose Moral Philosophy
encompassed Hegelian views, including that “the state is the true developmental medium of
the self” (Kirmmse 173).
26. N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). According to Kirmmse, Grundtvig was “surely the most
gigantic and protean figure of the Danish Golden Age. Poet and pastor; politician and
prophet; theologian and philologist; historian and popular educator – this titan broke all
normal boundaries in his relentless and almost unlimited productivity” (Kirmmse 198).
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27. In a journal entry from 1849 Kierkegaard wrote concerning how Anti-Climacus stands as a
judge against established Christendom:
If I have represented a person so low that he even denied being a Christian, then the
opposite also ought to be represented. And Christendom does indeed greatly need to
hear the voice of such a judge—but I will not pass myself off as the judge, and
therefore he also judges me, which is easy enough and quite appropriate, for anyone
who cannot represent ideality so high that he is judged by it himself must have a poor
understanding of it (Journals and Papers Vol. 6 178).
28. I Corinthians 1:23. “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and
unto the Gentiles foolishness” (NKJV).
29. Mark 6:3. “Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joseph, and
of Judas, and Simon? And are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him.”
I Peter 2: 7-8. “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are
disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner,
And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense, even to them who stumble at the word,
being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed” (NKJV).
30. A reference to Luke 2:34. “And Simeon blessed them, and said unto Mary, his mother,
Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel; and for a sign which
shall be spoken against” (NKJV).
31. Matthew 11:6 and Luke 7:23. “And blessed is he, whosever shall not be offended in me”
(NKJV).
32. See Matthew 11:1-5.
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